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STUDIES IN HEGEL'S

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

WITH A CHAPTER ON CHRISTIAN UNITY IN AMERICA

BY

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TO MY SONS

THAT THEY HAVE REASONABLE, HOLY, AND VITAL FAITH
AND TO MY DAUGHTER IN PARADISE.



PREFACE.

THE insisting upon knowing what there is in it, even in religion, is one of the profoundest impulses of the human spirit. Hegel tried to satisfy this demand in his Philosophie der Religion. He endeavored to discover and state the speculative idea of religion. But with him the speculative was both vital and practical—the very life of the spirit throbbing through all the tangled mass of variegated religious phenomena in the world's history.

Dr. W. T. Harris, the profoundest student of Hegel in this country, says that "no other work more deserves translation into English." But any mere translation of it would need a further translation into expository paraphrase. The inadequacy of such a translation may be tested by the reader in the first few pages of Chapter VIII.

I therefore offer some STUDIES on parts of this great work, deeming them of value, both in themselves, and in introducing readers to Hegel's own volumes.

The title STUDIES is a most elastic one, bearing on its face its own apology for not being finished literary work. It signifies studying done "out loud," after considerable silent pondering over the "what there is in it." It also allows greatest freedom for new inferences and applications suggested by the text. Hence this volume is not a mere expository paraphrase of Hegel. I have adhered to the expository form only in Chapters III and VIII. I have also followed Hegel's order of argument in Chapter IV, while freely making it the basis of studies in Apologetics. The purpose of the volume throughout is apologetic. It is written with faith and in the interests of " The Faith," though demanding an almost antipodal orientation or point of view to that of both deistic orthodoxy and ecclesiasticism. Some may blame the author for needlessly abandoning some of the current methods of apologetics. But thorough and honost proof of their faultiness and inadequacy has first been made. It is mere time-serving to manufacture evidences where there are none. It is as useless as it is wrong to attempt the "hard-Church" method of overriding reason and conscience with the mere might of an uncriticised authority. It is both anti-theistic and anti-Christian to profane the secular in the interest of the sacred. It is infidel to refuse to welcome the Light lightening every man and every institution that comes into the world. To posit an abstract Infinite, a merely supermundane

God, lands us inevitably in agnosticism. To prove the brightness of Christianity by portraying the darkness of heathenism leads to pessimism.

On the other hand, to discover the concrete Infinite immanent in, vitalizing and educating man throughout his history; to maintain the essential kinship of man with God; to insist upon religion being the mutual reconciliation and communion of God and man, makes the whole earth kin, and binds it with chains of gold to the head and heart as well as to the feet of God. This is the key and motive to the vital rationality of religion, interpreting and vindicating at their relative worth the many elements which, when put forth separately, are easily overthrown by skepticism. To acknowledge that these elements have only relative validity is the first step toward integrating them as living members in a historical manifestation of the supreme Λόγος "reconciling the world unto himself." God's revelation to man, and man's discovery of God, are but the two sides of the same divine education of the race. Neither of these sides is ever complete and final: neither of them ever lacks progressively adequate activity.

In the light of the immanence of God in the religious history of mankind, old evidences seem curiously inconclusive and unnecessary. Place has not been found in this volume for the work of resetting the old faith in the light of this fundamental

truth. But the way for this has been radically prepared. The deistic separation of God and man, or the setting them merely side by side, with only occasional and mechanically supernatural connection, has been strongly contended against, while the opposite error of a pantheistic confusing of the two has been avoided as both unspiritual and unphilosophical. That is, both a mechanical naturalism and a mechanical supernaturalism are abrogated and fulfilled in the concrete view of the Divine immanence. Otherwise the one of these two views is just as atheistic as the other.

The use and the abuse of the language of metaphor in religion have been fully considered. The relative rationality of passing interpretations and forms of religion is granted without yielding the claim of finality to any one of them. In every way religion, in the high and broad sense of vital kinship between God and man, has been vindicated as rational and necessary.

I have studied over nearly the same part of Hegel's work that Principal Caird has in his Philosophy of Religion. That is a masterpiece of rare art in translating Hegel out of the narrow, arid husk of scholastic form and prolix technicalities. I gladly recognize his volume as one far beyond my own ability to produce. It is the work of a consummate literary artist, and a powerful preacher and thinker. I rejoice to see its large and increasing circulation in

this country. I am indebted to it for leading me to a study of the original. Hegel's own work is heavy, formal, scholastic, and removed from ordinary, unscientific conceptions of the revealed mystery of the relations of God and man. But it contains the philosophical key to the heart of the matter. His whole work is to reconcile reason with religion, by finding reason in religion and religion in reason. It explicates, in the form of thought, the content of religion, which is ordinarily held in the form of feeling or metaphor, or at best in the form of faith, or abbreviated knowledge.

The last chapter, on *Christian Unity*, is obviously an *appendix*, written in view of current abstract conceptions of the Church, which hinder the realization of its visible organic unity. It is an attempt to annul this abstract conception in the more concrete historical view. It is a study that makes for truth, for faith, and for unity.

I have to thank my colleague, Prof. Charles L. Wells, for his assistance in the tabulation of the facts in regard to the early Christian ministry, in this appendix.

J. MACBRIDE STERRETT.

FARIBAULT, September 1, 1889.



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STUDIES IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

CHAPTER I.

HEGELIANISM-A PREFATORY STUDY.

HEGEL wrote his own actual posthumous biography when he said, "The condemnation which a great man lays upon the world is to force it to explain him." Scarcely had the grave closed over the chief intellectual victim of the cholera in 1831, when this sentence issued in the most wholesale acceptation, rejection, misrepresentation, criticism, vituperation, and sectarian and heretical interpretations of the Hegelian philosophy. He has been the best abused philosopher of modern times. He evidently apprehended this treatment, as he is also reported to have said of his disciples, "There is only one man living who understands me, and he does not." Certainly his reply to the smart Frenchman was very apt. He asked Hegel if he could not gather up and express his philosophy in one sentence for him. "No," he replied, "at least not in French." No one who has studied his Logic, at least, could wish it to be more brief. It is one of those books "which would be much shorter if it were not so short." The real value of all great works is not to be measured by the immediate assent they command, like commonplace solutions of great questions by ordinary men, but by the amount of study and discussion and explanation they demand in order to gain the wide sweep of view and depth of solution which they contain.

Hegel died master in the field of philosophy. He had conquered and founded an empire. His philosophy had pervaded universities, state, and church. His disciples were numerous, admiring, ardent. For ten years after his death his system remained the foremost intellectual phenomenon of the time. In the mean while, however, interpretation was succeeding faith and dismembering the parts of the organic whole of the master. Interpreters of his system have differed more than those of the Bible. From it, each—the right wing, the center, the left, and the extreme left wings-his dogma sought and each his dogma found. The comprehensive system offered various aspects, which seemed to various types of mind to be the whole system. The right wing, Goeschel, Gabler, Daub, and Erdmann, found him to be the champion of Christianity and of all social institutions, while the extreme left divested the whole system of all religious and ethical meaning, degenerating into the boldest materialism and atheism. Of this school Feuerbach is best known to us through the early translation of George Eliot. Theology was merely anthropology. Dr. Strauss is the best-known representative of the left wing, through his mythical theory of the Life of Christ. While the right wing could plainly show that Hegel had vindicated God as the subject of all philosophy, and

Christianity as the absolute and perfect religion whose influence was gradually actualizing moral order in humanity, the left wings claimed that *logically* the method made "each man his own God" (autolatry), with "a right to everything" here, as there was no hereafter. They rejected Hegel's acknowledged theistic and Christian position. But to trace these various orthodox and heretical schools of Hegelianism would be almost to write a history of modern German philosophy.

This breaking up into such opposite schools caused skepticism as to its real worth. This, however, has been the fortune of every great truth or system which has ever influenced the human race. The complete Socratist came only after numerous partial and antagonistic interpreters of Socrates. Hegelianism, indeed, is said by some to be now dead in Germany. The many diverse interpretations of it have been appealed to as a disproof of its validity. Within twenty-five years it has almost ceased to exist in Germany as a professed system, while in very truth both its spirit and method are the leaven at work in all the present philosophic thought.

In a Philosophical Verein, at Leipsic, an expression of surprise at the *studied* ignoring of Hegel only called forth a flood of bitter but irrational denunciation. Only with the greatest difficulty could one find a full set of his works in that book market of the Continent. As a *professed* system it does not reign in Germany. But it died only as the seed which grows. The day of mere discipleship is past. But philosophy owns no Pope. Names stand only for insights of human thought. Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, and Kant, have often been "outgrown,"

and yet they remain facile principes, or, as Dante describes Aristotle, "the masters of those who know"

(i maestri di color che sanno).

Hegel's own "method" has been applied to his system. At first blank being, mere all or nothing or nonsense, becoming, through all sorts of differentiating interpretations, something, many things determinate, only to be again discussed into fragments, still squirming with the life of the logical idea into other and higher representations, till now the transformed Hegel really occupies the intellectual throne as firmly as his bust the pedestal in the Hegelplatz in Berlin. This process of the interpretation of a system Hegel himself thus outlines:

A party first truly shows itself to have won the victory when it breaks up into two parties; for so it proves that it contains in itself the principle with which it first had to conflict, and thus that it has got beyond the one-sidedness which was incidental to its earliest expression. The interest which formerly divided itself between it and that to which it was opposed now falls entirely within itself, and the opposing principle is left behind and forgotten, just because it is represented by one of the sides in the new controversy which now occupies the minds of men. At the same time it is to be observed that when the old principle thus reappears, it is no longer what it was before; for it is changed and purified by the higher element into which it is now taken up. In this point of view that which appears at first to be a lamentable breach and dissolution of the unity of a party is really the crowning proof of success.

He has been a name to swear at as well as to "swear by." He has not been canonized, yet he is master even of those who know him not. In all that

relates to philosophy, religion, and history, Hegelianism is the greatest power in Germany to-day.

Von Hartmann and Wundt may be the conspicuous stars in the present philosophic horizon, but they shine over only a very small part of the planet that Hegel illuminates. Von Hartmann himself has said: "The fewest of those who are influenced by Hegel's spirit are themselves aware of it; it has become the common heritage of the most cultured circles of the German people."

In Germany, then, there are but a very few of the old-fashioned followers, disciples, and expounders of Hegelianism as a system, but its spirit and method have become inextricably entangled with the whole thought and culture of the country. It has had disciples and expounders in Italy, France, and Russia. In Great Britain it has also greatly influenced philosophic thought, though accepted and expounded as a system by none. Its introduction to an incurious public some twenty years ago by Dr. J. Hutchinson Stirling has been very ludicrously described by Dr. Masson. His Secret of Hegel was met "with such \ a welcome as might be given to an elephant if, from the peculiar shape of the animal, one were uncertain which end of him was his head." Some said of "this uncouth and turbid book," "if this is Hegel in English, he might as well have remained in German." Others were unkind enough to say that Dr. Stirling kept all the Secret of Hegel to himself, even if he knew it. A score of years, however, has sufficed to atone for this barbarian reception. Scores of leading thinkers have read, marked, learned, and inwardly digested enough of Hegel's method and results to thankfully acknowledge his great worth. Its

influence is especially strong and pronounced at the Universities of Oxford and Glasgow.

In Germany the cry of "back to Kant" and Nco-Kantianism is but the first step of the protest against the temporary materialistic and psychological thought which means a speedy return to Kant's successors, and especially to Hegel as the truest interpreter and the best finisher of Kant's great fragment. They hear with surprise that Hegel's sun is rising in America after it has set upon the fatherland. It is a sun that sets to rise again. It may safely be said, however, that there are no mere disciples and blind adherents of Hegel in America. Perhaps Dr. W. T. Harris has most nearly been a disciple and exponent of Hegel. Certainly as editor of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy he has done more than any other man in America to introduce Hegel's method and works to us. He founded it for that express purpose in 1867. But as a thinker he has necessarily cast off the bonds of mere blind partisan discipleship. Replying to the complaint of the un-American character of the contents of the Journal, he said, "It is not American thought so much as American thinkers that we want." And to think in the philosophic way is to transcend all national limits. This is an apt reply, too, to Dr. McCosh's cry for an "American philosophy" in the first number of the new Princeton Review. So, among the rapidly increasing number of those who are studying Hegel in America, there is only the desire and the determination to think thought and not merely to reproduce the formulas of any national thinker. The great thinkers of all ages, the great contributors to the Science of Knowledge, are no mere external authorities. Their thought is to be digested and organically reproduced necessarily, it is true, as American

thought.

Hegel is recognized as a thinker whose comprehension of thought and its method no student of philosophy can fail to acknowledge as great among the greatest. But I judge it to be unjust to characterize these students of Hegelian philosophy as Hegelians either in the popular, untrue, or in the exact scientific sense of the name. "Bound to swear in the name of no master" in philosophy, and only in the name of Christ in religion, would better characterize them all. so far as I know. They recognize Hegel's as the latest great epoch-making contribution to the philosophic interpretation of the world and comprehension of humanity's experience. They are mastering and using his method rather than accepting all of the results which this method yielded himself as he applied it to the great spheres of human experience. They are getting great help and looking for greater from the method which is greater than even his own employment of it. Help in comprehension of experience may come from those who are not infallible in knowledge.

I gladly give Prof. Edward Caird's estimate of the worth of the charge that Hegel's philosophy has entirely lost the credit in Germany which it partially retains in other countries. President Stanley Hall, indeed, says that it was this historical status of Hegelianism that first weakened its hold upon his mind. "If by adherence to Hegel," says Prof. Caird,* "be meant that kind of discipleship which is content to

^{*} Hegel, by Prof. Edward Caird, LL. D., p. 223.

be labelled with the name of Hegelian as a complete indication of all its ideas and tendencies, we might state the fact still more broadly. For there are few, if any, in any country, who could now take up the same position toward Hegel which was accepted by his immediate disciples." Philosophers are not creators, but merely interpreters of human experience. They do not spin from their own brain baseless dreams in place of substantial realities. They only comprehend the substantial reality beneath and permeating all concrete life—physical, social, and religious.

Man is in vital relations with his Creator and Redeemer. In his religious life Jesus Christ is the fullness of all divine light and life. As men experience their vital relations to him, they are filled with life and light. Philosophy then comes to interpret and comprehend this Christian experience, to trace in intellectual forms the movements of the divine Logos in all true life and light. In its truest sense philosophy is theology; in its highest form it is Christian theology. Its chief interest in Germany and the chief cause of the diverse schools of interpretation have come from its essentially theological character. Philosophy sees the universe as a process, as a manifestation of God. The Substance which Pantheism puts back of all things is seen to be the self-revealing, conscious, intelligent, purposeful Subject-God. Feuerbach and all other members of the "left wing" rejected this Theistic interpretation which Hegel undoubtedly gave the universe. They denied the essential validity of the laws of thought (the unity of thought and being), accepting them and all their creations and implications as the work of the individual thinker, and finally as the mere result of materialistic

conditions. From Hegel to Bruno Bauer was from Theism to materialism. Hegel himself always professed his belief in the doctrines of the Lutheran Church. Against both the rationalistic school and that of mere feeling or faith, he labored to show that the dogmatic creed is the rational development or intellectual exposition of what is implicit in Christian experience. Goeschel, Gabler, Marheinecke, Daub, and the now venerable Erdmann of evangelical Halle, took this position of Hegel in interpreting his system. They affirmed that Christian experience is the substance of their philosophy. On this ground they maintained the full personality of God, and likewise defended historically the literal views given by the Scriptures of the person of Christ, as the Godman—the Mediator between the divine and the human, in whose light we see light, and in whose life we have life. Dr. Dorner, in his History of Protestant Theology (vol. ii, pp. 365-367), affirms the same as to the teaching of these right-wing Hegelians.

In England and America, too, the interest in the study of Hegel is chiefly owing to the relation of his thought to religion and to Christianity as the absolute, full, and final religion. It attracts Christian thinkers seeking for intellectual comprehension of religious experience, faith, and facts. God and the universe, man and freedom, Jesus Christ the Reconciler and Finisher of all that is imperfect, all moving on in a divine process, which the light that is within man sees by means of the congenial but infinite Light that enswathes him; in a word, the divine Logic in all experience is that which Christian thinkers above others should and do seek for. They are at-

tracted to Hegel because they find him thinking mightily on the same; and yet the chief opposition to the study of Hegel comes from the odium theologicum of Christian teachers. Hegel and his philosophy are abused with insensate epithets enough to warn all true (or stupid) Christians from having anything to do other than to revile this chief apologist of the Theistic and Christian interpretation of the universe. Pantheist, denier of human freedom and immortality, of the historical Christ, and of his eternal person and work, mere charlatan in philosophy and religion. whose real aim and tendency is the destruction of all that is real and great and true in the universe and man and Christianity, they ignorantly affirm Hegel to have been. They are moved with righteous but ignorant indignation against any one daring to even study Hegel, imposing the high theological and ecclesiastical tariff of anathema for such daring offense.

The object of this chapter * is to offer something toward abating this unjust and ungenerous attitude toward Hegelianism and its study. I can not pretend to have made an exhaustive study of Hegel or of German philosophy since Hegel. I write this chapter only in part from the results of independent study.† So much, indeed, has been mis-said about

^{*} This chapter is reprinted from The Church Review, April, 1886.

[†] I give the following references to the best accessible English materials on Hegel: Prof. Edward Caird's little volume on Hegel (English) is an introductory exposition of his philosophy, combining happily biography and popular exposition of the meaning and method of Hegel's Logic. His larger volume on The Philosophy of Kant is also a good introduction to Hegel. Dr. J. Hutchinson Stirling's Secret of Hegel is said to be helpful in the way of exposition. Prof. A. Seth's article in the Quarterly Review, "Mind," October, 1882, is as freely critical as it is justly appreciative. Principal J. Caird's Philosophy of Religion does as

Hegelianism that I am tempted to continue in this gossipy vein throughout this chapter and leave the philosophical exposition and vindication for future work. Indeed, anything like a satisfactory exposition of the Hegelian philosophy and its results is beyond the scope of any review article. I attempt only a preliminary clearing away of misconceptions. Dr. Seth deprecates the false humility of those students who represent themselves as merely picking up the crumbs at the banquet, merely guessing at his meaning without venturing to compass his thought. I do not assume such humility, for I do not understand how any real student of Hegel can long be ignorant of his secret or method, nor how any independent student can accept him as an infallible master either in his method or in his own employment of it, and much less in his own results in various spheres. But I do understand how no real student of Hegel can ever be the same man intellectually after that he was before his study of Hegel. The whole concrete experience

well and as popularly for Hegel's Philosophie der Religion what his brother's little volume does for Hegel's Logic. Dr. W. T. Harris has devoted unusual ability and labor in making Hegel known to American thinkers through his Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vols. i-xx, in which he has been aided by a corps of competent helpers. He has a volume of critical exposition of Hegel's Logic nearly ready for Grigg's German Philosophic Classics. Dr. J. Steinforth Kedney's volume on Hegel's Æsthetics is already published. Hegel's Philosophy of History is translated in Bohn's Library. Dr. W. Wallace has translated the text of the Logic and prefaced it with helpful introductory expositions. The following books may also be named as Hegelian, but not in any merely slavish or expository way: The Nation and The Republic of God, by Dr. E. Mulford; Philosophy and Christianity, by Prof. George S. Morris, Ph. D.; Prolegomena to Ethics and Introduction to Hume's Works, by the late T. H. Green, the recognized leader of Hegelianism at Oxford; Ethical Studies, by F. H. Bradley.

of his life and that of humanity receives a new and divine interpretation and exposition—

And by the vision splendid Is on his way attended.

He finds in it the poem of the prose of every-day life, because it gives the essential truth and setting of that life. True poetry systematizes the chaotic, the multitudinous facts of experiences. So, as Dr. Stirling confessed, the system of Hegel is "in a certain sense only a poem." It is a poem as Christianity is a poem—a grand living system. It is in fact only the intellectual rhythm, the Logic of the Logos in whom are all things, "both which are in heaven and which are on earth." It is indeed always and everywhere the function of philosophy to point out this rhythmic movement of thought in all forms of life—to express all concrete experience in terms of thought. Philosophy is not all things, it is only the thoughtful comprehension and expression of them. Christianity is not the product of a dialectic process, but it is its given concrete object. But its intellectual analysis is the inevitable sequent of its reception by thinking beings. It is true that the transcript which philosophy makes of great concrete wholes may be unattractive to us in our throbbing concrete life-very unlike the flesh and blood of reality; and when taken for the whole, when ignoring that of which it is only the intellectual transcript, it becomes vainly puffed up and deleterious. "Feeling, intuition, and faith," as Hegel said, "belong to religion as essential elements, and mere cognition of it is one-sided." But it is one side, and an essential side of the religion of intellectual beings. All theology is proof of this. Even

Jacobi, the philosopher of Faith, declared that the reading of Kant's argument for the existence of God brought on a violent fit of palpitation of the heart. So great emotion may an intellectual vision awaken

in heart and body as well as in mind.

Hegel may indeed be justly accused of looking chiefly and always for the movement of thought in all forms of life. But this criticism is itself a valid criticism of all those attacks upon Hegel as a teacher of concrete forms of experience. Philosophy and Theology are both out of place in hours of our profoundest religious emotion. Our communion with God at such times is not the immediate work of thought. But when we reflect upon such or any other experience of our own or of mankind, we seek for the thought, the Reason, implicit in it. Philosophy may be said to be retrospective—looking back at the thought at work under the forms of Nature, Mind, Art, State, and Church—trying to comprehend all as the work and expression of governing immanent reason. This is not easy work; and it is special work that demands, as other departments of science do, trained minds that also feel the need that it seeks to supply. Faith, feeling, the mere reasonings of the understanding, have their place in man's work; but the worth of all knowledge and the reality of all being is also a question for man's study. The intellectual comprehension of the thought and reality of the unfolded universe—the manifestations of God as Subject rather than of substance—this is the "vision splendid" of that philosophy which is thoroughly and essentially theological. With Hegel philosophy and theology are synonymous. It is this that attracts and fascinates religious thinkers. As in the old Roman Empire "all roads

lead to Rome," so in Hegel every finite truth leads up to and is explained in God. Perhaps a personal confession may not be out of place here, and may be of worth. My own interest in this study began and continues as a purely theological one—the intellectual search for "God as the self-conscious Reason of all that really is." That is Hegel's true first principle. He early declared that "the great immediate interest of philosophy is to put God again absolutely at the head of the system as the one ground of all, the principium essendi et cognoscendi." Again, he devoutly exclaims, "What knowledge is worth knowing if God be unknowable?" (Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, p. 27.) This spirit is present throughout all of his works that I have read. His Logic is a Theology.* His Philosophy of History is a Theodicy. † So, too, are his History of Philosophy ‡ and

^{*} Hegel's Logic, pp. 133, 172, 248, Wallace's translation, and Journal of Speculative Philosophy, iii, 369.

^{† &}quot;That the history of the world, with all the changing scenes which its annals present, is this process of development and realization of spirit—this is the true Theodicy, the vindication of God in history. Only this insight can reconcile spirit with the history of the world, viz., that what has happened and is happening every day is not only not 'without God,' but is essentially his own work' (Philosophy of History, p. 477).

[‡] Speaking of the History of Philosophy he says: "For these thousands of years the same Architect has directed the work, and that Architect is the one living Mind of which the nature is Thought and Self-Consciousness" (Logic, p. 18, Wallace's translation). He goes on to say that differences of system which philosophy presents are not irreconcilable with unity. It is one philosophy at different degrees of completion. In his introduction to the History of Philosophy he states most plainly a Philosophy of the History of Philosophy, which is in most cheerful contrast with the comfortless, saddening view maintained by Mr. George H. Lewes. Mr. Lewes's purpose throughout his History of Philosophy is to show the negative answer given by every system to the question, What is truth? Each system is refuted by the succeeding ones, and the whole

his Philosophy of Religion explications of God in the minds and hearts of men.

Not only the name but also the nature and works of God are ever the theme to which he turns and in which he ends. He points out that philosophy seeks to apprehend (not create or evolve), by means of thought, the same truth that the religious mind has by faith. His last work was on The Arguments for the Existence of God, in which he treated the perfect matter in these proofs as distinguished from the imperfect manner of statement. In the preliminary chapters of his Logic he had already criticised Kant's supposed destruction of these classic arguments. He maintained that no critical reasonings could destroy the necessity and right of the mind to rise from the finite to God; that these arguments are only imperfect descriptions of the implicit relations of man and the universe to God and of the steps of the implicit logic of Religion.

Man is a being that thinks, and therefore sound Common Sense as well as Philosophy will not yield up their right of rising to God from and out of the empirical view

[&]quot;affords accumulated proofs of the impossibility of Philosophy." Some Christian teachers seem glad to use this sad skepticism as a defense of the faith. (Thus Christlieb, Modern Doubt and Christian Belief, p. 80.) Hegel well says: "The history of philosophy would be of all studies most saddening when it displayed to us the refutation of every system which time has produced. . . . The refutation of a system, however, only means that its limits are passed and that the fixed principle in it has been reduced to an organic element in the completer system that follows. Thus the history of philosophy in its true meaning deals not with the past, but with the eternal and the veritable present; and in its results resembles not a museum of the aberrations of the human intellect, but a pantheon of godlike figures representing various stages of the immanent logic of all human thought" (Logic, p. 137).

of the world... And what men call the proofs of God's existence are seen to be ways of describing and analyzing the inward movement of the mind, which is the great thinker, that thinks the *data* of the senses... This leap into the supersensible is thought, and nothing but thought... Animals make no such passage, and in consequence they have no religion.*

In fact his whole Logic, which contains his system or method in pure scientific form, seems to me to be but his explication of the nature and activities of God immanent in the actuality and order of the world, and transcendent as its efficient and final Cause. All objects of science, all terms of thought and forms of life lead out of themselves into a supporting, fulfilling, organized unity. In this completed unity they find their truth and reality. That unity and truth is not external and mechanical, but living, loving, intelligent, and self-conscious. It is God, the Category of all categories—the Subject of all absolute predicates. All knowledge, from one side, is an exaltation of man toward God, while, regarded from the other side, it is the manifestation of God to man.+

^{*} Hegel's Logic, p. 87, Wallace's translation.

[†] The ancient philosophers have described God under the image of a round ball. But if that be his nature, God has unfolded it, and in the actual world he has opened the closed shell of truth into a system of nature, into a state system, a system of law and morality, into the system of the world's history. The shut fist has become an open hand, the fingers of which reach out to lay hold of man's mind and draw it to himself. Nor is the human mind a mere abstruse intellect, blindly moving within its own secret recesses. It is no mere feeling and groping about in a vacuum, but an intelligent system of national organization. Of that system Thought is the summit in point of form, and thought may be described as the capability of surveying on its surface the expanse of Deity

Both atheistic and, sad to put in the same company, Christian Agnosticism are throughout thoroughly repudiated. God knowable because self-manifesting, and man in duty bound to study this knowledge, are with Hegel self-evident and demonstrable principles. He studies human history as men of science do nature—with the presupposition that it is rational—the "coming to itself," of that human reason, which only "finds itself," and finds itself only, when it finds God's Reason immanent in all its knowledge, and this finding is mediated by "the Light of the World." Assuredly he deserves the epithet that Novalis gave Spinoza, "the God-intoxicated," intellectually at least, and not without a tinge of the emotional and mystical. This I know will bring the quick retort, "Certainly, for he also was a pantheist." I once supposed this current charge to be true. I now know it to be false. Not only do his words but also his whole system refute the charge. "The Absolute Substance of Spinoza," says Hegel, "certainly requires something to make it absolute Mind, and it is a right and proper requirement that God should be defined as absolute Mind "-that is, God is more than the pantheistic substance. Again, "God is more than life: he is Mind." Again, in criticising Spinoza, he says that Substance, as accepted by Spinoza as defining God, "is, as it were, a dark, shapeless abyss, which devours all definite content as utterly null, and produces from

unfolded, or rather as the capability, by means of thinking over it, or entering into it, and then when the entrance has been secured, of thinking over God's expansion of himself. To take this trouble is the express duty and end of ends set before the thinking mind, ever since God laid aside his rolled-up form, and revealed himself. (Quoted from Hegel by Wallace in his translation of Hegel's Logic, p. xxii.)

itself nothing that has a positive subsistence in itself. . . . God is Substance. He is, however, no less the Absolute Person. That he is the Absolute Person, however, is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza never perceived; and on that side it falls short of the true notion of God which forms the content of religious consciousness in Christianity."*

Again, "Everything depends upon the absolute Truth being apprehended not merely as Substance, but as Subject." As opposed to both deistic and atheistic views of the universe, he might deserve the name pantheist, refusing to know a world without God, but emphasizing the truth that the world only has its being and truth in God. But pantheist in the sense of making all but mechanical parts of one stupendous substance or unknowable power, without will and without conscious intelligence, he was not. The fundamental idea of his system (in his Logic) is that the unity to which all things must be referred is a spiritual, self-conscious principle, showing that all other categories used to explain the world are resolvable into this. Substance, Essence, Force, Law, Cause, are only partial expressions which find their truth in the highest category of self-conscious, selfdetermining Spirit.

The monks of the East once made a riot in Alexandria because Theophilus denied that God had a physical body. Hegel did not differ from Theophilus. Some of those who call him pantheist do not differ much from the rioting monks. Carlyle's retort was as sensible as the question whether or not he was a pantheist: "No! I am not a pan-theist, nor a pot-

^{*} Hegel's Logic, pp. 89, 91, and 236, Wallace's translation.

theist, either." Pantheist, in the Christian sense, I believe Hegel was. I have failed to find any view expressed in his Logic or in his Philosophy of History or in his Philosophy of Religion which derogates from the glory of God or the chief end of man. The intelligent, self-conscious, self-determining Subject embraces the universe and man without detriment either to the actuality or evanescence of the world or to the freedom and immortality of man. Hegel asserts that the maxim of Pantheism is the doctrine of the eternity of matter, that "from nothing comes nothing" (Logic, p. 143). With this goes the doctrine of necessity. No system which does not include determinism and exclude freedom is really pantheistic. "Out of something comes everything by inevitable necessity "—this form includes the double falsehood of pantheism. But a more strenuous opponent of these errors can not be found than Hegel. It is but the most absurd travesty of it which can define the Hegelian conception of God as "a self-evolving, impersonal process, which, after having traversed all the spheres of matter and mind, attains to a knowledge of its God-head in the speculative reason of man." God, as self-conscious, is not the end of an evolution, but all things created find their reality in him. Men are not mechanical parts of God, nor do they lose their identity, though they find themselves truly, only in him. In proportion to their perfection they reflect him - become his created image. God in his manifestation as Creator is the maker of his image. He defines God to be the Pure Personality, whose self-conscious freedom is self-contained, not evolved, in time. The fleeting show (Schein) of temporal phenomena does not create nor destroy the

self-consciousness of God or of man made in his image. That Hegel taught both the personality of God and the immortality of man is most strenuously maintained by the recognized exponent of Hegel's own view-Dr. Erdmann. By God, as Subject, not as pantheistic substance, he means the internal selfactive nature, or the Essence which impels itself into phenomenal being. Man's immortality as well as his true being is in his organic, not mechanical, union with God. We do not charge pantheism upon the Biblical doctrine of creation, nor the absorption and loss of individual souls in Christ, upon St. John and St. Paul. God and man in Christ are freely spoken of as being in indissoluble union. It is no longer we, but Christ in us. God determines, works in, us to will and to do of his good pleasure. In the fullness of the completed work of creation and Redemption "God shall be all in all." There is what may be called a Christian pantheism and determinism. And other than this I do not find in Hegel. Nature and Man are treated of, not as discordant and irreconcilable with God, but as forming one organic whole in him without losing their relative independent reality.

It may be worthy of notice that all English and American Hegelians accept these truths, and also that they believe them to be Hegel's own teaching.*

^{*} The English Church Quarterly Review, January, 1884, contains a commendable exposition of English Hegelianism and its Religion by one who evidently is not a Hegelian. He says: "An impression may probably be felt that Hegelianism is unfavorable to distinct belief in the Divine Personality. As regards the English branch of the school such an accusation would be wholly untrue. The very principle of the system is that the Divine Mind is in unity with the human, and that both are personal." He quotes Prof. Green's definition of personality as "the quality in a subject of being consciously an object to itself. Again, "The

Hegel's system rightly understood, I believe, as Gabler maintained, assumes a self-conscious Absolute Reason before the world process, and, as Daub maintained, that in it reason is the organ, not the source of the knowledge of God, and, as Hegel himself maintained, that Christianity is the absolute full and final religion for man.

Prof. Flint, of Edinburgh, said that he regarded Hegel's method most valuable and helpful and his results very rich mines of thought, but that we must divorce it from Hegel's Pantheism, which he found in the very first pages of his Logic. Prof. Harris (Journal of Speculative Philosophy, October, 1879) has briefly replied to the same charge made by Prof. Flint in his Anti-Theistic Theories. He points out that Prof. Flint misconceives the dialectic method of The Logic. Hegel's dialectic, like Plato's, is not a method of proceeding from a first principle which continues to remain valid, as, e.g., a mathematical axiom does. The dialectic shows that the first principles which are hypothetically placed at the basis are inadequate, and that they presuppose as their ground and logical condition a concreter principle. The concrete principle is at once the logical and the

genuineness, not merely of Principal Caird's theism, but of his Christianity, is undoubted." Again, "Hegelianism gives us no cosmos of experience into which the mysteries and miracles of Christianity do not readily fall. . . . The whole connection of God with the world involves for the Hegelian who believes in God a relation in His nature to humanity, which may truly be called a tendency toward incarnation." The same verdict must be rendered as to American Hegelianism by all who read the emphatic and devout maintenance of the stanchest Christian Theism in all the books that deserve the credit (or slur) of being Hegelian. Read Dr. Mulford's sublime words on "The Personality of God," The Republic of God, chap. ii.

chronological presupposition. The dialectical procedure is a retrograde movement from error back to truth, from the abstract back to the concrete and true, from the finite and dependent back to the infinite and self-subsistent. We are proceeding toward a first principle rather than from one when we study Hegel's Logic. Hence Hegel does not (as Prof. Flint thinks) "profess to explain the generation of God, man, and nature from the pure Being that is pure nothing." He only shows that "pure Being," which is the highest principle according to many thinkers, is not so adequate as that of "Becoming," and this not so adequate as that which has become (or Being determinate), nor this as adequate as "infinite being," etc. He passes in review all the categories and discovers their defects - i. e., their presuppositions. This is merely a brief statement of Hegel's own interpretation of the categories. The first category of mere blank empty Being may be taken, as it often is, as a metaphysical definition of the absolute or of God. So with all the succeeding categories-each of which is fuller, richer, concreter, and therefore an approximately more adequate definition of God. But each of these is reached not by evolution from the lower one, but from the implications and presuppositions that the defects of the lower one exhibits. Indeed, Hegel in the Logic (page 244. Wallace's translation) warns most explicitly and emphatically against this very misinterpretation that Dr. Flint makes. The advance from mere being is to be regarded as a "deepening of being in itself whereby its inner nature is laid bare, rather than as an issuing of the more perfect from the less perfect."

Each lower category is, and is not, till it is seen in relation with something higher and fuller. Each partial result, through its unsatisfactoriness, seeks the truth just beyond and yet implied in it. It is the unrest of the negative of each category or definition that impels the process onward till the last category of thought is reached—that of The Idea—Spirit, Selfconscious Reason, Self-determining Intelligence—God. God is not the end or result of this process, but he is the real presupposition that lies back of and gives comparative worth to every stage of the process. St. Augustine's exclamation as to our souls might well be applied to each of these imperfect categories, Being, Essence, Causality, Mechanism, and Life—all but that of Spirit:

Thou hast made us for thee, O God! And our souls are restless till they rest in thee.

Moreover, Hegel's doctrine of God is the Christian and not the deistic or pantheistic doctrine. God is the real concrete infinite only because of his essential Triune nature. In him all finite beings find, not lose, their reality. As a category either of thought or of being, Hegel did not treat it as Spinoza did substance—" as a mere terminus ad quem—a lion's den in which all the tracks of thought (and being) terminate, while none are seen to emerge from it." All finite beings emerge from it and exist in it, only being clothed sub specie æternitatis: "All things in God" does not mean "nothing but God." Self-realization through self-sacrifice in a fuller life is the movement of Hegel's whole philosophy. This, Prof. Caird says, he got from the study of Christianity. "Die to live" is the nearest possible expression of Hegel's philos-

ophy in one sentence. To him Christ's words, "He that sayeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life shall save it," is the first distinct expression of the very truth of the nature of all Spirit. The tracing of this through all the forms of Spirit is the whole work of his philosophy. The "more life and fuller that I want" is found only through dying unto the selfish self and living into the truer self. The Christian doctrine of God, as Triune, is the expression of this nature of God's self-revelation, including the element of self-sacrifice. "What Christianity teaches is only that the law of the life of Spirit—the law of self-realization through self-abnegation—holds good for God as for man, and, indeed, that the Spirit that works in man to 'die to live' is the Spirit of God. For Hegel such a doctrine was the demonstrated result of the whole idealistic movement which is summed up in his Logic. So far, then, as Christianity means this, it was not in any spirit of external accommodation that he tried to connect his doctrine with it. Rather it was the discovery of this as the essential meaning of Christianity which first enabled him to recognize it as the ultimate lesson of the idealistic movement of thought."*

I have indeed barely touched upon the outskirts of the full refutation of the charge of pantheism. I have done less as regards the charge of his sublimating all the facts and doctrines of Christianity into mythical products. The fuller and juster vindication against both these charges demands an exposition of at least his Logic and his Philosophie der Religion.

^{*} Caird's Hegel, p. 218.

CHAPTER II.

INTRODUCTORY.

HEGEL was radically and throughout a theologian. All his thought began, continued, and ended in that of Divinity. We may justly say that even the religious element is pervasive of all his works. Writing almost like a zealot against the current indifference to vital theology, he exclaims pathetically, "What knowledge would be worth the pains of acquiring if knowledge of God be not attainable!"* He had the indispensable requisite for treating of religion—that is, the love of religion within himself and sympathetic hospitality to all manifestations of it in the world. His Philosophie der Religion is thus the very heart of all his thinking. The posthumous editor of this work (Dr. Marheineke) styles it "the highest bloom of Hegel's philosophy." Pathos, power, sweetness, and righteous severity mingle in winning strains in the profound and scholastic exposition of man's highest relation.

The Philosophy of Religion has not been in good repute among theologians till recently. This and the cognate Science of Religions, or Comparative Religion, have been looked upon with suspicion as implying or leading to the reduction of Christianity to a

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, p. 37.

level with other religions. There has lingered a relic of the method of some of the earlier Christian apologists. All other religions were simply the work of the devil, the imitator, "the Ape" of God. He had cunningly introduced elements of truth into those masses of corruptions in order to more easily seduce mankind. Nor has the more general theory of the systematic corruption of a primitive supernatural revelation given a much more generous or just estimation of the religions of the world. It is true that Clement of Alexandria and others taught a doctrine of the Logos as the Divine Pedagogue (Θείος Παιδαγωγός), which was essentially that of the modern philosophy of religion. But the successful trend in the Church was that which identified the Logos locally and exclusively with God's teaching in and through herself, till finally the possibility of a distinction between religion in itself and the Church was a conception not to be allowed for a moment. The only ray of light granted by the theologians, who were also great men, was a certain donum naturale that served to curse rather than bless the heathen. Protestant Christianity inherited and emphasized the same narrow view of one exclusive channel for the work of God in humanity. Until recently the only classification allowed was that of Christianity and false religions. Any attempt to examine pagan religions impartially or to point out the vital truth in them that gave them their power over men was imputed to disloyalty to Christianity.

From the beginning of the fifteenth century the intellect of man began to break the shackles of ignorance and authority. The Renaissance, the Reformation, the almost simultaneous discovery of the great

globe earth and the greater vault of the heavens, and the growth of the historical and physical sciences, greatly widened the horizon of man's knowledge. Old Asia and new America, the civilizations and religions of Greece, India, China, and Mexico, hurled heaps of new facts into men's minds. Wonder was followed by study and observation, this by necessary skepticism as to the traditional theories as to man, earth, and heavens, and crude, monster attempts at reconstructing new theories, too often disparaging the old in admiration of the new. Any final construction or synthesis of all the elements was far beyond the range of the finite views and methods of the Éclaircissement, Rationalism, and Aufklacrung of the eighteenth century. These various national forms of the same narrow mental method were even less fitted for an appreciative, impartial, and scientific study of the various religions of the world than either Romanism or Protestantism. The theory of a primitive revelation and of the donum naturale gave them some elements of universality which deistic rationalism never possessed. Its general theory that religion was the invention of priests or poets or rulers still holds its place in the lower infidel discussions of to-day. It was reserved for the nineteenth century to make a scientific study of the religions of the world, and to arrive at a philosophic comprehension of what religion is as a universal and necessary part of human life.

Two truths are now generally accepted: First, that there is such a branch of knowledge as the science of religions or comparative religion; and, second, that the co-ordinate relation of God and man in religion is organic and has a law or logic which may rightly be called the philosophy of religion. Chance

and chaos are no longer allowed to reign in this department of experience. Thought insists upon finding thought, spirit in finding spirit in religion. Philosophy, or the intelligent comprehension of concrete experience, is the one science with which mind can not long dispense. Least of all can the universal and necessary religious experience of humanity be left as a "mighty maze without a plan," as Hume virtually pronounced it to be. The science of religions is the appreciative, intelligent study of all the religious phenomena in the world. As comparative religion it has as its motto that he who knows only one religion knows none. This science may not yet be very far advanced; but its progress in the making has been very rapid. Facts thus gathered, classified, and generalized then demand interpretation. What is religion whose manifestations have been thus systematized? Is it an illusion, an excrescence, or is it a reality? Can spirit or intelligence find itself in it? Thus the science of religions must be followed by the science or philosophy of religion. On any basis but that of skeptical agnosticism its reality must be affirmed. It is a real, reciprocal communion of God and man. In it the seeking and finding each of the other is real. revelation may be slight and the worship ignorant, but in their various measures they are divinely and humanly rational and real. This idea of religion, as the mutual reconciliation of God and man, becomes the very center of all thought about religion. This reconciliation, the attainment of which is found to be the motive in all religion, exists in idea eternally. The logical, thoughtful development of the idea of religion, which contains implicit phases or moments in its process or dialectic, constitutes the philosophy of re-

ligion. This idea in its eternal actuality is, as Hegel shows in Part III, only fully and intelligently stated in the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity. This is from the Divine standpoint. It is the eternal process or history of God. "God was first known in the Christian religion, and this is the meaning of its central doctrine of the Trinity." On the other hand, is the human side of the relation—the idea as it appears in human history. This history illustrates the phases or moments of the process of the idea. The science of religions illustrates, but only inadequately, the science or the philosophy of religion. It does not, however, create it. It is claimed by some that the history of religions gives us the only philosophy of religion that we can have. This no theologian, much less Hegel, would allow. The intimate interrelations and mutual dependencies of the two must be granted. But this evolution in temporal history is to be translated into a process of thought which transcends history. The explication of this process of thought is theology or the science of religion. The religious experiences of man while illustrating, must themselves be viewed in the light of the fundamental idea of religion. This furnishes the only adequate criterion of their place in the historical manifestation of the idea; and this Hegel insists and shows is only to be found in Christianity, the absolute religion—the πλήρωμα or fullness of the revelation of the idea in time. Thus the philosophy of religion, though it comes last in time, is prior in idea. It is primary, inspiring, directive, and interpretative, as the plan is of the builded cathedral. The other is the objectified, manifested, interpreted, as well as suggestive, illustrative, confirmative, and corrective.

Hegel is easily chief and master in this department. But he had his predecessors, into whose work he entered to carry it far toward completion. Lessing may well be called the modern founder of the philosophy of religion. He restated and reaffirmed Clement's idea of revelation as a Divine education of the race. Child of the German rationalism as he was, he could not wholly free himself from its shackles. From Lessing to Schleiermacher was from rationalism to faith, and on to Hegel went the process, till faith, as "abbreviated knowledge," was made explicit as thought. The idea which Lessing gave the thought of his time was forceful in freeing it from the shackles of both theological and rationalistic dogmatism. It helped toward mental hospitality and philosophical comprehension, inasmuch as it considered religion as a whole process, and humanity as essentially religious. Still, as a child of the Enlightenment (Aufklaerung), he sought too exclusively for the essence of religion in morality, esteeming dogma, worship, and church as merely conventional and accessory. He failed to see in them, as he did see in morality, the genuine outcome of the same religious principle. This, too, was the error in Kant's philosophy of religion. Duty alone was real. His Religion within the Bounds of mere Reason stripped religion of everything but the bald ethical. The relation between God and man was that of Wordworth's Duty:

Stern daughter of the voice of God!

It was not conceived of as broader or more intimate, more congenial or loving, than it was under the old law. "Religion is the recognition of our duties as Divine commands." But what was his

conception of God, other than the bald deistic one of the current philosophy and theology as represented by Wolff? The abstract Infinite of the mere understanding, in no vital, necessary relations with the finite, the God afar off, who had none but arbitrary mechanical connection with the world, was rightly held, as Kant had proved, to be unknowable, with whom man could have no conscious, real communion. The subjective Ego was the all of knowledge. The postulating of a great First Cause, as a Deus ex machinâ, was but an infirmity of reason, and was only God in name, an "otiose deity as a more or less ornamental appendage to the scheme of things."

The idea of such a God, as Kant had himself demonstrated, no more proves his existence than the idea of a hundred dollars proves one's possession of them. The analogy is perfect, and hence also the demonstration. There is no more a real, vital, organic, or kin-connection between such a God and man than there is between dollars and one's pocket. Only if God be a living God, in organic relations with his creatures, can he be known or his manifestation be discerned. Only if man is himself inexplicable except as sharing the inspiration and life of this present God, has religion any intelligible reality.

Schleiermacher, Herder, and Jacobi lead in the reaction from this mechanical deism and individualistic morality, and in maintaining the validity of the elements of faith, feeling, and the more mystical elements of the religious consciousness. God again became the living, present, inspiring, loving God that religion demands, and the moral order of the world became the Divine life on earth. Fichte emphasized the ethical element in this present Divine

life in which men had a conscious part. Schelling saw God everywhere seeking for himself through all the series of intermediaries from brute matter to spiritual mind. But this became that kind of mysticism which to intelligence is but a misty bridging over of the schism between God and man that deism had left as its result. Thought still insisted upon satisfaction. Intelligence would not leave the field till it found its own larger self in the consciousness man had of communion with God. It gladly accepted the advance made by mysticism upon deism. It accepted the grateful reality of the reunion of God with his creation and creatures. But it demanded that the reunion be vital and organic—a logic of spirit, of intelligence, which man's spirit could know because he was in it. It demanded that the felt communion be explicated, as far as possible, as thought for thought.

Hegel represented most fully this demand of the spirit for cognition of the content and implications of the religious consciousness. Gathering together the results of all previous attempts, he proceeded to an exposition of the idea, as the concrete content of all the facts and contrasts. In the misty bridge of feeling and faith he discerned the implicit and real logic of spirit binding man and God into an organic unity. He attempted to translate feeling into the language of thought in order to maintain it rather than to do away with it. He gave it more than a mere subjective basis which continually sinks the mind into doubt and despair, or into indifferentism. This is really the motive and aim throughout his writings. But he gives it technical treatment in volumes xi and xii of his Werke, which contain Die Philosophie der Religion.

The most important parts of these volumes are the Introduction (Die Einleitung), pages 1-85; Part First, treating of the content of the idea, and the various phases of the religious relation; and Part Third, giving an exposition and demonstration of Christianity as the absolute religion. Part Second of these volumes gives an exposition of the various religions of the world as phases or moments in the struggling evolution of the idea till its full final manifestation in Christianity. This is the least valuable, because the most empirical part of the volumes, depending as it does upon the fullness and correctness of the current knowledge of these religions. More knowledge of them may lead to placing them in different positions as illustrating phases of the development of the idea. Here it is that the science of religions can correct the science of religion. Exactness here is not essential, as it is not possible without fuller knowledge. He characterizes the Chinese religion as that of Measure, or temperate conduct; Brahmanism as that of Phantasy, or inebriate dream-life; Buddhism as that of Self-involvement; that of Egypt as the imbruted religion of Enigma, as symbolized by the Sphinx; that of Greece as the religion of Beauty; the Jewish as that of Sublimity; and Christianity as the absolute religion, the fully revealed religion of truth and freedom.

Thus he attempted a unification of all sides and phases of religion, and permeated and joined them all by one principle and one *method*, "the method of the self-explicating *Idea*." * Immense learning, severe scientific method in simple language, combine in

^{*} Vol. i, p. 59.

rearing this massive temple to the indwelling living Deity. For throughout one feels the warm religious emotion of one who loved and worshiped God. In it, too, the polemical spirit burns like a consuming fire against the anti-theistic and anti-Christian theories of his day. And none of these called forth so much of his scathing criticism as the current rationalism in theology and philosophy. This produced works similar to those of the English Deists and their Christian opponents as-e.g., Toland's Christianity not Mysterious and Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity. Such an "Age of Reason" was more odious and foolish to Hegel than to any other devout defender of Christianity, and his polemic against it is sufficient to destroy it forever in any intelligently religious mind. He maintained that to know God is eternal life. But this knowledge of God was not that of either the apologists or the opponents of Christianity in the eighteenth age of reason-not a knowledge of reasons pro and con, but of real vital experience of communion with God.

I append the following brief vocabulary or explication of the most pregnant of Hegel's key-words: "The notoriously troublesome word" Vorstellung I have rendered "representation," "figurate conception," and "pictorial thought." It means literally a presentation or introduction which the mind makes to itself of absolute truth in terms of sense, understanding, and imagination. It is picture-thinking, envisaging the invisible in the visible. It is metaphorical, finite thought. It is the work of philosophy to elicit the latent infinite thought out of this form, to translate Vorstellung into Begriff. I have uniformly translated Begriff by "idea," to distinguish it from Idee

(Idea). A Begriff, "idea," is literally a gripping together into unity the various elements or members of a concrete thought. It is a comprehension. Idee (Idea) is the Idea of all ideas, the ultimate comprehension of all unities. It is thought as a totality or system. It is the Aoyos of all logics. It is God, as Absolute, self-conscious, voluntary Thought, vitalizing and comprehending all ideas (Begriffe).

The word aufheben has, as Hegel observes (Logic, 155), the double signification of "to destroy" and "to preserve," as the Gospel fulfills the law. I have rendered it variously, as abrogate, fulfill, annul, transmute. Its exact signification is to reduce to "moments." A "moment" is a constituent element or factor in a unity. Its isolated reality is annulled by its being preserved as a dynamic element in a concrete unity. The acid and base are aufgehoben in the salt. The three Persons are moments in the Godhead.

Vernunft is reason as speculative, synoptic, synthesizing, the faculty of unity or comprehension. Verstand is reason as the understanding which analyzes, defines, and holds separate elements as ultimate and independent data. It is the faculty of the finite. The dialectic is the protest of thought, negating the abstract, partial conceptions of the understanding. It is a phase of reason rising on steppingstones of annulled abstractions to fulfilling concrete unity. All life and thought and progress are such only in virtue of this inherent element of the dialectic.

Thought defines; but thought also criticises and negates its partial definitions in higher ones. The dialectic is the restless protesting element of thought that is ever restless till it rests in the supreme concrete unity, God. The whole of Chapter IV illus-

trates the dialectic of thought from the finite to the Infinite. Hegel's use of the terms abstract and concrete is purely and finely philosophical. Ordinarily the term concrete is applied to something obvious to the senses, found in time and place, and abstract to any mere mental conception. Hegel uses abstract for that form of knowing which wrings a part or element out of its organic connection or relations of thought, and *concrete* for that form which grasps these elements indissolubly together in organic unity. Abstract is therefore a one-sided, sectarian view, and concrete is catholic, looking before and after and comprehending all relations as elements of an idea (Begriff). The understanding abstracts, while the reason concretes, gives a synoptic view of the various interconnected and interdependent elements. Sense and Science are abstract; philosophy is concrete. Moreover, it is only in the true, organic, vital concrete that genuine necessity, Nothwendigkeit, is found. The ethical or spiritual alone gives the true type of an organism and the true significance of necessity. In such each member is at the same time an end in itself and a means to the whole, and the whole realizes itself in each member and in the totality. Hegel refuses to commit the absurdity of defining an ethical by a physical organism. It is only when this is forgotten that his persistent use of the term necessity seems to strangle freedom. In fact, with Hegel "the truth of necessity is freedom" (Logic, 243). The members of the ethical organism are linked by spiritual necessity to one another, so that "if one member suffer all the members suffer with it." Each is not foreign to its limiting others. All are elements of a spiritual whole, being at home, realizing themselves only in and through this necessary relation with the others. This is the Christian conception of concrete, spiritually determined freedom. God's service is perfect freedom. All else is spiritual schism, which is bondage to death and the devil. The abstract sects of any idea, person, or institution can only be reconciled into their place as moments of an organic unity by a process of mediation, Vermittelung. The *immediate* is the simple, sensuous, undeveloped. It is the state of nature, while the mediated is the state of culture, of realized being, of organic connection. Man is abstractly rational, made in the image of God; but it is only by a process of mediation, of culture, of discipline, that he becomes concretely such in the ethical organism of the kingdom of God. The absolutely mediated is that whose process of mediation is self-determined, whose realization is due to the evolution of its own forces through its organic relations to other elements and to the whole. Thus the finding one's self at home in others, and, above all, in God and his kingdom of spirits, is essential to true concrete freedom and self-realization. The same is true of all thoughts and of all institutions.

CHAPTER III.

HEGEL'S INTRODUCTION TO HIS PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.*

HEGEL begins by asking what the true conception of religion is, which is the object presented to the philosophy of religion. He answers it immediately in a passage which should become classic, as commanding immediate and universal admiration: "It is the realm where all enigmatical problems of the world are solved: where all contradictions of deep, musing thought are unveiled and all pangs of feeling soothed. It is the region of eternal truth, rest, and peace. . . . The whole manifold of human relations, activities, joys, everything that man values and esteems, wherein he seeks his happiness, his glory, and his pride-all find their final middle point in religion, in the thought, consciousness, and feeling of God. God is, therefore, the beginning and the end of everything. He is the center which animates, maintains, and inspires everything. By means of religion man is placed in relation to this center, in which all his other relations converge, and is elevated to the realm of highest freedom, which is its own end and aim. This relation of freedom on the side of feeling is the joy which we call beatitude;

^{*} Vorlesungen ueber die Philosophie der Religion, Zwei Baender, herausgegeben v. Phil. Marheineke. Berlin, 1840.

. . . On the side of activity its sole office is to manifest the honor and to reveal the glory of God, so that man in this relation is no longer chiefly concerned with himself, his own interests and vanity, but rather with the absolute end and aim. All nations know that it is in their religious consciousness that they possess truth, and they have always looked upon religion as their chief worth, and as the Sunday of their lives. Whatever causes us doubt and anxiety. all our sorrows and cares, all the narrow interests of temporal life, we leave behind us upon the sands of time; and as when we are standing upon the highest point of a mountain, removed beyond all narrow earthly sights, we may quietly view all the limits of the landscape and the world, so man, lifted above the hard actualities of life, looks upon it as a mere image. which this pure region mirrors in the beams of its spiritual sun, softening all its shades and contrasts and lights. Here the dark shadows of life are softened into the image of a dream and transfigured into a mere frame for the radiance of the eternal to fill. ... This is the general view, sentiment, or consciousness of religion, whose nature it is the object of these lectures to observe, examine, and understand."* He whose heart does not respond to this call away from the finite world can have no interest in this task. While it is the purpose of philosophy to demonstrate the necessity of religion and to lead men to cognize the religious elements in themselves, it does not propose to make a man religious in spite of himself. But no man is wholly without some relation to this central interest of humanity. Religion is

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, pp. 3-5.

essential to him as a human being, and not an alien sensation. But the relation of religion to man depends much upon his general view of the world and of life. These views distort and tear away the true impulse of spirit in the direction of religion. The philosphy of religion must, therefore, first work its way through and above all these false views or philosophies of life. These begin outside of, but by their own movement are brought into contact and conflict with philosophy.

I. The first of these is the separation of religion from

the free worldly consciousness.

(a.) Man has his week-days in which he busies himself with worldly affairs; his Sunday comes to bring him into new activities. The religion of the truly pious, unsophisticated man is not a special matter to him, but it penetrates with its breath of flavor all his feelings and activities. His consciousness relates every aim and object of his daily life to God. But from this worldly side, vitiation and variance creep into his religion. As Wordsworth says—

The world is too much with us; late and soon, Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers.

The development of this variance may be designated as the rise of the *understanding* and of human interests. The laws, qualities, orders, and characteristics of natural things and of the creations and activities of man are inquired into. He is conscious of himself as a knowing and a creative agent. Science, art, politics, methods of making life easier and culture wider, all these come to be looked upon as his own possessions. And with this comes the consciousness of a separation from the *Sunday*, consciousness of de-

pendence for everything upon a higher power. Self-dependence rises in contrast with the spirit of humility and dependence. Still, man must recognize that the materials and means for all this work are given to him. The world and his mind and their powers are not his creations. He may and must still confess that God made them. As the worldly consciousness encroaches further, he makes his peace with religion by the general admission that God has made all things.

(b.) But even where one makes this assertion in earnest, as a pious man, there is danger of variance creeping in. Piety particularizes and says that God made this and this. Everything is considered as a special Providence. Its view is the teleological one. But this again brings in the use of the understanding, which points out as many indications of defects and of absence of purpose as otherwise. The most beautiful flower may be a chalice filled with poison. The storm which purifies the air may devastate the earth. What is food to one is poison to another. The disease is as real as medicine. This external, physical teleology of piety is weakened by the relative imperfection of the physical process, and by the finiteness and separateness in which its objects are viewed. A more profound synthesis of these merely finite and external ends or aims must be made. The understanding demands consistency and necessity. With this the principle of selfhood develops completely. The Ego becomes the center of relations. Cognition deals with these relations. It is no longer sufficient to designate God as the cause of the thunderbolt, or of a political revolution. The immediate finite cause is what is sought for. Thus our science may formulate a world that does not need God. This is the

primary attitude of Positivism, which makes a breach with all religion. Science and religion thus develop into such contrast that there seems to be nothing but positive opposition and enmity possible. Science is confident and proud. It knows that it knows, and denies any other than finite knowledge. Religion, with its earnest affirmation that there is a real superfinite, that God makes all things, is distrustful of cognition that has formulated a world of finite necessity. And yet cognition can not be bowed out of the controversy nor its results overlooked and denied. In the needed harmonization, in which God may appear in the world and the world in God, full satisfaction must be given to the highest demands of cognition. While religion can not be dragged down into the realm of finitude, it must make a wide enough synthesis to grasp all its contents.

The need of this conciliation is more apparent in the Christian religion, because cognition is an inherent element in itself. Christianity concerns itself with the salvation of the individual from conscious alienation from God. I am to be saved. My own freedom and happiness are an end and aim. Self-hood is not lost in sacrifice. But this subjectivity, this selfhood is in itself the principle of cognition. This, however, again is sometimes made absolute, and the contrast developed again within Christianity itself of faith and cognition. Hence the various dis-

cords of the day between head and heart.

II. Hegel then passes to the question of the position of the philosophy of religion toward both philosophy and religion.

The general relation of philosophy to religion is that of nearest kinship. Hegel never ceases to identify them in respect, at least as to their subject-matter. While all realms where thought is manifest are the fields of philosphy, there is none so congenial as that of religion, because it also is a universal, penetrating and covering all other realms like philosophy. "The subject of religion, as well as of philosophy, is the eternal truth in its objectivity, or God, nothing else but God, and the explication of his nature." * Again: "Philosophy has for its aim the cognition of truth, the cognition of God, for he is the absolute truth, in so far that nothing else is worth knowing compared with God and his explication. Philosophy cognizes God as essentially concrete and spiritual, self-communicating like light. Whoever says God can not be cognized, says that God is envious, and he can not be in earnest in his belief, however much he may talk about him. Rationalism, the vanity of the understanding, is the most violent opponent of philosophy, and is offended when it demonstrates the presence of reason in the Christian religion; when it shows that the witness of the spirit of truth is deposited in religion. In philosophy, which is theology, the whole object is to point out the reason in religion. In philosophy, religion finds its justification from the standpoint of thinking consciousness, which unsophisticated piety does not need nor perceive." † But the faith of naïve piety is only abbreviated knowledge, which philosophy or theology explicates. Philosophy is falsely charged with placing itself above religion, for it has no other content than faith. It only gives this content in the form of thinking. Thus religion and philosophy coalesce, differing

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, p. 21.

[†] Ibid. vol. ii, p. 353.

only as theology and religion do—in regard to their *mode* of being occupied with God. And in this difference are found all the difficulties which seem so

insuperable.

Philosophy takes religious ideas out of the domain of feeling and practical experience, and makes them objects of thought, seeks the thought implicit in them, and translates them into their equivalents in thought. Whatever is real is rational. Without this principle the cosmos would be chaos. Religion is the most real concern of man. Without it man would not be man. But, also, without thought man would not be man. And thought seeks its like in all realms of human experience. Religion can not, if it would, suicidally avoid the scrutiny of intelligence. The thoughtful religious mind demands a rational explication of the religious consciousness. The reflective thought of the mere understanding analyzes this into contrasts, oppositions, antinomies. Its rationalism dismembers and lets the life out of all religion. But this critical standpoint can never be more than temporary with a sincere man or age. The revolutionary, iconoclastic rationalism is but the negative element that soon spurs the spirit on to a larger horizon and comprehension of truth. Philosophy must come to swallow up all such negative relations in victorious unity. Hence it comes after the positive sciences, with their negation of the absolute. Its duty is not to collect, observe, and classify, but chiefly to interpret. It seeks to translate the religious phenomena of the world into a process of thought, logical and rational, to give them rational significance and systematic coherence and order. Speculative philosophy is the consciousness of the Idea (Idee), which is the

concrete unity of all differences and contrasts. Religion also has for its subject the content of philosophy as a whole, grasped implicitly as a whole by faith and feeling. Thought merely seizes upon this whole, the absolute truth, and brings out to intelligence all its implicit contents and contrasts.

The philosophy of religion starts with the presupposition that religion and religious ideas can be taken out of the domain of feeling into that of thought. It is simply a different attitude of the human spirit to-

ward the same object—God.

"What signifies the expression God?" asks Hegel (vol. i, page 26). For philosophy it signifies the nature of God expressed in thought-a logical or intelligently explicated knowledge of him. For religion it signifies an image-concept, an example, an illustration or picture corresponding to the logical definition of God, or to theology. Each answer implies and contains the other. They are but different modes of the occupation of the spirit with God. In both it is spirit finding spirit in mutual search. The philosophy of religion deals only with self-manifesting spirit —finite and Infinite. God is not its result, but its beginning. But spirit is rational in itself, and also manifests itself rationally. The philosophy of religion deals with this immanent, eternal, living rationality of the absolute spirit, and also with its phenomenal manifestations. It is not merely our subjective reasonings, the unvitalized rationalism of the individual finite understanding, as to the being and nature of God; but it is simply the explication of the eternal and phenomenal process of spirit finding spirit, the reconciliation and vital relationing of God with man and man with God. It apprehends the process of

losing the negative rationalism of the individual and the finding its truer self in the life and being of God. Such, in brief and imperfect exposition, is Hegel's essentially religious attitude in all his thinking. For this is always and everywhere an explication of spirit. He might well have exclaimed with the devout Kepler, "I read thy thoughts after thee, O God!" Hegel next treats of the relation of the philosophy of religion to positive or dogmatic religion. This is embodied in the Creeds and in Systematic Divinity as based upon the Bible. In all definitions of dogma reason forms an element. "At first thinking was allowed to be merely the exegesis which collects the thoughts of the Bible." But, as matter of fact, reason contains inherent principles and presuppositions which come into play in the work of interpretation, which must be more than mere verbal translation, substituting one word for another of the same scope. Explication and systematization must explain and systematize in accordance with mental principles and prejudices.

Commentaries on the Bible often give us the current rather than Scriptural conceptions. There is

some reason for the couplet:

This is the book where each his dogma seeks, And this the book where each his dogma finds.

Exposition is often imposition; or, as Hegel expresses it, "the Bible has been treated like a nose of wax."

Thus rationalistic theology sprang up and proceeded till it put itself in opposition to the Bible and to Church dogma. The mere understanding takes the facts and doctrines of Spirit in its finite molds

and ends in annihilating the religious content and completely impoverishing Spirit. This rationalism (Aufklärung) led to the baldest deism and morality. But Hegel here, and elsewhere at greater length, emphatically renounces and controverts this rationalism. Its abstract metaphysics of the understanding analyzes all life out of Spirit. It separates God and man. It rests content with making God the great outside First Cause, an otiose Deity, not even so much as a Deus ex machina, to occasionally interfere with his foreign, outcast cosmos. But the thinking reason of Spirit conceives God as essentially concrete fullness. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is absolutely essential to the conception of God as eternal, living Spirit. (This assertion is maintained and fully developed only in Part III of the second volume.) The philosophy of religion is the thinking explication of this Concrete Spirit. It disdains the dusty road of rationalistic theology, and can not stand in the opposition to Church dogmas that it does.

On the contrary, its kinship with positive doctrine is infinitely greater than appears at first glance, and the rehabilitation of the dogma of the Church, after it had been reduced by the understanding to a minimum, is so largely the work of philosophy that, for this very reason—which is its true content—it has been decried as an obscuration of spirit by a rationalistic theology, which does not rise above the limits of the understanding.*

Every ray of light from the Spirit, indeed, appears as an obscuration to the night of rationalism. It hates philosophy because it has rehabilitated what it thought it had reduced to disjecta membra. The

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, p. 33.

Creed-breaking age of the rationalism of the understanding is followed by a Creed-restating age of the comprehensive and synthetic reason. There can not be two kinds of reason and two kinds of Spirit—Divine and human—absolutely different from each other. Hence philosophy can not be at variance with religion.

Spirit, in so far as it is the Spirit of God, is not a Spirit beyond the stars, beyond the world; God is present, omnipresent, and as Spirit he is in every spirit. God is a living God, all energy and action. Religion is a creation of the Divine activity and not the invention of man. The expression that God as reason rules the world would be senseless did we not assume that it refers to religion also, and that the Divine Spirit is active in the determination and formation of it. The perfection of reason through thinking does not stand in any contrast to the Spirit, and, therefore, it can not absolutely differ from the work which Spirit has produced in religion. The object of reason is reason itself, Spirit, Divine Spirit.*

I have translated these passages in full that none may doubt the earnestness of Hegel's scornful repudiation of the rationistic theology. Theologians may refuse this succor, or even take offense at seeing their doctrine stated in terms of reason; but when once cognition has arisen, its rights can not be withheld. It will either stop in the Dead Sea of rationalism or lead on to the Mediterranean of philosophy. Hegel found, in his day, many tendencies and principles, both religious and rationalistic, that were hostile to philosophy's taking religion for the subject of its investigation. He, therefore, briefly

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, p. 34.

considers these hostile principles, claiming to find in them all, or in their comprehension, the historical element out of which the perfect philosophical thinking has developed itself. He finds in his day that men's minds are so occupied with the knowledge of finite, secular things, that knowledge of Divinity has but little real interest for them. The unbounded growth of the sciences has quenched the nobler longing to search after the knowledge of God, has practically rendered us securi adversus Deum. But in reality none of these things are worth knowing if God be not knowable. Our vanity is really our degradation. Even theologians are found who aid in this most unchristian view of the unknowableness of God.

- I. There is great indifference to Church dogmas. Their significance is minimized or ignored. Many fail to attach proper importance to the dogmas of the Trinity, of the Resurrection, and to miracles. Not only rationalism, but even pious theologians, reduce the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ to its lowest significance. The current religious literature fully discloses this indifference to orthodox dogma. Philosophy, on the other hand, is attempting to reach a comprehension and a higher appreciation of these Church dogmas, and thus to replace them in their true value.
- 2. Again, this depreciated value of dogmas is shown by the historical method of treating them. The interest is not in their truth, but in their historical origin and growth. These theologians, whether belonging to the historical school or to that of tradition, are "like clerks of some mercantile house, who keep account only of somebody else's wealth without

having any property of their own; it is true they receive a salary; but their sole merit is, that they serve in recording the wealth of others. . . . They know as little of God as the blind man knows of the picture whose frame he has felt. All they know is, how a certain dogma was framed by this or that Council, what reasons the framers advanced, and how the one view or the other predominated."* But they lack the one thing needful, the main point in both philosophy and religion—the entering of the mind into a direct communication with the highest interests.

3. Again, the theory of immediate or intuitive knowledge of God arises to rebuff philosophic intelligence in the sphere of religion. Faith, feeling, the testimony of the Spirit to each soul, is claimed to be the highest possible experience. This is much more congenial to philosophy than the other two attitudes. It is really the first stage of philosophic knowing, which only goes on to see and to comprehend what is implied in this direct personal knowledge of God.

Hegel makes a fuller examination and criticism of these hostile and yet helpful principles in Part I of his work—The Idea or Conception of Religion.

Before entering upon this, however, he states briefly the objections to any philosophy of religion. Is a rational knowledge of religion possible? Is not reason quite presumptuous in attempting this task? Some object to its competency to deal with religion as a kind of truth that has been authoritatively revealed; but if religion is real and cognition an essential part of man, then they can not be kept separate

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, p. 42.

except by doing violence to one or the other as both rationalism and Romanism do. Others deny the competency of reason to attain knowledge of anything but finite phenomena, as positivism and agnosticism. Others maintain that the only religious experience possible is in the realm of feeling—of the accidental feeling of individual subjectivity. This leads to the denial of God's objectivity and finally to atheism. Each man's God is the product of his own feeling, which may be held to be either psychological or even physiological. The so-called *Left-wing* Hegelians, Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer, gave this atheistic and materialistic interpretation to religion. It need scarcely be said that Hegel would not consider them worthy of any sane man's belief.

But how do we know that reason is competent to deal with religion? A criticism of the organ of knowledge is still insisted upon. This was the futile task of Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason, for this criticism must ever be done with the instrument under criticism. Reason alone can examine reason. which presupposes, what it tries to prove, its capacity and its rationality. It is the futile task of learning to swim before going into water. Its capacity can only be proved in its use. It is often, too, the suicidal task of sawing off the limb which bears one up. As a matter of fact reason is the organ and reason is also the object of thought. Whatever is real is rational and whatever is rational is real. In religion as in other realities reason only finds itself, its other, larger, truer complementary self. Philosophy as well as the finite sciences, has real subject-matter—reason, spirit, God -and a competent organ of knowledge. God is not to be demonstrated as an external, alien object, but

he is felt, found, and followed in all rational activity of spirit. He is not proved or known by anything foreign to his own being. He reveals himself in thought and to thought. A philosophy of religion is simply the tracing the process of thought in the relation of finite spirit to its congenial infinite spirit, the Father—a process which is implicit in religious feelings, activities, and worship. It only presupposes that religion is not a chaos, a chance irrational realm, but a realm of reason, of spirit. It is this rationality of the real that binds God and man in no merely arbitrary or accidental relations. Kinship is everywhere present. The old metaphysical distinction of the abstract infinite which made only a deistic theology possible is replaced by the true concrete Infinite, which is the organic, vital correlation of spirit. The rigid opposition and alienation of Infinite and finite, of God and man, is the false assumption that makes a philosophy of religion or any philosophy or cosmical comprehension impossible. The fundamental notion that makes any philosophy possible is the fact of the genuine concrete Infinite, which makes the whole earth kin and binds it with chains of gold to the head and heart as well as to the feet of God. This unity of correlatives, as of parent and child, is the true starting-point, the goal and also the guiding thread of method in explication of which Hegel is always engaged, but in no place in such profound and convincing way as in his Philosophie der Religion.

Hegel concludes his Introduction by giving a classification of the whole subject. We at once note the triplicity that characterizes all his works—A, B, C; a, b, c; a, \beta, \gamma; I, II, III; 1, 2, 3, form the ap-

parently mechanical and arbitrary divisions which everywhere meet the eye.

But with Hegel this results naturally from his method—that of the self-explication or self-unfolding of the *idea* or comprehensive concept of religion. This manifests itself primarily in its *universality*; secondarily, in its *particularity* or differentiation; thirdly, in the ripe and rich *individuality*, or synthesis of the unity and difference—the U. P. I. of formal logic.

"This is the rhythm, the pure eternal life of spirit itself, without which it would be a corpse. It belongs to the spirit to manifest itself as its own object. But at this standpoint it is merely finite. Its third phase is where it finds its own self in this objectivity, becomes at-one with it, and thereby attains its freedom. For freedom is this being at home in what once seemed foreign."

I. The general idea or conception of religion in

its universality, as faith and cultus.

II. The various pre-Christian religions, regarded as specializations or particular forms of the general conception.

III. Christianity as revealed, or absolute religion, the full adequate realization of the conception of re-

ligion.

- I. The general conception, or *idea* of religion, is not abstract and contentless like the general concepts of formal logic and unphilosophical sciences. It contains the whole nature of the subject, as the seed contains the trunk and branches, the sap, flower, and fruit of the tree, but not in such a way that one can see them through a microscope, before their actual evolution from the seed.
 - I. The phase of universality is a phase of thinking.

Religion may have its historical starting-point in the sensuous and finite, but thought is always at work upon this crude form, interpreting into some intelligible form. It is not merely emotional. God is not the highest feeling but the highest thought, and to this all true religion leads us. Even among men the highest spiritual relationship can not exist without intellectual culture.

2. But when this universal *idea* proceeds to self-specification, as it does in the subjective consciousness of the individual, the phase of contradiction appears. The thought and the thinker are two combatants. I think the universal, the absolute, and yet I am the finite and empirical; I am the middle term of the syllogism, containing only the characteristics of the two extremes. I am thus not merely one of the two struggling elements, but I am the struggle itself (Romans vii, 15).

This relation of opposing elements passes through the forms of (1) Feeling, (2) Sense-perception, and (3) Representation or pictorial thought, till pure thought is reached, where the religious consciousness will comprehend itself in its fully explicated conception or idea. Thus the content of religion may, for different persons, or for the same person at different times, be either felt or imagined or thought.

3. From this standpoint of God and man the primary religious relation is that of fear toward an absolute, awful, arbitrary power. Some have maintained that all religions the primary fear to be a significant to be a significant

tained that all religion thus originated in fear.

Primus in orbe deos fecit timor.

But fear *separates*. One flees from what he fears. Religion has to unite. Hence this standpoint must

be overcome, and man recognize his true essence to be in God. He must come to recognize himself as made in God's image, the child of God. The process of this reconciliation constitutes the phase of cultus or worship. The cultus embraces the whole internal and external activity which has for its object the bringing about this at-one-ment, this transformation of fear into love. It is too often used with reference merely to the outward and visible part, not laying sufficient stress upon the inward and spiritual activity of the soul with God. But the Christian cultus embraces not only sacraments, rites, and ceremonies, but also the inward history of the "way of salvation" that repentance, conversion, regeneration, and sanctification, which can only take place within the soul under God's grace.

In this true *cultus* lies the real reconciliation of the two conceptions of God, as transcendent and immanent. When God is recognized as without and above, as an object of consciousness among other objects, there can be no real reconciliation in works of external worship—in lip, knee, and hand service. But when the Divine is recognized within the soul, as an act of self-consciousness, there is no reconciliation to be effected, and quietism displaces all cultus. Hegel notes especially the barrenness of cultus resulting from the merely immanent conception of God. Without the transcendent relation of God and our consequently obligatory relation to him, all cultus shrinks into mere subjective emotions and sentiments. "The cultus contains as essential elements the actions, the enjoyments, the assurances, the confirmations and attestation of a Supreme Being. But these can have no place if the objective

and obligatory element is lacking in them. For this would cut off progress of consciousness to objective knowledge, and likewise progress from subjective emotion to action. Each of these is most intimately connected with the other. Man's idea of his obligation in regard to God depends upon his conception of God: his self-consciousness corresponds to his consciousness. Neither can he conceive of any definite, obligatory action in regard to God, if he has no knowledge or definite conception of him as an objective existence. Only when religion becomes a real relation, and contains the difference of consciousness can the cultus assume its true form and become a living process in the annulment of the difference. But this movement of the *cultus* is not limited to this inwardness in which consciousness frees itself from its finitude and becomes consciousness of its essence. In this, the subject knowing himself to be in God, enters the source of his life. But cultus is not merely internal. Its infinite life begins to develop in an external direction also: for the individual's life in the world has the substantial social consciousness for his basis. Just how he will determine his aims in life depends on the consciousness of its essential truth. It is on this side that religion reflects itself in worldly affairs, and the knowledge of the world makes its appearance. This entrance into the real world is essential to religion, where it appears in the form of social morality" (p. 70).

The cultus, therefore, generally speaking, is the eternal process of the subject positing itself as identical with its essence. God becomes his God. The transcendent object of consciousness becomes the immanent self-consciousness. The reconciliation of

the two conceptions of God, however, is only reached in *cultus* as a process of presupposed unity of differentiation and of reconciliation.

The Incarnation, the unity of God and man as an external fact, represents the unity. This essential element of religion is found in some distorted form in all religions. So, also, is the estrangement of man from God, the Christian doctrine of sin being its profoundest form. But this evil is seen to be foreign and hostile to me. O wretched man! none can deliver from the body of this death but God, through Jesus Christ, who is the perfect man. So we finally come to fully and freely "delight in the law of the Lord," as our own law. And thus the transcendent God becomes immanent; from being merely an object of Consciousness, he becomes our perfect Self-Consciousness.

II. Positive (pre-Christian) Religions.—The whole of Part I is devoted to the discussion of the above given phases of religion in its universal idea. But this universal is now to unfold, to particularize itself, to posit its elements of differentiation. The *idea* exists only as activity. Religion can not exist as mere idea. It becomes self-explicating, self-actualizing in the sphere of human consciousness. This is the material in which the *idea* realizes itself. The seed bursts forth into differences. This is only a mid-station to the end. It is not the end any more than the child is the man. Now, these mid-stations of the self-explicating idea form the various positive or pre-Christian religions. These, indeed, are not true religion, revealed religion, our religion. But they are all contained in ours, because they are essential, though subordinate stages, in the whole process toward fully revealed

religion. They are not, and they are, foreign elements. In their historical aspects, as actual religions of men, claiming to be true, they are false, and present most uncongenial and irreligious aspects. But, so far as they represent phases of the idea, moments in its process toward perfect self-realization, they are neither foreign nor false. Isolated they are false, made elements of the concrete truth they are not. "These phases, in their lower forms, appear as forebodings or superstitions which grow by accident, like flowers and other forms of nature." And yet even here there is an underworking of some essential phase of the idea of religion itself. Thus the thought of incarnation is found in every religion, however far it may be below the Christian conception. These religions often give a most distorted and whimsical conception of God and his worship. But it is wrong to see nothing in them but superstition and fraud, or to content ourselves with a mere natural history sort of a study of them. We must seek their meaning, interpret them, find the rational element in them. They also were fellow human beings who conceived and believed these religions. Nothing human is without some shade of reason. And what is human and rational in them is ours, though only an inferior and passing phase of our higher conception. This does not imply a justification of their horrible and absurd parts; but it does imply that they all are historical manifestations (with all the misrepresentation that this implies) of various phases of the idea on its way to the goal of adequate manifestation or perfected self-consciousness. The philosophical contemplation of these religions thus differs from the historical. The one considers them from the point of

view of the perfect *idea* of religion, while the other studies only their accidental external forms. Both profess to study only that which *is*—the one what is rationally, the other what is temporally and accidentally. In order to study them in the higher way, in the light of the *idea* of religion, we ask of each religion (1) what is its conception of God, and (2) how does this conception affect the worshiper's conception of himself? The conception may be lofty enough to beget the conception of his own imperishable nature. Thus, the conception of the soul's immortality enters into the history of religion as an essential element.

The conception of God gives the basis for a classification of these religions, which we give in full in Chapter VII. We note here only the three main divisions: 1. Nature Religions. 2. Religions in which spiritual individuality asserts itself. 3. Religions of free personality.

III. Revealed or Manifest Religion.—The process of the idea is not an aimless, endless one. "It is necessarily implied in the idea of religion, that spirit must here as elsewhere run its course. It is really spirit in so far as it exists through negating (swallowing, digesting, and assimilating) all finite forms of itself, thus becoming the real concrete or absolute."

The characteristics of the *idea* as actualized in the various pre-Christian religions are seen to be self-characterizations of the *idea*. These partial reflections, false by themselves, are then taken up by the return movement of the *idea* upon itself. Its own content thus becomes adequate to itself; and this constitutes revealed or realized religion, in which God is manifest. This is the absolute religion, or

Christianity. Christianity is the realized fulfillment of all preceding religions, but not merely the sum and result of them. Nor is it, like them, temporary and finite. It does not pass over into another, for it is ultimate, the perfect realization of the idea of religion. It reveals the intrinsic unity of the Divine and human nature. This is the ne plus ultra of religion. At first there was a veil over religion, and it did not appear in its truth. In due time religion appeared unveiled. This was not an accidental or arbitrary time, but a time fixed in the essential and eternal counsel of God, chosen by eternal reason and wisdom. It is this idea of religion itself, the Divine idea, the Idea of God himself, which has thus specified itself in this course of development toward its own ultimate realization.

"This course of religion is its true theodicy. It displays all the productions of the Spirit and every form of its self-cognition as necessary—necessary, that is, because spirit is that living, active impulse which attains self-consciousness or self-realization as mediated by the series of its own self-posited differentiations. Such self-knowledge is absolute truth." He elsewhere explicates the absolute religion as: "(a) The Revealed Religion. (b) The positive or externally revealed religion, which seeking and finding and realizing man, becomes (c) the Religion of truth and freedom." †

^{*} Page 84.

[†] Vol. ii, p. 192.

CHAPTER IV.

THE VITAL IDEA (BEGRIFF) OF RELIGION.*

PROPER exposition demands amplification. Amplification means addition as well as subtraction from the text. In this chapter I add much and subtract more. I merely follow the outline given by Hegel, and do not misrepresent his thought. I develop the inferences and implications suggested to my mind, rather than give a direct exposition of the text. If it is not *Hegel's* Philosophy of Religion, it is *Hegelian* in method and spirit.

Hegel begins this part of the work with the question, "What is our starting-point, and how have we won it?"

In the work of the Logic, God the Absolute Idea, the νόησις νοήσεως, the Categories of categories, is found to be the ultimate reality, the thought which alone has being in itself, and which imparts whatever measure of thought and being that all else has to it. This is the ripe, concrete result of the Logic, or philosophy proper. The Philosophy of Religion is a part of a system. In his Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences Hegel includes the whole in three main divisions: 1, Logic, or the Science of the Idea; 2, the philosophy of nature; and, 3, the

^{*} Hegel's Religions-Philosophie, I, Part First, pp. 87-252.

philosophy of spirit. The first, as we have said, might better be called metaphysics; the third includes psychology and anthropology, the philosophy of the state, and the philosophy of Absolute Spirit. This last comprises a brief outline of the philosophy of art, the philosophy of revealed religion, and philosophy proper. All these lead to the fuller comprehension of absolute spirit. All are but parts of the one stupendous whole of this reality, which is Thought, Idea, Spirit, God. Thus his system is encyclopedic, aiming at the rational comprehension and synthesis of the totality of being. It is an attempt to unveil what is the rational or real being of the universe, which is Thought—not our subjective thought but that Thought or Logos, which is the life and substance of all phenomenal being. God reveals himself, I, In the logical idea; 2, in nature; and, 3, in mind. It is the same manifestation in different phases, and at different stages of the process. In the Logic the various succeeding categories of thought are all relative and progressively more adequate definitions of God. The logical *Idea* in its completed development may indeed be called but a phantom Deity. So may all theology. Both are but descriptions of the only reality, and yet both are revelations of this reality to our thinking. But this "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories" of the Logic freely goes forth from itself as NATURE* and becomes truly incarnate in man as SPIRIT, the culmination and the interpretation as well as the interpreter of Nature.

I have never read Hegel's Philosophie der Natur,

^{*} Cf. last paragraph of the Logic.

the most severely critcised of all his works. The spirit is too adumbrated there for it to be thoroughly and congenially studied. But when he comes to the interpreter of nature, to the study of mind or spirit, he traces with glad heart and mind the very lineaments of Him in whose image man is made. Novalis said that "Nature is a kind of illuminated table of contents of the spirit." Hegel would rather apply this to man. That which could only be spelled out with difficulty in nature he could read while running in the mind of man, and rise in rapid flight, rather than on stepping-stones into the world of intelligible reality. Nature is to be studied as the cradle of man, but his social and intellectual relations are more truly formative of him. And it is in the study of mind in these its own works—the state, art, and religion—that Hegel is peculiarily great and convincing. These are objective to man; these are the work of the Spirit in different grades of its manifestation. The science of man is "writ large" in human history, in man objective in all his institutions of family, states and church, in his systems of art, religion, and science. Humanity is man. But humanity, as a merely empirical existence, is not "the measure of the stature of the fullness" of perfect man. "Groaning and travailing," he yet lives and moves and has his being in God; and the goal of all his history is union with God—resemblance to God. God is the beginning and the goal of man as spirit. Religion is the sphere of man's activity where the process toward this goal is a present, though progressively more adequately realized, enjoyment. Hence the Philosophy of Religion, or the thoughtful comprehension of the mutual relations of main and God, as

implicit in all religion and as fully revealed in the Christian religion, is of the highest and most vital interest.

A. Concerning God.

In a philosophy of religion we can not begin with the full and scientifically adequate conception of God attained in philosophy.

We have to begin with the conception of God which is present in the ordinary religious consciousness, and develop the presuppositions and consequences of this ordinary conception to the philosophical one.

We know God and that he is. We know that he is the creator of heaven and earth. We know and believe in our hearts that God is absolute Truth and absolute Being upon whom all else depends; but this conception is comparatively abstract and unscientific. It is the object of the philosophy of religion not to merely explain it in its own terms and conceptions, but in those of speculative thought. It is to translate the same content from the form of representation or figurate thought into the form of the idea* which holds all the elements of religion in necessary and vital relation as a body does all its members. There is a reputed saying of Hegel, legendary for aught I know, yet essentially genuine, that thinking is real worship—das Denken ist auch wahrer Gottesdienst. This is as pregnant and practical as the classic "laborare est orare," and this is the divine service that Hegel proposes to render in his work on the Philosophy of Religion. In being thus related to

^{*} Cf. last part of Chapter II.

God in thinking, man is as truly worshiping as if he

were praying or laboring.

To say that God is Absolute is not to unveil him to thought. When we add that he is the Absolute Substance and all else phenomenal and relative, we do not get further than the pantheism of Spinoza. It is not till we have seen him as Subject or Spirit that we know Him. Substance must be seen translating itself into Subject both in religion and in philosophy. But even this definition of God as Subject or Spirit may be held in the lifeless abstract way of deistic conception. It must be seen revealing, manifesting itself, as self-imparting love rather than as self-withholding jealousy. This conception is directly given, externally revealed, in Christianity. Philosophy studies this religion in order to reach the same result, a last which is really first and concomitant in all thinking.

But as religious we begin with this conception in us. But where in us is it? In what form of our subjective consciousness does this religious apprehension of God as Spirit take place? We ourselves as spirits are a complex of feeling, imagination, faith, and thought. In which form do we have this conviction that God is Spirit? Where in us is God at home? We say that he is omnipresent, but we finally determine that it is chiefly in thought that he appears to us an Absolute; and here absolute Substance precedes, in our apprehension of God, absolute Spirit. God is universal Substance, yet probably no religion or philosophy ever held the vulgar conception of pantheism which makes God to be simply the sum total of all things. The conception is rather of an unrelated nature or essence that endures forever,

while all things else are but the most evanescent and contingent manifestations of some of the most remote of its attributes. Hence, Hegel says,* "Spinoza can be better termed an a-cosmist than an atheist." God as absolute substance is forever, while the world is not, except as the transient shadow of this reality.

Spinozism may be termed the philosophy of abstract identity, having no essential characteristics or attributes. But the whole of philosophy is nothing but the study of the specific forms or characteristics of the $\tau \delta \pi \acute{a}\nu$ (or rather, according to Hegel, of the $\delta \epsilon \acute{e}s$). The philosophy of religion exhibits a series of increasingly adequate determinations of the essential attributes of God through substance up to spirit. This divine universal or spirit in uncharacterized form imparts himself to our consciousness, and religion begins with God as an object of consciousness.

B. The Religious Relation.

Religion is itself a relation, a living and true connection of God and man. It is the work of philosophy to show the *necessity* of this religious relation. It must be seen to be not accidental and transient, the result of fear, priestcraft, or illusion, but a very necessity of man as spirit to thus relate himself to God as well as essential on God's side to thus relate himself to man.

The necessity of religion, say some, needs no other proof than its universality; but all men are not religious even if you include the lowest forms of superstition. Well, says another, its necessity is evident from its being essential to the founding and

^{*} Hegel's Logic, p. 237.

maintaining of states and all forms of social life and morality. Plutarch is quoted as giving best expression to this political necessity of having some religion in every state. But no such merely external necessity or expediency can long maintain any religion. It ceases to be useful as soon as it is seen to be merely useful. Many radical socialists believe that it has thus been used to keep the poorer classes in subjection; that bills upon heaven have thus been exchanged for the labor of the poor. Hence they urge the necessity of destroying all religion. Meantime their too often just iconoclasm springs itself from implicit religious feeling. Religion is necessary to the well-being of any society because it is intrinsically necessary, involved in the very nature of man, as progressively realizing his manhood in the image of God.

I. The Necessity of the Religious Standpoint.—Religion is not merely instinctive, but is the result of a process of mediation. Beginning life with relation to finite things of time and sense, the human spirit forces itself above this point of view, and thinks of the great invisible beyond. Visible things are temporal, there must be an eternal; our life is but a vapor, there must be everlasting substance. No mere process, from one finite thing to another larger one, satisfies this movement of the spirit. The most universal conception of a finite cosmos that can be framed by scientist or philosopher can not long arrest this necessary movement of the spirit to the infinite and eternal, as the real ground of every cosmos. In nothing short of this can the spirit of man come to real self-consciousness. Epicurus and his modern followers can give no larger conception than that of cosmos

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cycling back to chaos. It is in new form the old myth of Saturn creating and devouring his own children and then devouring himself. Modern science to-day, in its non-theistic form, is Saturn creating. It may seem to be optimistic. But its logical creed ends in chaos whence it started, and pessimism is its last word. Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann are the real philosophers of all atheistic science. Every doctrine, every formula of the universe that does not rest on the idea of system-making Logos or Spirit, has implicitly chaos and pessimism at the core. But if its gods have gone away, they must return to save it from destruction. Religion is necessary even to science. The undevout astronomer is mad, and his music of the spheres will soon pass into wails of so many lost Pleiades, unless, like Kepler, he reads God's thoughts after Him. No mind to-day will stop with mere atoms. Some little of the Logos or system or thought is seen by all. Mere matter is no longer mindless matter. In the chaotic flux of separate atoms there is some relating, comparing, synthesizing power seen at work. Evolution is itself the partially revealed Logos, Idea, Spirit, God. It is involved in matter and not the evolution of mere crass, mindless, world-stuff. The mind, in science, refuses to stop with the actuality of finite things. It necessarily rises to the point of view of their ideality, in which their actuality becomes a mere moment or constituent element. Actual things are separate and independent. Idealization sees them not only connected and related, but organically related—deprived of independent existence, depending upon each other and upon the whole for their being. Thus, the egg in its ideality is a chicken. Man is man, only as a

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member of the family, the state, and the church. this process the finite, separate existence dies to self, to live a more realized self in the larger whole. Its reality is that of a moment, or a constituent element in the larger unity. It is abrogated, destroyed, and in the same process restored and enlarged. Such is the double significance of the favorite word aufgehoben of Hegel. The act of consciousness affords the simplest illustration of this ideality. There are, at first, two separate things—the ego and the non-ego; but consciousness grasps them both in its unity without destroying either. They both become constituent elements of knowledge. Its larger illustration is seen in our apprehension of nature and spirit. They are different, and yet they are identical in their essence. Thus far much of the current agnosticism will go. It is intellectually forced to posit a common substratum—a great unknown, one from which all spring and in which all are identical. may be the formless substance of Spinoza, or the blank, cold, abstract absolute of Schelling. All have got beyond calling this substratum mere matter, and making mind a mere function of it. Matter has been spiritualized and defined ultimately as unknowable force. This is the latest idol created.

But beyond this subjective necessity which forces all thinkers to some substratum, in which nature and spirit are sublimated, it must be shown objectively that they sublimate themselves from mere finitude in the religious relation. Science itself rises clear out of materialism. In its categories of causality, force, order, law, mind casts phenomena into category after category of thought, including the higher ones reached by science, and still is forced on till that of self-con-

scious spirit is reached as the ultimate. No finite or mechanical, chemical, or even vital relations of things are adequate to contain nature. Spirit alone is ultimately seen to be its causal and sustaining truth. This is the only vocation of nature—to be offered up as a burnt-offering, that out of it may spring forth Psyche. But such a Psyche is not, at first, a real spirit. In Nature spirit is, as it were, inebriate, or in a dreamlife. Spirit is only implicit in nature, in man it comes to consciousness. At first it is as finite spirit. But we are forced by an irresfstible self-necessity to rise above all finite spirit, even above humanity—to spirit absolute and universal—in which all finite spirit lives and moves and has its being. Spirit finds itself in Nature, which at first sight seems to limit and enslave. Man becomes the interpreter of it, and it becomes his servant. He is also born into a limiting world of social relations. At first sight he may seem to be the passive creation and tool of heredity and of domestic, social, and national influences. But it is in and by means of these that he first finds himself, comes to himself, realizes himself. "They are another which is not another "-foreign, yet not hostile. Abstracted from them he is not truly man, but only an amputated fragment. All these relations are necessary parts of the man himself. As he lives in them he realizes himself. Thus it was that old Rome realized herself. Her god Terminus was elastic enough to include and transform all hostes into cives sui, and she became imperial mistress of the world. In its largest definition this limiting social environment is what Hegel calls "the moral (sittliche) world" -the state. Citizen of no petty state, but of the world—cosmopolitan—is the highest point in which

spirit, as finite, can find its freedom and realize itself. Spirit only lives and grows in this social medium. In it man finds his freedom, and lives a human, rational, and spiritual life. Without this he would be a naked waif, a native Simeon Stylites, a nonentity. Unus homo, nullus homo. Without society no persons. Isolation impoverishes, society develops and enriches the individual. From the individualistic standpoint all social customs and institutions are limits to freedom. Rousseau voiced this individualism in the eighteenth century. The savage is the only freeman. Carlyle fairly shouted it out on the transcendental key, while all the world wondered. But that phase is passed or passing. Egoism, individualism is seen to be morbid selfishness and self-destruction. We are bound on a voyage of discovery to find ourselves in everything foreign. All things are ours. Nothing human is longer alien to us. We love ourselves truly in loving others, thus loving ourselves into new and fuller life. The family, the state, art, religion, and philosophy are not only our clothing, but very bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh, and spirit of our spirit. No one has ever done as much as Hegel to emphasize and manifest this true freedom in bounds, the freedom of apparent necessity; and to protest against the one-sided subjective freedom of sheer individualism. His ethics are entirely social. The Philosophy of the State (Philosophie des Rechts) is his only work on moral philosophy. He treats the family as the instinctive realization of the moral life; and the state, in its larger sense, as the very consummation of man as man. He restored the Greek ideal of the moral life-enlarged, enriched, and fulfilled by the Christian ideal. The upward impulse of

transcending spirit, its inherent necessity to pass beyond the finite, will not stop short of the Christian ideal of man complete only in God. Social limitation after social limitation may be transformed into constituent elements of concrete freedom, even to the highest type of genuine humanitarianism—and yet the spirit wings its flight into the beyond. We approximate more and more to our real, full life, without attaining. The goal flies before us. The last words of Schiller's Pilgrim expresses this experience:

Und das Dort ist niemals hier.

Inadequacy is yet present with us. Necessity forces us on panting after "more life and fuller." Man is yet finite—only relatively complete in these social relations. Even in the highest form of humanity, in universal history, the spirit groans after fuller life, only finding its goal in Spirit universal and absolute, in which all finite spirit exists. And it is here that Hegel finds the necessity of religion—the necessity in man to transcend all that is finite and relative, and to rise into communion with God. The beyond that must be the here is the world of Absolute Spirit. It is a present Spirit or Intelligence, mediating itself to man through nature, art, religion, and philosophy.

In art this relation of human to absolute Spirit appears in the form of sensuous perception, in philosophy in the form of thought, and in religion in the form of feeling and of representative or pictorial conception. This relation seems most immediate and real in religion. In it God is omnipresent, and nature and humanity are seen sub specie æternitatis.

But this necessity of religion, or of the religious

point of view, is deducible not only from the world of finite nature and mind,* it is also deducible from the very *idca* of religion itself, proceeds necessarily from the all-embracing unity, is an essential element of the Divine Spirit itself. But this can only be seen after an examination of the religious consciousness.

II. Forms of the Religious Consciousness.—Religion is never merely intellectual. Consciousness of God, or religious certitude, at first seems to be an immediate relation between the soul and God. We are as sure of God as we are of our own selves. It is more true to say that in suppressing this consciousness of God we extinguish ourselves, than to say that in destroying ourselves we extinguish God. But perfect certitude of a thing does not prove its truth. We say that we believe, and do not know; but faith is itself a kind of knowledge, often an implicit knowledge of the most fundamental and essential elements of our moral and intellectual nature. In this way it is equivalent to Reason. We believe, says Jacobi, that we have bodies; we do not know it. We believe that God exists; we do not know it. We can fully sympathize with this reaction against the negative results of Kant's criticism of the arguments for the existence of God. We can say with Jacobi that Philosophy can not give us God, freedom, or immor-

^{*} Prof. T. H. Green, in his Prolegomena to Ethics, has made this deduction in most admirable and philosophic form. The metaphysics of Nature as well as of man, mental and moral—that is, their implicit conditions, the total environment which their existence presupposes, that which is immanent in, back of and sustaining Nature and man—their only adequate metaphysics is that Eternal Spirit, or Self-consciousness, "with whom the human spirit is identical in the sense that he is all which the human spirit is capable of becoming."

tality, if, like him, we restrict knowledge to the sphere of the understanding, and regard Spinoza's as the only consistent scheme of Philosophy. Call it faith or reason, or what you will, the human Spirit is not thus impotent to rise beyond the finite, the necessitated, and the temporal. It will break out in forms of theosophy or mysticism, or zealous fanaticismin some way it will protest against the limits placed to human vision by Kant, Hamilton, Mansel, and the "whole cloud of witnesses" that they may cite to prove their agnostic philosophy. The last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar - άγνώστω Θεω-to the unknown and unknowable God," says Hamilton. St. Paul says, "I know him whom I have believed." St. John says, "We know that we know him"; and the world of thinkers as well as the world of plain, honest men holds with St. Paul and St. John. Innumerable expressions apparently the most contradictory might be adduced as to the relation between faith and knowledge, all which would need such sifting as we can not find place for here. It opens up the whole question between gnosticism and agnosticism—the most vital philosophic question of the day. Hegel's whole life-work was to maintain the power and worth of human cognition. With agnosticism he had less patience than with mysticism. The one utterly saps the vitality of thought, the other only floods it with more sap than it has channels prepared to receive. The one denies that we can know any reality, and affirms that all that we can ever see is our own shadow; that our knowledge is strictly conditioned to the prison walls of our own senses, and conceptions, and ideas. We know less of realities than Plato's cave-men. Hegel

maintained the validity of human knowledge; that our faculties give us truth; that there is a genuine kinship between thought and being; and that, wing our flight where we may in the universe, we shall always find ourselves at home, because we shall always find intelligence everywhere. But Hegel has been accused of such gnosticism as would imply his own personal omniscience. Because he maintains the validity of our thought, and the ultimate identity of perfect thought and being; because he refuses to believe in a Ding an sich God who always plays hideand-seek in vain with children made in his own image, he has been most foolishly, and sometimes even savagely, denounced as impious. But the thinker who maintains such gnosticism as belongs only to the piercing eyes of God has never yet been admitted to the circle of philosophic thinkers. Hegel undoubtedly uses expressions as to the comprehension of thought that might, though only arbitrarily, be interpreted as the height of human arrogance. Perfect knowledge of a perfect world—no! he did not make this insane claim for human thought; but he did claim the power of human thought to know reality. He did maintain that thought is the ultimate reality, that thought is things, and things are thought; that God is the highest Thought, and that we can know him through thought. Prof. T. H. Green realized the criticism which Hegel's Absolute Idealism is exposed to. Holding to absolute Idealism himself, maintaining that there is nothing intrinsically unknowable to us in the universe or in God himself, he yet thinks that Hegel often states his philosophy in a form that affronts the common-sense conviction of reality. Thus, he says that, while God is in us,

is our self, we are so conditioned that we can not grasp the whole as God sees it. Language which seems to imply such identification of our thought with God, or with the world of spiritual reality, can lead to nothing but confusion. But he adds this appreciative criticism: "That there is one spiritual self-conscious Being, of which all that is real is the activity or expression; that we are related to this spiritual Being, not merely as parts of the world which is its expression, but as partakers in some inchoate measure of the self-consciousness through which it at once constitutes and distinguishes itself from the world; that this participation is the source of morality and religion; this we take to be the vital truth which Hegel had to teach."* He says further in regard to Hegel's philosophy: "It may be doubted whether it has thoroughly satisfied even those among us who regard it as the last word of philosophy; yet, when we think out the problem left by previous inquirers, we find ourselves led to it by an intellectual necessity."

It is because our experience is a member or element of a living, organic totality that we may read in it the *principle* and nature of the whole. This may be in the form of faith, or "abbreviated knowledge," or the apprehension of the essential principle, while "knowledge" may be restricted to the expansion, to the worked-out details, relations, and applications. There is no complete, mechanical separation between human and divine intelligence, but the most congenial, consubstantial connection. Now "I know," though only in part. When my union with the Divine Spirit

^{*} Works of T. H. Green, vol. iii, p. 146.

becomes perfect, "then shall I know even also as I am known." More than something like this I can not possibly attribute to Hegel; less than this I should wish no one to believe.

Religion on its phenomenal side certainly does not start with knowledge in any technical sense of the word, yet its most subjective form is not devoid of some element of intelligence. The one who has God in the form of feeling or of pictorial conceptions is yet a knowing, thinking man; and man is not such a bundle of side-by-side faculties as the old abstract psychology affirmed. Feeling, and willing, and knowing are in reciprocal and organic union in man. The self-conscious Ego, the intelligent subject is present in and through them all, distinguishing man's desires and feelings from those of mere animals. Thus, in examining the nature of the religious consciousness, or in tracing the elevation of the human spirit from carth to heaven, from self to God, we find three closely interrelated forms—feeling, representation, and thought—which are the forms of the ascending spiral.

I. The most immediate form in which the certitude of God appears is that of emotion or *fceling*. Thus it is said that we know God immediately, intuitively, in the heart; that our feeling, rather than our reason, is the ground of our certitude.

Take *first* the assertion that we know God *only* intuitively. It is the word only that renders the statement false. This intuitionism is often the creed of despair in philosophy as well as in religion. The criticism of the understanding has destroyed the fair unity of our religious, ethical, and philosophical conceptions. Our old gods are apparently slain, yet we can not but believe them still living. Granted that

we can not prove, but rather destroy proof of them by reasoning, then we have this last resort, to deny the jurisdiction of reason in these provinces. have "innate ideas," "intuitive principles of morality," "immediate knowledge of God." We do not find God at the end of any syllogism. Nor do the best instruments of science find him for us in Nature. The absolute infallibility of the Bible and Church has been rudely shattered, and yet we do have absolute and immediate religious certitude. God is nearer us than even we ourselves are. The noisy chatter of the critical schools, the logomachies of theologians and philosophers, the agnosticism of science, make us martyrs of both despair and disgust. We soar above them all to the mount of transfiguration, where God and spiritual realities warm us into the spirit of rapt devotion, and give us that absolute conviction that is essential to our very being. How often has the reasoning of the friends as well as of the foes of Christianity thus driven the best spirits to claim higher, firmer grounds of faith in intuition. Jacobi's faith, Neander's Pectus est quod theologium facit, the oversoul of the transcendentalists, and the unutterable vision of saints and mystics, all are valid witnesses at least against the adequacy and the jurisdiction of the mere understanding in the apprehension of spiritual realities. Take the so-called "Evidences of Christianity" of the eighteenth century, and who does not sympathize with Coleridge when he exclaims against such evidences—" Evidences of Christianity, I am weary of the word!" The eighteenth century was pre-eminently rationalistic. The supremacy of reason was acknowledged by all. It was proposed to defend Christianity by proving its reasonableness.

One should only believe what he can prove. And so the manufacture of reasons for believing Christianity went on till but few of the manufacturers or their customers had any vital faith left, and the Evangelical school and Methodism, with all their lack of reason and abundance of feeling, brought about a real revival of religion. The more Christianity was proved, the less it was believed. Who cares for a revival of another such "age of reason"? Who longs for a return of such rational evidences of the faith? What faith can be vital that is grounded on such intellectual evidences? Such reasoning was most subjective, mechanical, artificial, sophistical, and at the highest merely logical. Reason meant the understanding, conditioned by sense, and not the vital reason that sees the whole complex of man's being and environment, and takes true and comprehensive views of them. The "age of reason" would better be styled the age of "reasons," of any and of all kinds of arguments pro and con. A new objection to Christianity was sprung by some pre-Huxley free lance, and the defenders of the faith said, "Well, now, that is a pretty hard blow, and we must consider how we can weaken its effect "-that is, give some accidental, special-pleading reasoning, paying him back in his own coin. Such reasoning is almost sure to become sophistry and lead to inventing evidences where there are none, and of telling lies for God. Some ground or reason may be given for everything under the heavens. But, as Hegel says, "To be confined within the range of mere grounds, is the principle and position of the Sophists." * They

^{*} Hegel's Logic, p. 196.

brought forward various points of view or grounds, or reasons, without confessing that these grounds were themselves ungrounded or without necessary content. Such grounds are always as available and as numerous for attack as for defense. "In a time," he adds, "so rich in reflection and so devoted to ratiocination as our own, he must be a poor creature who can not advance a good ground for everything, even for the worst and most deprayed." In speaking of the attempt made to esteem the socalled proofs of God's existence as the only means of producing faith in God, he says: "Such a doctrine would find its parallel, if we said that eating was impossible before we had acquired a knowledge of the chemical, botanical, and zoölogical qualities of our food; and that we must delay digestion till we had finished the study of anatomy and physiology."* This would be nonsense, and yet these sciences about food and digestion are a necessity for thinking man. To eat is not the whole of life. Intellectual comprehension of the process is worth something. And to have immediate certitude and enjoyment of religious truth can not be ultimate for the thoughtful worshiper. It is not merely reflective, analytical thinking, but also comprehensive, synthetic, speculative thinking that is a necessity of our nature. In the profound maxim of Anselm, credo ut intelligam, the ut intelligam is recognized to be a necessity of his nature as well as the credo. So, too, with his saying, fides quærit intellectum.

But whatever be the reasons for this claim of immediate intuitive knowledge of God, and however

^{*} Hegel's Logic, p. 3.

much we sympathize with the attitude of those making it, we must not forbear to examine more closely the assertion.

What is it to know? Knowledge in its lowest terms implies at least a self and an object—that is, we know God as an object of consciousness without knowing how or what He is. We know Him intuitively as the absolute Being. But if this is all that we know, it is, as Hegel says, not worth the knowing, for of all the categories of thought that of mere undefined Being is the emptiest and most sterile. Such being is mere being, negative being, nothing.* "Being is the same as nothing." This is one of the celebrated paradoxes of Hegel, meaning that if every characteristic, attribute, and quality is abstracted, there remains only the blank, indefinable identity of mere being which is thus indistinguishable from nothing. "No great amount of wit," he says, "is needed to throw ridicule on this maxim." His only interest is to show what an utterly barren and inadequate definition being is to give to God.

But, granted this intuition of the Being of God, it remains our own. The being of God is an object within our own consciousness. We distinguish between the two elements, but can only do so by asserting being of only one of them. It is my consciousness. I am, have being, therefore the other, God, is not, except as part of me. I take the being to myself. I can doubt everything except my own being, for in doubting I am the doubter and the doubt itself, and so doubt flees away and leaves pure, real being only in me. This is a reduction of intuitional-

^{*} Cf. Hegel's Logic, p. 137.

ism to subjective idealism, the basis of most agnosticism. Fcuerbach, the left-wing Hegelian, applied this subjective view to theology in his Essence of Christianity (translated by George Eliot). God is simply the reflection or objectification of the individual within his own mind. Theology is but objectified anthropology. A figure of speech, personification, accounts for it all. Max Stirner produced the reductio ad absurdum of this subjectivism in "The Individual and his Possession," in which absolute anarchic individualism is proclaimed. Thus the dialectic forces this form of knowing God to a denial of his real existence, to Kant's position that we can never know any but our own mental states and ideas. If God is still to be held, there must be found a place within the me, where he really exists, inseparable from my being. We have then the second form of immediate knowledge of God. God is in me in feeling or Sentiment (Gefühl). In feeling God within me I have the most absolute certitude of his existence. Vainly I seek him in the intellect; I only find him in my heart. Intellect separates, feeling unites.

While fully granting a measure of truth to this position, we must say that it is false when held so as to exclude all activity of thought. Thinking man can have no doors within himself locked against this activity. He thinks all over, even in the deep recesses

of the heart.

To feel anything implies at least some distinction between the one who feels and the object felt. In the religious relation this object is so universal and absolute as to almost extinguish the subject. We are emptied that he may fill us. We easily recall the most extravagant terms in which saints and mystics have expressed this total self-effacement under the felt presence of God.

Faith passes into contemplative love, and this into ecstatic bliss.

But it may also take the form of abject fear. We are naught, vile earth, worms of the dust, in the presence of the Almighty. All that is left of us is mere fear, passing into repentance, and, it may be, into love and peace.

We ought thus to feel God; but mere feeling of anything is no proof of the worth of the feeling. Within the sphere of feeling we have the most varied content, and some discriminating power is needed to specify what feeling is strictly religious, and some standard of excellence by which to grade all feelings that we have. The loveliest flowers and the most noxious weeds alike spring up within the heart. feel a thing does not vindicate its goodness or worth. How do we distinguish between the feeling of right and wrong, of love and hatred, of God and the devil? Not by mere feeling, but by an intelligent, rational insight into the real worth of these objects felt. The pleasures of the sensualist are felt as much as the raptures of the saint, and mere feeling vindicates the one as well as the other. Without some criterion outside of feeling, then, we are left with the maxim, De gustibus non disputandum, or do what gives you the most pleasurable feeling. Feeling depends upon the temperament and idiosyncrasies of the individual. We may say to a friend, "You ought to feel this," and he returns the irrefutable answer, "I am so constituted that I can not." Again, we may feel merely fantastic creations of the imagination. We may be moved with pictures of ourselves as noble, heroic, holy souls,

with hopes and fears that may be utterly groundless. Feeling is thus the worst form of subjectivism. Animals, too, feel, but they do not have religion because they do not think.

But this view may be expressed in a higher form. We have God in our hearts. Heart means more than mere temporary accidental feeling. It is the abiding center or core of our life. It is our character. But the Bible expressly ascribes evil as such to the heart. Selfishness, anger, wrath, malice, fill the hearts of many. Only the intelligent man can say in his heart, "There is a God." "The foolish body" denies it. The heart needs to be kept "with all diligence," to be changed, regenerated, according to the form of some intelligent good. Again, the most cultured intelligence does not exclude feeling, but rather nourishes and elevates it. True religion is in the heart. Pectoral theology is the vital theology; but feelings are not self-kindled, the heart is not self-moved. Objects of love create love, and objects of enmity create hatred. They alone who know God aright will love him aright. They who do not know him aright may have the most intense religious feeling. The most degraded idolater can appeal to his heart as proof of his religion. To distinguish between true and false religion we must appeal to intelligence. It is the intelligent heart that knows God and the intelligent will that obeys him.

Thought, too, must come to discriminate between myself and the object felt in my heart. Thought must come to make God a free, intelligent, external object. Thinking our way out of mere feeling, we come to know God as he is and as worthy of adoration. Our religious feeling is seen to rest on that

which certifies to its value as distinguished from other kinds and grades of feeling. Thus, knowledge enters as an element of religion. Thought is seen to be the vindication of the religion of the heart. Religion must be felt, must be in the heart, but it must be intelligible feeling. Hegel does not deny the necessary and continuous element of feeling in religion. In fact, he maintains that it is essential to any truth being ours, that it be in our feeling, in our heart. He only contends against that form of faith that appeals to feeling as its sufficient ground, and maintains that it is the function of thought to justify good and true feelings and to condemn evil feelings.

But there are various forms of knowledge. There is knowledge coming through the senses; there is knowledge of the logical understanding which in theology defines the whole content of religion in definite, dogmatic propositions; there is knowledge gained through scientific induction which has much to tell us about the great part of human experience that is constituted by religion; there is, finally, knowledge in the form of the comprehension of the organic unity of all parts of the totality of experience, the necessary self-relation of all elements in a living whole. In which form of knowledge is religion to be found? In all of these, we may say. Yet it is only the last, that of speculative thought, that gives us our indiscerptible grip on God and absolutely vindicates the religious relation manifested in the less adequate forms of art, of imagination, of inductive and logical knowledge. But, as elsewhere, this true first is chronologically the last. The speculative comprehension of the religious relation never comes to many men, and comes to others only late in life.

Hegel is never tired of asserting that religion and philosophy have the same content, only differing in form of knowing it. Philosophy tries to comprehend that which religion is. The philosophic content of religion is comprehension in a living system of the "abbreviated knowledge" of faith. As such it is the highest form of theology; but both theology and philosophy are only the religion of the few, while religion is both the theology and the philosophy of the many. With the many, religion lingers in the form of representative or metaphorical conceptions. The thought of God is the soul of the religion of the heart. It is also the soul of religion expressed or interpreted in language of metaphor and general concepts. But, before passing to this most general form of religious knowledge, Hegel devotes a section to a more primary form, in which man objectifies the absolute—that is, the form of art, the creation of sensuous intuition or perception.

2. Sensuous perception is the direct apprehension of an object under the external conditions of time and space. Material things here represent as symbols the subjective object of devotion in the heart. It may thus be called *external* representation or symbolism. In its highest form it constitutes the realm of the Beautiful and its forms of Art. Art, Religion, and Philosophy may be said to be the three forms in which the Absolute exists for man. *Sensuous perception* or external representation is the organ of this knowledge in art, representative conception in religion, and speculative comprehension that of philosophy.

It will not do to cover the lower forms of idolatry with the beautiful veil of art. Yet, in the lowest

form, the heathen sees in his images, or in his stock or stone, a representation of something higher and invisible. Natural objects were at first images of non-natural powers. Art, undoubtedly, sprang out of idolatry, as astronomy out of astrology. In art, the human spirit labors to manifest the absolute in visible form as the Beautiful—to portray the Divine to eye and ear. The Divine is really the center and heart of all Art. Hence its ultimate relation with religion. It is, in fact, an essential phase of religion. But when made the chief phase of religion it becomes false—relapses into idolatry. It reached its highest form among the Greeks. Their religion was the religion of the Beautiful. Hegel barely notes this phase of religion here. For fuller treatment of it we may refer to his Æsthetics.*

Religion for us, however, finds expression rather in what we may call mental art. Mental conceptions take the place of objective nature and forms of art, in our representation of the Divine. Sensuous perception is ideally transformed into pictorial mental conception and generalized definitions. Methinks I see God—where? In my mind's eye, says the religious Hamlet. The passage has been made from sense to thought. The whole process of name-giving is the work of this phase of thought. The first Adam had made this passage, and could therefore respond to God's request that he should give a name to every beast and bird. The plural "we" is a primary mental generalization of two different sensuous persons. They are grasped together into one mental con-

^{*} Hegel's Æsthetics: A Critical Exposition, by J. Steinforth Kedney, D. D.; Griggs & Co., Chicago.

cept. All our most general and abstract terms—law, force, order, substance, essence, being, even that of God-are the result of this work of thought. Sensuous things are thus immersed and regenerated in this mental process. But there is a tendency to revert to their material equivalent. Used as symbols to represent more than any complex of sense could give, and as symbols of more than themselves actually present, they are sometimes personified and thus accepted as the exact equivalent of what they were intended to represent in a metaphorical way. Metaphors are thus objectified. In this phase it resembles the lowest form of art. It is mental idolatry. Instead of objectifying in sensuous forms, it accepts its definite mental pictures as the very incarnation of the absolute. A representation (Vorstellung) * is a generalized picture introducing an object to the mental eve. It is a device of thought to get above sense. It works these conceptions partly out of sense and partly out of materials emanating from self-conscious thought.† Sometimes they are the very images of real thought, and yet only formally so, for they never get beyond the limits of the understanding. The timeless and invisible are envisaged under conceptions valid only for temporal and sensible objects. Besides, these conceptions are independent, and can only be externally connected.

This picture-thinking, as Hegel styles it, forms the bulk of that done by the mass of mankind. But it is only proximate and inexact. The work of philosophy is needed to transform such conceptual thinking into organic thought. Conceptions, like works

^{*} Cf. last part of Chapter II.

[†] Hegel's Logic, p. 31.

of art, "half conceal and half reveal." These mental images may at one time help to wing the flight of the soul heavenward if used as helps, or they may chain it down to earth, if metaphor is literalized.

3. Representation. — The religious consciousness finds spontaneous and helpful expression in this language of conceptions and metaphors. It is peculiarly the language of religion. But it may become a hindrance and a limit to the true expression of religion as well as a help. Admit its worth, but scan its inadequacy and misuse. A pictorial conception may mislead as well as a sensuous picture. Men may be so blinded that they will fight and die for abstract and inadequate conceptions, as a heathen will for his gods of wood and stone. John Wesley wrote to the Calvinist Toplady, "Your God is my devil." Yet each of them would have endured the pains of martyrdom to maintain his own conception of God.

We must note more closely some of the uses and abuses of this form of thinking in interpreting the

religious consciousness.

From the cradle to the grave our religious life is nourished and strengthened by metaphors. The soul's loftiest flights are winged by metaphor. The world of sense and imagination are gleaned for choicest imagery to express the invisible and the spiritual. The language of the Bible and of devotional literature of all ages is essentially anthropomorphic, but only as metaphor. The cold critic may challenge the religion because of its language. He may caricature the common Christian conception of God as that of a "non-natural magnified man, living just around the corner." He literalizes where they

spiritualize. And yet even the devout soul often literalizes. Winged as it is by metaphor, it is often chained to metaphor. It accepts metaphors as equivalents, instead of symbols, of spiritual truth. But as new experience comes, the spirit waxes strong enough to break through the letter that chaineth. adequacy of its former conceptions being realized, there comes a state of mental unrest. The mind is continually battling with inadequate, worn-out conceptions, and emancipating itself from the temporal and finite elements in its conceptions of the Infinite. It recognizes not only the contradiction between its imaginative conceptions and the absolute and infinite nature of its object, but also the contradictions of its conceptions among themselves. As the artist realizes that his creations are inadequate representations of the ideal, so do religious people recognize that their conceptions of the invisible and spiritual are inadequate; and while using this figurate, metaphorical language, they tacitly assert that it is merely figurative. The form is not equal to its content. It only suggests and embodies the content in such a way as to enable them to immeasurably transcend it.

Thus we speak of the Father and the Son in the Trinity, tacitly denying that we affirm their relations to each other to be the same as the relation of a human father and son to each other. We affirm only a likeness, a similarity to the human relation that helps us better to express the true nature of God. So, too, when we speak of the wrath of God, his vengeance, his throne, his right hand, and his holy arm, we recognize that they are only inadequate figures. The Scriptural expression, "The fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil," contains intellectual and moral

elements, which submerge, and force us to rise above its sensuous element of tree and fruit. So it is that very many of our anthropomorphic conceptions of God are used and not abused. Dwelling on them as metaphors and parables, they suggest and awaken the highest spiritual communion with God, while at the same time they are not accepted as exact equivalents for the spiritual realities they thus suggest.

How best to conceive God to-day under the changed conditions of modern science and culture is the chief task of religious teachers and apologists. How to discard antique and effete conceptions (misrepresentations of our religious truth that create the skeptic, and give him a man of straw, or quixotic windmills to do battle with) and to replace them with new, vital, and more adequate ones-this is a work not to be declined by earnest and intelligent Christians to-day. Our own self-necessitated iconoclasm has destroyed our old idols; can not, must we not, make new and better ones? A divine revelation must come and be interpreted under these limitations of human mind and language, or it would be as unmeaning as the equation of two unknown quantities x = y. But the experience and content of the human mind varies—advances, we believe—and so the materials out of which it must frame its conceptions varies and increases. Are we to be equal to this task laid upon us by the Zeit-Geist of the present century. as our fathers of other centuries have been equal to their task? This is not the highest sort of vindication that thought has to make of religion-not the absolute vindication that the philosophy of Religion offers; but it is, nevertheless, a very lofty one that may well engage the sanctified intellect of those

who have to speak to the people through pulpit and

press to-day.

Not only do these pictorial conceptions help us to rise far beyond themselves, but also external facts of history serve the same purpose, though they may also, like abused conceptions, smother the idea in names and dates and external events. But almost none are too stupid to draw a moral from history. They read between the lines, and interpret merely external events. Some plan, idea, providence, or spiritual interpretation is thus given to all history. This may often be far below a philosophy of History, but it at least shows the tentative efforts of the ordinary consciousness toward the comprehension of the spiritual import of mere events. The events of the life of Jesus are genuine divine history; but as mere facts they are of the same value as other historical events. Yet they have an inner and spiritual content that only reason can see and interpret. Divine activity, eternal transactions, and absolute divine relations are manifested in the sensuous, finite events that form the external history of Jesus Christ. The content is infinite, the form only finite. Faith, spirit, thought, it is, which sees the infinite content. Spirit testifies to spirit, and the son of man recognizes the Son of God in Iesus of Nazareth.

"The history of Christ's life is thus the external evidence, but faith changes its signification; for the important point is not merely faith as a belief in this external history, but in the doctrine that this man was the Son of God. There the sensuous content becomes quite a different one; it is changed into another, and the demand or postulate is that it should be proved by evidence. The subject is changed

completely; from a sensuously, empirically existing subject it becomes a divine one—an essentially highest phase of God himself. This content is no longer sensuous; when, therefore, the demand is made to prove it in the former sensuous manner, this mode is inadequate, to begin with, since the subject is of an entirely different nature."*

Spiritual truth comes to all primarily in this form of representative knowledge. It is translated out of the form of feeling, which it has largely created, and given some definite characteristics and attributes. The genesis of the religious feeling, it is true, belongs to the primitive depths in which God and the soul are practically one. The child has the native capacity for religion. Religious training would be in vain without this presupposition. To give the child any conceptions, any symbols, names, or attributes of God is to meet the essential religious wants of his nature, by helping him to positive conceptions of what he feels blindly stirring within his soul.

Hegel notes the pedagogical question as to whether or not religion can be taught. He holds the induction of children into objective forms of worship and faith to be essential to their religious development. Religious training is as essential as any other part of education. He would approve of the catechetical method, which is followed in all the public schools of Germany to-day. So bare a skeleton as Sadler's "Church Doctrine and Bible Teaching" is a positive help at this stage, as it is a positive hindrance when its abstract, dogmatic, literalized imagery is given as meat to strong men. But it is just in this pictorial,

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. ii, p. 323.

anthropomorphic form that religion can be taught. It is educed and nourished by such definite conceptions. The love of God is depicted as the love of a parent for a child, only infinitely greater, and his anger likewise. The conception of almightiness may be made the beginning of wisdom and love as well as of obedience. Faith lays hold of all these conceptual attributes, and raises the believer into closer communion with God. Fear is changed into confidence. God is not a hostile but a friendly power. We are only complete in Him as we identify ourselves with Him. Any poor earth-born mortal with God on his side is always the majority—is on the side of the biggest guns which triumph over all foes. This was one of the points of difference in the bitter disagreement between Hegel and Schleiermacher. Hegel made the feeling of nothingness and of sheer dependence a lower and transient phase of religion, while Schleiermacher maintained that it always constituted true religion. He maintained that the Church at the Reformation rightly apprehended and restored the central doctrine of justification by faith. Through faith one is so united with God that he has absolute assurance of salvation, and absolute freedom in his spiritual life. God's laws are seen to be the laws of his own true being. God is for him, and he will not fear what the devil or man worketh against him. It is the testimony of the Spirit that authenticates religious truth. The positive catechetical stage must be so conducted as to lead to personal conviction. But this comes only through mediation. At first truth is received as "Church doctrine and Bible teaching." Thus the incarnation—the very core of revealed or absolute religion—is received naïvely on

authority. It is the same with other doctrines. But thought unavoidably comes to reflect upon these doctrines, to criticise and examine them in their pictorial and dogmatic form. Their limitations and contradictions then appear. Doubt comes to shake the whole fabric of man's creed. Certitude is then sought through rationalistic investigations and evidences, only to multiply doubts. Then recourse is had to the belief of the majority. The quod semper maxim is appealed to. Thousands and millions of the wisest and best men have believed thus, œcumenical councils have thus decreed the creed; therefore it must be true. Thus, faith ceases to be living and personal. The superstition of pagan oracles appears in the form of absolute and unsubstantiated infallibility of council and Church.

I am free to admit that, so long as religious thought tarries in this realm of figurate conceptions and definitions, and demands absolute infallible certitude of such conceptions, there can be no other one offered than this same doctrine of ecclesiastical infallibility. All the so-called evidences of Christianity that try to meet rationalism on its own low plane can attain to nothing more than probability or credibility. Put "old faiths in new light," and old foes will appear with new faces. Restate doctrines; reconceive them in harmony with the changed conditions of modern science and culture: disintegrate and reintegrate the Creed with the evolutionary hypothesis; reform the Reformation; let the new Theology and the new Reformation replace effete conceptions by modern and more adequate ones; let science and religion find a modern reconciliation of concepts, and still no permanent certitude will be

reached. All this work, as I have said (page 91), is very valuable, and none of us who are in earnest about helping our fellow-men can do otherwise than heartily engage in translating out of the old into new conceptions. But we are still in the realm of inadequate forms and language, which our thought will never cease to criticise. So one must let thought have its perfect work, and reach its ultimate comprehension of the religious idea and relation in which the absolute rationality of Christian doctrine is vindicated, or else he must, if still haunted by the phantom of infallibility of conceptions, fall back on sheer authority.* Thought must transcend the conceptions of both common rationalism and common orthodoxy, before the faith can have that vital, personal, intellectual vindication of which any ex cathedra infallibility is the veriest ape. Either this Philosophy of Religion must be attained, or we must rest on the external evidences of miracle and councils. The only other alternative is to refuse to examine, to ask for no evidences, to keep the simple faith of childhood in mature years by arbitrary repression of thought.

Apologetics may seem to advance independently. Yet its work is constantly that of an interplay of thought and conceptions and reasonings, and authority, with authority as the ultimate place of refuge. Common rationalism will then ask for the authority of *ex cathedra* authority, for the credentials of infallibility. The appeal is to miracles. But they are not evidences of our own senses. We were not present

^{*} The worth and the worthlessness of this notion of infallibility are admirably considered by the Rev. Dr. Kedney, in his Christian Doctrines Harmonized, vol. ii, p. 242.

when the revelation was thus confirmed. We must accept the testimony of eye-witnesses. That the apostles were eye-witnesses we must ultimately believe, because the Church says they were. Then rationalism smiles at the credulity of believers in miracles. Modern science seems, at least, to render their occurrence utterly improbable. The newer criticism plays havoc with the verbally inspired Bible of the orthodox. The new method of historical study reveals the human element as dominant in all church history, robbing all councils of the ecclesiastical gloss of infallibility. The Bible, Reason, and the Church, one after another, are made the standing-ground of Apologetics, and yet not one of them is infallible. Each one needs a larger apologetic to vindicate its authority. They are all relatively sufficient grounds, when themselves grounded upon the authority of the absolute idea of Religion. I am the last one to depreciate their relative value. I am convinced that modern Apologetics must largely deal with these methods, and that it makes no mistake in its appeal to the Bible, to Reason, and to the Church as authorities. I am the last one to abate anything from the just deliverances of the Christian consciousness as embodied in these three forms of authority. But I do not believe that any or all of them can absolutely vindicate our deepest religious verities, much less the temporary and imperfect conceptions in which these verities are often couched. None of them can afford us a "short and easy method with skeptics." The Bible is infallible. The argument is, "Believe or be damned." The ninetcenth century shrugs its shoulder into at least an interrogationmark. Reason is infallible. The argument is, at least,

"Believe this or nothing." The agnostic chooses the latter alternative. Then comes the hard-church argument, affirming the right of might, of mere possession. The Church is infallible. Its assertion—for it proffers no argument—is the quicunque vult of the Athanasian Creed, and its last word is the anathema. Never argue, but continually affirm and maintain the old teaching. Apologetics are an impertinence. All attempts at restating and resetting gospel truth in the culture of the nineteenth century is decried. Once allow an inch to reason, and it will take innumerable miles. And, when reason does this, it does not give definite answers to all questions. It opens more questions than it can close. It challenges its own dogmas of previous ages. It ends at best in semi-agnosticism. It can not speak ex cathedra. Its confession must be, "We are none of us infallible, not even the youngest"-not even the nineteenth century reason of the mere understanding. There is only one perfect Gnostic—that is God. And yet we, as his children, must strive to become like him in mind as well as in heart. Yet old textbooks are worn out, and many new ones are very superficial. Many are justly weary of such unevidencing evidences. Many, though heathen with the understanding, are yet Christian with the heart. They believe, in spite of such evidences.

Skepticism is prevalent to-day among all intellectual classes. Is the devil at the bottom of it all? I am unwilling to impute it to that source as long as there are so many patent causes for it within the Church itself, which I can sum up under two heads:

1. The Church's persistent use of the uncriticised category of infallibility.

2. The practical atheism of

the Church teaching, which often banishes God from the secular world.

I. Infallibility is the dream of mere seminarians, and the tool of ecclesiastical politicians. By both, the Divine Self-Revelation to human children is dwarfed and rendered mechanical and arbitrary. Fleeing the light of human reason, it buries itself in closets, to issue forth as the party-whip to compel men to obedience and faith. Refusing to notice the human instruments and the historical experience by which this Divine Revelation is mediated to men; refusing to recognize the work of the Holy Spirit in the movements of men's minds and human experience in this century, it persistently anathematizes all attempts to reset the old truths in new light-It assumes infallibility to pronounce itself infallible. It divorces intellectual insight from the holy life of love and good works. It divorces God's own Self-Revelation from his divine love and goodness, and makes it as arbitrary as the deliverances of the gods of ancient or modern superstition. Much of modern skepticism is simply the inherently just and necessary demand of the human spirit to know the source and ground of such asserted infallibility for Bible and Church and Reason. It is more than willing to yield to rational authority. But it will not, and it ought not to yield the blind obedience demanded to any authority. It must see what it is in the Bible and in the Church and in Reason that makes them authorities that should be respected, and that will help instead of hinder the aspirations of the human mind and heart. It insists, and rightly too, in pruning off excrescences, temporary and accidental elements, mechanical, verbal inspiration, and ecclesiastical infalli100

bility, which sets itself above history, or manufactures its own history. A candid examination of any of these arbitrary infallibilities easily silences their ex cathedra tones, or makes them to be mere voices from the tomb or from dream-land. It opens more questions than any one of these authorities can answer except with its anathema. It compels it, if honest, to say, "I don't know," to many questions. I compels it to retire to the lower throne of semiagnosticism. There is a vast amount of dogmatic and ecclesiastical rubbish, relics of by-gone contests and victories that must be frankly proclaimed as non-essential to the faith. The doctrine of the Divine guidance into truth, as men are able to see the truth, must supplant that of mechanical infallibility. The authority of the Bible and the Church must be vindicated on other and more real and congenial grounds. Skepticism must question, not to reject in toto but to reassert in more vital form. Bible and Church and Reason will always command men's reverence, when a true rationale of their authority is presented. It is necessary for the strong, growing human spirit to question the absolute infallible authority, in order to submit itself to all worthy, adequate, ethical ones. Relatively, under necessary limitations of human conditions, the triad of Bible, Church, and Reason, will be accepted by anxious skeptics, as the very essential media for the Self-Revelation of God to men. Obedience to them will be self-imposed. They will be neither arbitrary nor foreign. They will be the best presentation of one's own duties, privileges, and laws. Looking at the way in which they have been evolved, and at the goal they seek for man, he will find in them all the very motions of the Holy Spirit guiding, luring, commanding into new truth and new and fuller self-realization. Other authority God himself does not care to give to spirits made in his own image, and other authority his own children should neither expect nor desire.

2. The second cause of much skepticism to-day is, the practical atheism of much Christian teaching, which often banishes God from the so-called secular life. Such teaching denies that the world is even God's footstool. It denies that the world is vet under the Divine guidance. It fences off what it calls the Church from what it stigmatizes as the secular life, refusing it any part or place in the great kingdom of God. It practically banishes God from the largest part of his own world, reduces his kingdom, alienates his allies, and denies the very revelation that it admits. Religion as a cult or as dogma is elevated above religion as a life, above the daily activity in all the divinely appointed spheres of life, above science, civilization, industry, and morality. The spirit of truth and love and mutual helpfulness, which permeates and sustains all the great secular institutions and labors—that is, the religion of Christ that there is in honest secular life is despised, or spoken of with abated approval. The religion, the communion with God through nature, art, through labor in the common and the professional and scientific spheres of human activity, is not recognized as religion, or as being evidence of and as helping forward the kingdom of God.

It is not too much to say that the priest who thinks that he manufactures God by a hoc est meus corpus (mumbled hocus-pocus) considers himself more religious than the man who labors ten hours a day

for the daily bread of his family, or than the great artists, engineers, scientists, scholars, and philanthropists who are laboring for the well-being of humanity. The priest may think so. But the great mass of God's children, who have, in his good Providence, been born in this century of human culture, will only say, and say rightly, that if this is true, then religion is of no worth to them. Formal ecclesiasticism and orthodoxy have made more skeptics than they have converted. There is often more faith in honest doubt of such misinterpretations of Christianity than in half such creeds.

Such religion narrows instead of broadens men's humanity and the kingdom of heaven on earth. Such skepticism is really broadening the kingdom, and forcing its keepers to make broader her mantle of generous appreciation and love for all that cultivates and elevates humanity. Such religion is daily calling down upon its head the woes pronounced upon it by the Christ when he saw it among the Scribes and Pharisees, the ecclesiastical and puritanical keepers, not spreaders, of the faith in his day. Such skepticism is the real stirring of the Spirit, protesting against having its work in secular spheres condemned as profane.

Modern skepticism is very serious and earnest and wistful. Much of it needs but the true presentation of Christianity as the life and light of the world, as the Divine love seeking and saving and civilizing and perfecting men—the most Divine because the most human power on earth, to joyfully accept and enter the social state in which the spirit of Christ reigns. Wherever work is being done for the education and the progress of man, there is the spirit of Christ; and where Christ is there is his church. That much of this is not

within the organized Church, is as much the fault of the Church herself as it is of those that follow not after the professed keepers of his faith. See how Christ's Spirit is working, often unrecognized, in the countless non-Christian and even anti-Christian brotherhoods and forms of social and co-operative societies. Their mutual helpfulness, patience, earnestness, and self-sacrifice, what a really divine service of man they often constitute! And yet what a cry it is to the Church for that divine brotherhood that was Christ's ideal of his church on earth! Let the Catholic Church proclaim by deed as well as by word this mission to help men to the highest realization of such brotherhood, and it will become the Catholic Church. She will lead earnest skeptics into her fold, because they will recognize it as their home, and not the fortress of an enemy. Let the Church reveal herself as the means of genuine salvation for man, and not as an end to herself, and men who now scoff will come to work and worship in her fold. Identify Christianity with moral goodness and brotherly love, and the Church with all the means wherever and however used for the perfecting of redeemed humanity; acknowledge all the light and truth that God is disclosing to the students of science, applied arts, and philosophy to-day as the self-revelation of the light which lighteneth every man that comes into the world—in a word, acknowledge the truth, and the ranks of earnest skepticism would be thinned as no polemical apologetics or ecclesiastical fulminating canons could ever thin them. Christianity is neither primarily nor chiefly a cult or dogma. The unjust over-emphasis of these two phases of Christianity have been the bane of Rome and Geneva in all their forms.

Finality claimed for provisional forms of thought and worship and organization, means sterility in the Church and skepticism out of it. Skepticism rarely attacks the character of our Divine Master. Let us reioice if it does attack our caricatures of his spirit and method and purposes. Family life, social and civil life, associations for the pursuit of knowledge and mutual self-help—none of these genuinely human interests and activities are thought alien to himself by Christ. He finds himself in them all. And when the worship and dogma of cult schismatize themselves from the larger life of Christ's Spirit in these concrete forms of human activity, they only belittle and render themselves harmful. This is that most deadly sin of spiritual schism, the only schism that our Lord ever thought of condemning. The Church excommunicates herself from the larger life of redeemed humanity, for the crime of the vital heresy of limiting the revelation and communication of Christ to his own, to one system and one channel. What wonder, then, that his sheep of the one flock are skeptical as to the dicta of such unbelievers? The cultured classes of France are all skeptical. The cult of institutionalism has excommunicated what the cultured world knows to be true, and the result is that there religion is for the priests and the peasants. The best men in France say that M. Gambetta only uttered the truth in his now famous mot, "L'ennemi c'est le cléricalisme." The Church there means opposition to modern science and progress. It means the clergy. The clergy teach superstitious follies in the name of Christ, instead of his more patent life and light in the secular spheres of men's interests and duties, and measure all goodness by a petty ecclesiastical standard. The

conversion of the cultured classes there means the abandonment of clericalism. The Bishop of Manchester has recently referred to the same evil in the Church of England. There are some signs of a petty but rampant revival of the same maker of skepticism in our own land. Hence I can not forbear making a pertinent quotation trom Canon Freemantle's Bampton Lecture. The supremacy of clericalism infallibly brings a perversion of the Christian ideal, and draws away the consciousness of dignity and holiness from common life by a pretended and false distinction between secular and spiritual things. "By clericalism," he says (page 364), "I understand the system which unduly exalts the clerical office, and the function of public worship, so as to draw away the sense of divine agency and appointment from other offices and other functions. This tendency, as has before been said, is not really one which exalts the Church. It exalts the clergy alone; it dwarfs and emasculates the Church. The clergy, and those to whom the system of public worship is dear, must learn to make the great sacrifice of Christians. They must learn to 'live not for themselves,' to 'look not on their own things, but also on the things of others.' The system they administer must be felt not to exist for itself, but for the general community. They must efface, if need be, themselves and their system in the effort to save the world. They must be willing to be nothing, that Christ may be all in all. They must desire that, if it were possible, there should be not only holy orders of bishops and presbyters, but holy orders of artists, and poets, and teachers of science, and statesmen. They should be forward to recognize good in departments which are not theirs, and in

forms very different from their own. A ministry imbued with such a spirit as this may still be the luminous and inspiring focus where light and heat are stored for diffusion through the whole mass; whereas, by almost identifying Christianity with public worship, and absorbing all ministries in the clerical function, and thinking more of correct forms of appointment and ordination than of the Divine gifts which form the true succession of spiritual leaders, we may become the greatest of all obstacles to the establishment of the kingdom of God."

"Ultima ratio regum" was the inscription on one of the cannons of Louis XIV. Some of the kings and priests of the Church of God have labeled their ecclesiastical canons with the same maxim of tyranny; but until the authority of Church councils and priests be vindicated as rational, as "made for man," as the best means subordinate to the moral and spiritual welfare of believers—until they are thus seen to be jure divino, they will be inefficient. Clericalism may make itself obnoxious, or it may assume the method of Jesus and of St. Paul, and commend itself to every man's conscience, and thus speak with the only vital authority that avails in dealing with men's souls. Such clerical work, and such a living and Catholic Church, will not lack that authority which is powerful, and which skeptics really crave. Such vital Christianity will be a far more efficient antidote to doubt than whole libraries of polemical Evidences. Many of these volumes are as hot and as harmless as papal anathemas. Such "aids to faith" have recently been somewhat severely characterized thus:*

^{*} The Rev. Dr. William Kirkus, of Baltimore.

"There is scarcely any kind of literature so exasperating, and even demoralizing, as Christian apologetics. Most of these tedious volumes are characterized by a haughtiness, a truculence, a contemptuousness, a cynical indifference to the salvation of souls, a cheerful alacrity in sacrificing any number of sinners to a single syllogism, which almost make humane readers regret that they were not written in defense of the devil. Mediæval arguments against heresy, Protestant arguments against Popery, Puritan arguments against Prelacy, theistic arguments against agnosticism—they are almost all alike. Opponents are fools or knaves, or a mischievous compound of the two. Moreover, they really intend to dethrone the Almighty and to ruin souls. They are not misguided 'brethren' to be 'gained,' but reprobates to be destroyed by 'fire from heaven.'"

This is too severe, at least too sweeping; for there is a gathering host of devout men who are writing in full sympathy with the culture of the present century,* and yet wise enough to know that wisdom was not born with this generation; men who perceive that Jesus has suffered almost as much from his friendly caricaturists as from his crucifiers, and yet can boldly say to the latter, "Ye know not what ye do"; men who know the mutations of human language and conceptions, and yet maintain the necessity

^{*} The writers of the recent volumes of that remarkable establishment for producing apologetical literature—The Bampton Lecture—ably illustrate this improved modern method of aiding faith. The volumes by Prebendary Row, Bishop Temple, Canon Freemantle, Prof. Hatch, Mr. R. E. Bartlett, and Prof. Cheyne are, to use a much-abused expression, fully abreast of modern thought, and interpret Christianity in conceptions understanded of the people of this nineteenth century.

of Church dogma and Bible truth; men whose unfaltering faith and sweet reasonableness are doing much to hold and win back many whom modern culture has alienated from formal Christianity. They are ready to exclaim with Schleiermacher, "Woe is me if Christianity be not more than my system!" and yet to say yea to Coleridge's assertion, "Christianity finds me," and to Jacobi's, "Only in finding God does one find himself." Such men, however, have come to fully appreciate the limitations and contradictions inherent in the common language and conceptions in which Christian truth is envisaged and held. Both are inadequate to the content. Both pictorial conception and the dogmas of the mere understanding are partial, abstract, and self-contradictory. They have their worth. They are the creations of the human spirit brooding upon Divine revelation. The Holy Spirit has through them been guiding us to fuller apprehension of the truth. They are not worthless; they are not false, except when held abstractly as the last utterance of the Spirit, as the last insight into Divine revelation, and the unchangeable and perfect image of the whole truth. And it is the same Holy Spirit that is urging men on to a wider vision, up loftier mounts, and into deeper communion. It is the same Spirit co-working with our spirits, groaning with our spirits, as it reveals the imperfection of our hitherto attainment and expression of spiritual knowledge. This Spirit thus demands that we find in religion the absolute and self-consistent truth. Thought does demand the good work of replacing worn-out conceptions by new and more adequate ones—more adequate because more in touch with current thought and conceptions in other departments of mental activity. But it also demands an apprehension of the absolute ground or authority upon which all these rest, and an intelligent, synthetic comprehension of them all in the organic unity of the idea of religion itself. It thus undertakes a criticism of the faculties of imagination and the understanding. It shows both the worth and the worthlessness of their work. Hegel, in his Logic,* fully justifies the place and work of the understanding in giving definite but stereotyped conceptions. At the same time he shows how it must be transcended by the further activity of thought. In this work he notes chiefly the limitations of the language of the pictorial imagination—that is, of Representation (Vorstellung), or the envisaging of the invisible in terms, pictures, and conceptions drawn from the visible and finite realm. The infinite and universal is represented in forms of the finite and contingent. It is thus manifested to us, but not adequately. The form is not adequate to the content. Thus, the absolute representation of the Absolute is intrinsically impossible. The content of religion may be, and is, felt and imagined, but the ultimate demand of the human spirit, moved by the Divine Spirit, is that it also be thought.

We have already seen how it is contained in feeling, and how it passes into the form of *conception*, being thereby only further developed instead of abolished. Thought now proceeds to criticise these its own creations. This is partly the work of common rationalism. It is a phase in the life of every thoughtful person. It is more developed in some men and in

^{*} Page 122.

some ages than in others. It appears as the Aufklaerung and the Éclaircissement, as Deism and as Rationalism, Skepticism and Agnosticism. Thus, it exposes the following chief defects of its own conceptions and dogmas: They are (a) stereotyped metaphors, (b) external and abstract propositions, and (c) mutually self-contradictory conceptions. Prof. Wallace has thus stated * Hegel's criticism of this approximate but inexact form of thinking in which religious truth is largely stated:

"Such thinking does not grasp these objects, but sets them before it. (a.) It is still trameled by the senses. Thought and sensation strive for the mastery in it. Thought is bound fast to an illustration, and of this illustration it can not as presentative thought divest itself; the eternally living idea is chained to the transient and perishable form of sense. It is metaphorical and material thinking, which is helpless without the metaphor and the matter. (b.) Presentative thought envisages what is timeless and infinite under the conditions of time and space. It loses sight of the moral and spirit of historical development under the semblance of the names, incidents, and forms in which it is displayed. The historical and philosophical sense is lost under the antiquarian. Presentative thought keeps the shell, and throws away the kernel. (c.) The terms by which such a materialized thought describes its objects are not internally connected; each is independent of the other, and we only bring them together for the nonce by an act of subjective arrangement."

This criticism of thought is partly the work of

^{*} Hegel's Logic, Prolegomena xci.

the understanding which has itself created the object of criticism. It is also partly the work of the reason, as the faculty of the infinite, the faculty of comprehension, of systemization, of concrete totality. It refuses to abide by the work of the understanding and the imagination as the ne plus ultra attainment of thought. The idea, as comprehensive, concrete, organic synthesis of parts into members, free in its selfdetermination, living in all parts of itself—some such a speculative synthesis of apparently incongruous elements of life and thought it is that lures and forces thought on to higher attainment. Thought's faith in itself, in the universe, and in God, may be said to be faith in such a vast, self-consistent, self-developing system. Despair of thought is exactly despair of system; but this despair is not the chronic or healthy state of thought. Thought is positive, aggressive, laborious in its persistent infusion of the lucidity of reason into all within its ken. It is the logos within joyfully recognizing itself in the logos without. It is subjective consciousness ripening into self-consciousness as it is recreated through experience in the image of God's mind. It is thus only that man, recognizing himself as the interpretation of experience, can become the adequate interpreter of it. Thought finds, then, all the ordinary categories of the understanding and conceptions of the imagination inadequate to interpret its experience into system. System it must have, else agnosticism, despair, and death for spirit. It does not seek to utterly abolish and destroy the content of feeling and imagination, but to realize them in more vital form. Thoughtful comprehension makes us neither unfeeling nor without understanding and imagination. As the definite and

pictorial form is above that of undeveloped subjective feeling, so is this larger comprehension of the contents of the religious consciousness but an advance in form. It is, to use the favorite and pregnant phrase of Hegel, the form of necessity—that is, the form in which every part is mutually correlated and essential to every other part as the head is necessary to the heart and both necessary to the vital body. The highest form of necessity is seen only in spiritual organisms. Here necessity becomes selfnecessity, determinism self-determinism, and the whole an organism of organisms with self-consciousness throughout. The higher form can never be adequately illustrated or explained by a lower one. You can not explain the lowest organism in terms of inorganic bodies. You can not explain an ethical or spiritual organism in terms which only describe a physical organism. Science could not move a step without this admission. The lowest form of organic life is not very different from inorganic matter. The lowest form of animal life is like a plant, but different. Man is like an animal, but different. Mere likeness would reduce the exquisitely graded forms of the world to the blank identity of nondescript protoplasm. The widest generalizations of science tend toward some such indescribable primal world-stuff. Abstracting difference after difference, it attains wider genera, orders, kingdoms, finally passing into some undifferentiated form of protoplasm. Science thus reconciles and unifies all things by abstracting all unlikeness and reducing them to identity—matter or force. It may thus attempt to explain man in terms of animal life, and animal life in terms of chemical and mechanical relations: but it is false to nature

in this attempt. It reaches its richer results when it is descriptive, and notes the differences between its objects that demand different grades of categories of description. The vegetable kingdom is rightly considered richer than the realm where only mechanical and chemical relations are used; and the animal kingdom is inclusive of still more various differences. These kingdoms rise above and upon each other. Chemical forces abrogate in combining separate atoms. Life abrogates while transforming them into a higher unity. The plant contains fiber and sap, but is more than the mere sum of these and its other elements. A new and higher conception is needed to describe the animal who contains all the elements of the lower kingdoms, and yet is more than the mechanical equivalent of all the elements from these kingdoms that it holds in a transmuted form. Yet in all these relations science posits external necessity. Any one thing is the result of the totality of conditions and elements implied in it. It scarcely dares rise to the category of true necessity, to that which is immanent in the idea or system of self-consciousness, where self-relation and self-determination are essential categories. The course of Philosophy ends here with just what science has as yet declined to accept. Its progress, too, is from lower to higher categories. It supplies, in fact, all the categories that science uses, giving them their relative truth and yet transcending all, while realizing them all in its ultimate category of the *Idea*, Reason, self-conscious Personality. It is the completion of the system of categories, any one of which is not false, as a member of the whole, only false when held as ultimate. Philosophy maintains that there is one system, or the

systematic unity of all things, and that this unity is immanent and self-creative, self-determining as to all its parts or members, creating and thereby manifesting and realizing itself in its differences. This Idea or system may be chronologically last and only reached by infinite struggle through the study of all phenomena on lower levels: but when once reached it is seen to be essentially and creatively the true first cause. It is the idea of the plant or animal that determines, creates its various parts. It is never the mere sum of them. The idea only realizes itself through them, fulfills itself in all its self-differentiations. first cause, then, is not the empirical origin but its completed form. Man may have sprung from the ape, but is not explainable by the ape and any number of external conditions. The idea of man is more than the sum total of all empirical antecedents and concomitants. He is a man for all that. We can no more explain him by these than we can explain a grand cathedral by a description of every bit of stone and mortar and wood that forms it. Its idea, its plans as thought out in the brain of an architect, is its true explanation, its real first cause. Illustrations without number might be adduced of this unscientific use of the post hoc ergo propter hoc by scientists. have used these few only to illustrate the difficulties and contradictions found by thought in current conceptions of religious truth, by which it is forced on to the higher comprehensive unity of the Idea. lustrations, too, without number might be adduced to show how metaphorical conceptions about God and man are literalized, how the understanding defines and isolates these from essential relations, how contradictory many religious conceptions are to each other, how categories of thought applicable only to lower realms are dogmatically applied to express the true content of the religious relation as felt in the heart, how inadequate they are to represent the real heart of religion—that intimate, vital, congenial, indissoluble, organic, and necessary relation between God and man. All these it is which raises the storm of adverse criticism and of anxious doubt that are the most conspicuous phases of the religious world to-day. The pious soul and the devout thinker alike demand a higher point of view.

The religious knowledge of ordinary thought is strained through finite images and materialized conceptions—is representative, figurate, and consequently inadequate Even in the higher form of systematic theology it is one-sided and inadequate because passed through the sieve of a narrow and rationalizing logic. This narrow logic let free plays havoc with dogmas, exaggerating differences instead of giving unity. There must, then, be a higher method of knowing the content of religion, of grasping the manifold elements of divine truth so that they shall be seen as correlated members of an organic whole. Nature, man, God, these—their reality and unity, can only be rationally conceived of and held under the form of an organic unity, which is The Speculative Idea of Religion.

There is an essential necessity, then, for thought to translate the content of the religious relation out of these inadequate forms into—

III. The Speculative Idea of Religion.—Complaint is sometimes made that philosophy destroys instead of transforms the content of the religious consciousness. It is only true in the sense that the fruit de-

stroys the blossom. Those who love the blossom and do not appreciate the fruit will find little in the philosophy of religion to their taste. Those who expect to find all the old conflicting metaphorical conceptions retained and justified in their old form will be disappointed. Transformation means change and development. It will be appreciated only by those who think through the transformation. The same objection is made to Theology that it destroys religion, that little worth having is left of religion in the form of Theology or Philosophy. Further notice will be taken of this objection after the transformation.

It must be noted that we make no objection to the purely religious use of metaphorical conceptions. It is only when they cease to wing the flight heavenward, and when the understanding insists upon their limitations and contradictions, so that they can no longer be the unquestioning language of the heart, that thought is forced on to transcend them. We have admitted that the language of religion is generally used with the tacit acknowledgment that it is inadequate; that God and heaven and its blissful life are all "beyond compare"; that language and imagination are utterly beggared in attempting any exhaustive description of them; that it multiplies all its conceptions by the infinite and subtracts from them all that is accidental, empirical, and sensuous; that all these are but suggestions to the imagination and heart to enable the soul to immeasurably transcend them. Thought does not criticise its own language of devotion when thus used. It is only when we, or others, misconceive and abuse it that thought begins its dialectic, its labor of chastising love upon

it. Our Lord himself spake much in parables—spiritual truth was *like* various natural objects—yet even his disciples were sometimes with those others who heard but did not understand. His wonderful parable of calling his "flesh meat indeed," and his "blood drink indeed," was a "hard saying" to them, and he had to warn them that only the Spirit could give life.

The highest representation that we make is that of the Absolute as God. But what does the word God signify to us? What are the mental images and concepts that it contains for us? That depends upon who we are, and at what period of life and culture we are, at the time of uttering it. Here we may notice the dialectic at work at home. We begin at the conceptions of God held by the most superstitious heathen and follow along through the higher forms of the world-religious, criticising and refusing to accept any of their conceptions of God as adequate or worthy. We continue the examination of the Christian conception of God in different epochs of time and culture, still criticising current conceptions. We criticise the conceptions of God that many of our fellow-Christians about us have. It is still fashionable in some pulpits to even revile the Calvinistic conception as being most inhuman and most undivine. We find every phase of heresy repeating itself in common conceptions of God. We criticise our own conceptions. From the mother's knee to the dying couch we are transforming or replacing imperfect conceptions about God by more worthy ones. We acknowledge that our highest conception only faintly adumbrates and suggests the inexpressible Infinite and Absolute. Thus God remains the abstract and simple Absolute. This tacit acknowledgment, however, has led to the shocking position that God is unknown and unknowable. The truth in this doctrine of the Unconditioned is that he is inconceivable under any temporal and visible conditions; that our concept-making faculty only creates out of such conditions, and therefore can never adequately *represent* him to the eye, soul, or mind.

We try to make our conception mean more by adding attributes-mere generalized conceptionswhich are not seen to proceed out of the essential nature of God. They are fixed and independent qualities not mutually related and mutually creating. They are conceptions about God, not derivative from him. Lacking substantial ground and organic relation, they are seen to be formally and mutually selfcontradictory the moment they are taken out of their purely devotional use. They are externally attached to the empty conception of the Absolute. If God is Almighty, there is no place for him to be All-wise. If he is just, he can not be merciful.* A scheme of these attributes is, therefore, proposed by theologians for harmonizing these contradictions, which barely satisfies while it is being made. The defect in this method of defining God through attributes is, that they are only special characteristics, whose only ground is our subjective conceptions. Thus comes the feeling, so strong among the Orientals, that God is the "many-named," and yet the nameless. A succession of such predicates can no more describe the essential nature of God than a series of points can describe a straight line, or than a series of distinct organs can describe a living animal. The life is more

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, p. 153, and vol. ii, p. 230.

than all organs; in fact, creates and integrates and lives in them all. They do not determine or describe it, but the reverse. We may call God the Creator. In this figurate conception, not unjustly labeled "the carpenter theory," there is no essential or necessary relation between God and the world. He might or might not have created the world. His creative attribute is not an essential one, but depends upon his arbitrary choice. It defines God only as related to a contingent world, thus indicating his relation to another and not to himself. Then his almightiness created only dead, inert matter, without form and void. His wisdom is then conceived as coming to repair his first creation. He might, moreover, have refrained from using both these attributes. The creation is not essential to his immanent, divine, selfactivity. "But we are conscious that God is not represented in a living way in this enumeration of arbitrary and self-contradictory predicates. To say that they must be conceived only in sensu eminentiori, does not remove the contradictions. The true solution is only contained in the *Idea* (Idee) in which they are seen to be self-determinations of God, who in them all differentiates himself from himself, and yet eternally subsumes and realizes himself in them." *

Thought makes the like criticism of the doctrine of original sin, and of the Holy Trinity, as held in ordinary religious conception. Hegel himself is the staunchest maintainer of the Nicene doctrine of the Godhead. Its doctrine of the Trinity is the only absolute and essential definition of God. But the ordinary, unphilosophical conception of the Trinity is a

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. ii, p. 230.

mixture of sensible and empirical elements with supersensible and philosophical ones, of picture-thought (Vorstellung) and of the speculative thought *idea* (Begriff), all enveloped in mystery. If positive, definite conception is attempted, the result is either *tritheism* or *Sabellianism*. To excommunicate for these two errors would be to almost empty the seats of the laity and to decimate the stalls of the clergy.

This is the continual process. Metaphors are used, then stereotyped and abused, and then criticised. But all this is the work of the self-same mind. Metaphors are for worship, and thus they reveal without defining God. They are literalized and used in constructing schemes of theology. They are argued about and with; but argument ends in revealing their inadequacy, and the demand then is for something better, or for nothing at all. It is I who worship, I who argue, and I who criticise, doubt, and press forward to self-consistent systemization of necessary truth. We refuse to abide in the world of abstractions and contradictions into which the critical understanding has uncreated our fair world of sentiment, fancy, and devotion. We decline its proffered gift of disjecta membra.

The parts in his hand he may hold and class, But the spiritual link is lost, alas!

The demand of thought now is for the *spiritual link* which shall make these dry bones live, recreating and living in "the whole body fitly joined together, . . . making increase of the whole unto the building up of itself in love." God and his attributes, man and his faculties, the world and its manifoldness—is there no process by which these can be

held as essentially and organically related? Is there no system? Is chaos and not cosmos ultimate for thought? The dialectic of thought forces us to seek a process of *mediation*, by which thought does attain unto the idea, system, cosmos, in which the religious consciousness finds its fullest content and vindication. Religion is the actual and mutual relation of the Divine and human spirit. What is thus given immediately as the naïve perception of the soul, has been criticised and shown to be impossible by the understanding, translating conceptions into definite and mutually independent entities. God is there, we are here; any communion is only fancy. But thought denies its own agnosticism, and appeals to Philosophy to show the coherent, systematic, rational, and necessary relation of God and man. There must be, is its naïve faith, an idea or an absolute Idea (Idee) in which all the constituent elements of the religious consciousness shall be seen to be correlated members of an organic whole, in which one member implies and necessitates the whole, while the whole implies and necessitates and finds itself in all the mem-Thus religion can be demonstrated to be necessary in the high sense of being implicit in the self-development and realization of the Absolute Idea itself. Hegel says that "every act of mind contains implicitly the principle which, when purified and developed, rises to religion."* This is the high argument of the whole Logic-no thing, no thought is isolated and alone. All meet and mingle and have their only being in Him who is the ultimate category of thought, and at the same time the primal source of

^{*} Logic, p. 115.

all things and all thought. Only the necessary is the free, but it is free only when it is not necessitated from without, or by the totality of mechanical conditions, but, when its necessity is immanent, springs from its own idea, is its own realization or self-determination. But this result is only reached by thought, through a winding and dialectic process. This process is the work of thought upon the religious consciousness. Or we may say that it is the implicit mediation of thought. We have now to note some of the stages in—2. The mediation of the religious consciousness within itself.

The religious consciousness keeps insisting that its knowledge of God and spiritual truth is immediate. Philosophy finds that the simplest kind of knowledge has passed through media; much more is it true of the rich content of the religious consciousness. call a thing immediate that is known directly through itself without any relations to other things. It is the naïve perception, the first impression that a thing makes upon our senses, before it is seen in a network of relations and in the process of a development. A man considered thus immediately is the child, an oak is the acorn. Mediation signifies the process by which a thing passes out of its immediateness into its development and realization. A cultured man is the mediated man—the untutored child, who has passed through all the media of social, political, scientific, and literary culture. In fact, every concrete thing exists thus by means of relations.

Nothing in the world is single:
All things by a law divine
In one another's being mingle.

This relation of one thing to another in a dependent, conditioned way is called Reflection. It is viewed in the light which it casts upon another, or which another casts upon it. This is the first form of relationing or connecting the disjecta membra, the isolated phenomena of observation. We associate one with another, thereby knowing them both better. Thought does not stop with mere definition of separate things. The canon of identity and the law of contradiction do not express its whole work. They affirm that every finite thing is itself and no other, and that A is not B. But, even in thus defining, thought relates and connects things, both with each other and with the defining mind. This is fully worked out in the second division of the Logic—Essence (Wesen), all of whose categories are those of reflection of one thing into and upon one another. Substance and qualities, cause and effect, are the chief of these categories of reflection or relation. Here the world of separate phenomena, of qualitative and quantitative differences, merges into a world of infinite variety, of essentially related and transitory existences; each of which is only as it determines and is determined by others, according to universal laws. Attribute means nothing without substance, effect without cause, and vice versa. These are the categories that modern science uses in relating and correlating endlessly diverse phenomena into its system, held together by external and mechanically necessary laws. It is here that false necessity enters with its chain of absolute power. One thing is necessitated by all others to which it is related. Every effect has a cause. It is what it is because it is so determined or created by its cause. Man is thus viewed as an

effect of the total physical conditions which enter into and environ him. Within the adamantine embrace of this necessity all things are swept and kept chained forever and forever. It is needless to do more than thus refer to this doctrine of necessity or determinism that is maintained in all its rigor by the chiefs of science to-day. These categories of science are the work of thought, and can not be said to be false. Yet they are false when held as ultimate. Thought uses, but refuses to be bound by, or to stop with, them. It goes on to mediate them into higher and more adequate forms. Relativism and physical necessity are superseded by the idea (Begriff) which itself evolves all difference and all relations out of itself, and realizes itself in and through them. Here relation becomes self-relation, the determined becomes the self-determined. Here thought posits the category of spiritual, organic unity, of which all physical and vital organisms are but faintest adumbrations. It is a concrete, living, self-differentiating, and self-integrating whole, apart from which no member is aught but a fragment, and which itself, apart from its members, is naught. It is an organism, not merely of organs, as in a physical body, but of organisms. The life of the whole is in every part, and every part lives only in the whole. Each part is a microcosm, and the whole the macrocosm, of free, self-determined, spiritual activity. Hegel makes the category of Reciprocity to be the bridge from the necessity of relativity to the freedom of the idea. A cause is only a cause in its effect. It is bound to its effect as much as its effect is to it. Each is an alter ego, finds itself and not an enemy in the other. They are reciprocally complementary. Thus, reciprocity

is a higher category than cause and effect, and transforms their external necessity into immanent necessity. This infinite connection with self becomes the idea (Begriff) which freely posits all differences—substance. cause, and effect—and yet finds itself in them. The truth of necessity is thus seen to be freedom. Things are mutually related and determined by each other, not as enemies but as congenial relatives — "each of them, in its connection with the other, being as it were at home and combining with itself."* The Idea contains all the earlier categories of thought merged in it. It is infinite creative form, † complete in all its creations, and not in distinction from them. Thought proceeds further through the categories of the subjective idea (logical forms proper) of the objective idea, in such forms as mechanism, chemism, and teleology, to the Absolute Idea (Idee) or Spirit, or Self-conscious Personality, which is beyond and creative of, yet lives in, without destroying, the personality of all other spirits—"in knowledge of whom is eternal life, and whose service is perfect freedom." This logical ultimate, is the chronological first, the νόησις νοήσεως which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the idea. The simplest act of the mind, the truth grasped by any of the lower categories leads out from itself, foundationless and restless till it rests in its perfect explanation and cause:

. . . Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies;
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower; but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

^{*} Cf. Logic, p. 243.

But we are anticipating too much. We have yet to notice some of the steps of mediation by which this mount of transfiguration is reached. The Logic does nothing else than exhibit this restless progress of thought through all lower and progressively more adequate categories to this Category of categories. Thinking means just this process of finding itself, its higher freedom, in realms that at first seem foreign necessity. No one category is false which one goes through on the way to truth, but is itself a phase of truth, an organic element of the Idea, which becomes false the moment it is torn from the living body. The Idea is the completed system, not of fragments, but of organic members. Hegel's Logic is thus at once Metaphysics and Theology. The whole of it is an explication of the nature and activity of God. So a full explication of the mediation of thought would require a full exposition of the Logic. Here we can notice but a few of the steps, by the way of example.

We talk of immediate knowledge, immediate intuition, and of things immediately present to our senses. The truth is, that there is nothing that is im-

mediate or unrelated.

"Nothing in the world is single." Everything to be known must be known through relations, and to be fully known must be seen as a member of a system. The absolutely unmediated, unrelated, is the absolutely indefinable, unknowable. Strip any existent thing of all its relations, and its mere existence is mere nothing. It is only cognizable and real as it becomes related, mediated. The seed may be said to be the immediate form of a tree; but the seed itself is the result of many mediations. I am here, but my immediate presence here is mediated by my hav-

ing made the journey hither. Even in the lowest form of sensuous perception, knowledge is the result of the relation of a subject to an object. I am conscious of a thing or of myself as affected, impressed, mediated by the object perceived. Cogito ergo sum is sometimes proposed as signifying immediate knowledge of self; but I know myself only as thinking, acting, living. There is no passive substrate, or inactive ego. Thinking activity is its very essence.

Quite as true is it that all religious knowledge is mediated. Christian education is the educing of something by means of something. From childhood up there is the mediation of Bible instruction, catechism, forms of worship, creeds, and doctrines. Baptism is not an *opus operatum*, done once for all. It involves instruction in "all things which a Christian ought to know and believe to his soul's health." Baptism is only completed in Confirmation. "Ye are to take care that this child be brought to the Bishop, to be confirmed by him so soon as he can say the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, and is sufficiently instructed in the other parts of the Church Catechism set forth for that purpose."

The Holy Communion follows, still further realizing the Sacrament of Baptism, which can not be said to be really finished till sanctification is attained. The Roman Church completes it by the Sacrament of Extreme Unction.

Revealed religion is religion mediated by revelation. Revelation is mediated by signs and wonders, and mighty works, and a whole course of historical manifestations. It is truth done in history.

In what is called the testimony of the Spirit there is the relation of the human to the Divine Spirit,

made possible and realized by means of all previous spiritual culture.

Religion considered as the elevation of the human spirit to the Divine is a process either from the finite self and world to the Infinite, or from the Infinite to ourselves as included in it. Our knowledge of God through the so-called proofs of his existence is professedly mediated knowledge, passing from step to step in a process of argument. Kant has forever shown how they fail as formal demonstrations. We must note their limitations as formal proofs, and yet maintain the labor of thought they contain. Hegel says that they are only a formal statement of the implicit logic of religion, only ways of analyzing and describing that inward movement of mind above the things of time and sense, or that leap or flight of thought from the natural to the supernatural as its own true self. Thought does make this leap. It does thus intelligize the data of sensations and elicit universality out of them. Considering nature, it rises to God. This does not mean that they find Him as the result of the widest induction. It means that nature implies God, that nature is the "other" of God, who, though seen in consequence of, is also seen as the absolute ground of the initial step and the whole process. Neither is He found at the end of a syllogism, though the formal statement of the ontological argument seems to imply this. In truth, it asserts thought's own self-necessitated relation to God.

As formal proofs all these vainly write the sign of equality between all knowledge and God. God is not merely the equivalent of all finite things, effects, design, intelligence, nor of the highest human conception of him. "It is not on the finite ground oc-

cupied by the Sciences that we can expect to meet the indwelling presence of the Infinite. Lalande was right when he said that he had swept the whole heaven with his glass and had not seen God."* Yet these proofs "which start from finite being give an expression to the necessary exaltation of thought to God." They are no inventions of an over-subtle reflection, but the necessary and native channel in which the movement of mind runs.† We must admit, after Kant and John Stuart Mill, that merely as arguments or formal proofs they fail. We say that they give very inadequate expression to the inner, implicit logic of religion and thought, which syllogizes God and man in indissoluble union.‡

All proof is through mediation or the connecting of one thing with another in necessary relation; but this necessary relation may be merely mechanical. It can be proved that a roof is necessary to a house, and shingles and nails to a roof. All forms of external effects are necessitated by their causes or by the totality of empirical conditions that will not permit it to be otherwise. Given one, you can prove the other. Then there is subjective necessity. We are so constituted that we can not feel otherwise. Given certain conditions, and we can prove certain subjective emotions. Then there is proof from logical necessity. The thing to be proved is contained in, deduced from, dependent upon, necessitated by the premise. No one of these forms of proof is congruous with the being of God. He is the underivative, undeducible, and found not by the widest possible inductions of

^{*} The Logic, p. 105.

[†] Ibid., p. 113.

[‡] Hegel makes extended examination of these proofs throughout his Logic, and chiefly in a large appendix to his Philosophie der Religion.

science; and yet neither sound common sense nor philosophy will yield up the right to rise to God from and out of the empirical view of the world. Man is a being who thinks, and thinks not only in the categories which science uses, but also in the categories of religion and philosophy. Thinking elicits not only the universality of science out of finite things, but also thinks the concrete universality which religion calls God. The finite implies the infinite as the center implies a circumference, the relative and dependent imply the absolute, the transitory the eternal; the wisdom, life, and truth in the world imply an all-wise, almighty, eternally living God. No criticism can destroy or antiquate this implicit logic of the human mind. The formal statements of this process are not merely invalid, but the proof they afford creates at best a hard, cold, unsatisfying conviction. They do not give us the vital knowledge of God. None can wonder at their insufficiency to convert an atheist; but they are misinterpreted when accepted only at their formal, logical worth. They very inadequately describe that movement of spirit that makes the ascent; but this ascent of the spirit, though above the comprehension of the understanding, is neither superhuman nor mysterious nor unreal. It is the same I as thinking which is in this movement of spirit. It is the same thought, which with its abstract logical method fails to relate organically and necessarily God, man, and the world into a rational and coherent system. It can only allow them to exist in side-by-side mechanical relations. Deism is its highest Theology, agnosticism its ultimate attitude toward the non-finite. Thought pauses, but only pauses at this stage. Finite cosmos

does not satisfy it now as the unscientific view of the world did not at an earlier stage. It relates itself to the Infinite; it refuses its former theory of *Relativism*, and says that the relation is now seen to be vital, organic, essential; it denies its former maxim, *Omnis determinatio est negatio*, and asserts that every relation or determination or limit means new and fuller concrete existence; it asserts that the finite and Infinite are thus organically related, and hence that we have only a phantom or a fragment when we hold either one in separation from the other.

Hegel's chief work, therefore, consists in showing the inadequacy of the ordinary conceptions of both the Infinite and finite, from which spring most of our intellectual woes in the shape of relativism, skepticism, and bad Theology. Thought works in the form of the dialectic upon the inadequate conceptions of the Infinite and the finite, forcing them on out of their unnatural separation through successive self-contradictions and self-abrogations till both are fulfilled in each other and the true concrete Infinite appears.

Herein is demonstrated for thought the truth of the heart of religion—i. e., real, living, organic communion of man and God. The problem of philosophy is always that of determining with increasing accuracy the significance and the mutual relations of the three great objects of thought—God, the world, and man. False definitions and theories concerning these can not but have a blighting influence upon religion. The religious relation may be naïvely apprehended. But thought is as much a part of me as religious feeling, and when it goes to work it must see for itself how the finite and the Infinite are related. God

and man are not discordant, irreconcilable ideas, but essential parts of one organic system—of its own system—of pure thought—of Philosophy. Religion asserts and lives by the real relation of real God and real man. Philosophy here only attempts to understand, to see for itself what is in religion, so as to justify it against all criticism that it makes in its lower forms of observation, of reflection, of formal logic, and the understanding. This process of the dialectic of thought, through its own self-posited criticism, through positivism, subjectivism, idealism, pantheism, agnosticism, to its own ultimate assertion of the true concrete Infinite, wherein both God and man have the fullest reality, is necessarily a dry and prolix one. To think exhaustively is always to think God the explanation of all, though not the pantheistic all, for the thinker remains; though explained by God, he is not annihilated, but realized. Thought embraces all —the totality—God, man, and the world—in its organic system. Each without the other is an abstraction, and thus unreal and false. In this, each element though dependent, receives its concrete, full, independent, free realization. The true organism is a unity of organisms, organic in all its elements. This is the system or *Idea* that philosophy has ever been more and more adequately apprehending. Despair of this is despair of everything rational. Despair of any such a final synthesis of all elements of existence is despair or doubt of the worth and reality of any partial syntheses. This is the goal of all thought, but no less is it also the presupposition which underlies and inspires all its activity, even in its negative, critical, skeptical, iconoclastic phases. For, to use a favorite maxim of Hegel, to be conscious of a limit,

of an imperfection, implies that one is already above it, sees beyond, and criticises the imperfect by a more perfect idea or system. Thus skepticism itself, as well as the refutation of all skepticism, implies this idea of organic system, or the totality. A foot-rule implies infinity. Though it can not measure infinity, it has its very being in infinity. We perceive the limitations of our thought, because we see that our thought is grounded in and a part of absolute thought. The central, inspiring idea of science that of the correlation of all parts of the universe in a system—goes part way toward this ultimate synthesis. It reaches the idea of cosmos, as a system or totality of things, mechanically and necessarily bound together—a mechanical universe, but not the rational soul of the universe. So, too, does formal logic essay a synthesis of all elements of knowledge, though ultimately reducing all to a universal blank identity, or nonentity. In both these phases of thought the idea of relation and correlation fail to rise, as thought finally insists upon doing, to the idea of self-relation; of relation that is the activity of self-conscious intelligence, of a totality that is neither material, mechanical, chemical, nor vital, but that of concrete, Absolute Spirit. In the light of this ultimate category of Thought all the lower and inadequate ones are seen to have their relative and essential worth. Man comprehending it lives, moves, and has his most true, free, and real being in it. Indeed, any interpretation of Hegel which attributes to him the denial of personality and freedom to either God or man, is not worth the paper it is written on. With these prefatory remarks I now propose to give a brief exposition of the dry and formal process by which he shows the

movement of thought to this ultimate goal, thereby justifying for thought, the reality of the religious consciousness. He continues the process of mediation in knowledge from the point of observation and reflection, and shows two things: I. That the finite is meaningless without vital relation to the Infinite; that finite spirit presupposes and is only intelligible in the light of the idea of the Infinite Spirit.

2. That the true Infinite can not exist as the nonfinite, but contains in its very nature organic relation to the finite.

The process of mediation in knowledge goes primarily through observation and reflection. Observation is empirical, and posits the Infinite as outside of mind, as force, law, order, or cause. So, too, does religion at this standpoint posit its infinite as an external absolute upon which it is dependent. This external infinite limits us and makes us finite. is no overlapping of the two objects. We find ourselves thus limited on many sides, by external nature, by animal wants, and inherited proclivities. We feel all such limitations as foreign and hostile, preventing us from being what we might otherwise Religion, however, leads us to reconcile ourselves with all such limitations, and to declare that all things are ours, that God is for us, and therefore nothing that his providence surrounds us with can be other than helpful to us. Thus, in religion, we overcome and pass beyond such limits as animals never do. But mere observation does not thus break through the limits seen placed about man. I am only what I am. All else is another. I am limited and finite, and call the infinite the unlimited. But this implies that the two, the finite and the Infinite, are mutually related; but so related that the finite resolves into nothingness before the Infinite. In feeling, this relation produces the sense of dependence and of fear. But there is also another side to this relation. I may be finite, but I can assert myself—be something. Thus, even the atheist may maintain his personal morality, in spite of all the unknown infinite which limits him. God can not be known. Observation may sweep the heavens with its telescope and not find him. But we can do without Him. We can be men; doing all that in us lies to live honest, faithful parents and citizens. We can have the religion of humanity, and finally—

... join the choir invisible

Of those immortal dead, who live again

In minds made better by their presence; live

In pulses stirred to generosity,

In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn

For miserable aims that end with self,

In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,

And with their mild persistence urge man's search

To vaster issues.

This is the loftiest funeral anthem sung by Positivism—immortality of good influence upon succeeding generations, but not with the choir spiritual in the presence of God.

With positivism the gods are gone away, to return no more. We may, indeed, long for their return, but the longing is a vain one. We must be content with our finiteness. The unknowable Infinite makes us finite, and also makes us emphasize ourselves as the only real absolute. I may long and strive after the infinite—the beyond—but I evidently

remain simply in my finiteness. All such striving is my own doing. If I apply such predicates as allwise and all-good to the beyond, the infinite, they are only my own productions—exist in me and not in the Unknowable—and have no objective worth. I am shut up within my own finite limits. If I could get out into the infinite, I should only thereby be annihilated. The infinite, call it by what divine or devilish name I please, exists only within my finite self. Thus, in my striving after the infinite, by which I feel limited, I am only limiting myself. In all this I am. And thus I negate the limiting infinite. 1 am, and I am what I am, and I am what I ought to be, just as stone and tree are. I am what I am by nature, and so I am good. Evil is not in me. Faults and sins are only accidental and negative. much I allow to evil. But I can and do atone for such accidental evil by casting it away, denying that it belongs to my nature. I reconcile myself with myself. There can be no other reconciliation.

Further, it may be held, on this standpoint, that the good is just what seems good to the individual. To follow one's nature, to be true to one's instincts, appetites, desires, and passions, is to be good. I can not sin. All that I do I do according to my nature, and I am by nature good. But let us examine more closely the concept of the finite, and first in the popular sense of the word.

(a.) The Sensuous Finite.—To be finite is to be mortal. Satisfaction of appetites may momentarily lull the sense of sensuous limitation. But the appetite constantly reappears. Nothing but death can annul my finiteness. Death is the great liberator—the negation of my sensuous limitations. But death

itself is a negation, a manifest nothing. In this negation of the finite, the Spirit appears. Thought asserts itself, though only in the form of imagination.

(b.) Finiteness from the standpoint of Reflection.— In reflection we pass out of our isolated, subjective selves. We consider ourselves in the light reflected from our relation to other things. We are what we are in relation to something else. Here the infinite appears. But is is only as a regressus ad infinitum. Any one thing implies another, and this something else; and the mind may thus lose itself in the endless succession of objects, without ever finding a resting-place—a progress toward an inaccessible that is no more progress than that of a blind horse in a tread-mill. Πάντα ρεῖ. Mind as reflection or understanding can never reach the true infinite—the causa sui, which, however, is a categorical imperative to mind. We are in a world of innumerable, manifold, finite things, each separate and distinct from the others. A is A and not B, C, etc., ad infinitum. Our knowledge, at this standpoint, is simply that of a collection of facts, of particulars negatively related. This is the lowest and yet the most consistent form of sensationalism and positivism. So too, in empirical ethics, sensual epicureanism is ultimate. Enjoy the pleasure at hand. Banish or lull the limit of desire by gratifying it. Catch the fleeting, individual pleasure; the next and the next will be no more nor other. There is no totality for thought, no absolute good for the soul. But this knowledge may fly from star to star, and yet the flight must on and on. Thus pleasure may satisfy one sense and then another only to find them awaken again—up and on after another pleasure. Carlyle's shoe-black can not be made

happy for more than an hour or two by "the whole finance-ministers and upholsterers and confectioners in joint-stock company." Give him oceans of Hochheimer and a throat like Ophiuchus, and he still wants more and better. Give him half a universe, and he will immediately fight for the possession of the other half. But this is the place to merely indicate, not to refute this standpoint, which has never been long held by men who rank themselves above and not below the brutes. Here the ideal of knowledge and goodness can never be reached because it is only that of a huge quantity instead of that of the concrete totality. We can heap monstrous numbers, mountains of millions, upon each other, add world to world until time grows old, and awful weariness overcomes the soul, and yet we are only in the finite. Here the infinite remains only a bigger finite. But we see that, to make this judgment of finiteness, implies an infinite. To be conscious of a limit is virtually to transcend the limit—to see beyond. The finite is that, which is not infinite, which implies that the infinite is that which is not finite. But at first these two appear as limiting each other, and the infinite is again reduced to a finite or a limited thing. It is limited by the finite. It is only everything except the finite which it is not. If I define it as everything, then it swallows up the finite. But, however I conceive it, it is still I myself who thus conceive it and give it being. It is my own product. Thus the Ego is all that can be affirmed. This subjective Idealism may take two forms, the empirical and the transcendental. I may either uninfinitize or infinitize the Ego. I am the measure of the universe. I create it. But I may be only a poor, finite, sensuous being.

The infinity which I create may only be an infinity of thought. I create, but I also swallow up in my finite self the whole universe. It is worth nothing. Chaos, cosmos, and chaos again. I can never get outside of myself, beyond my own mental processes and conceptions. But I may either deny or assert the worth and reality of myself. Here the conception of the Ego gives the comparative worth to the self-created world:

'Tis with our Judgments as with our watches: none Go just alike; yet each believes his own—

or, "and no one believes his own." This last is the affirmation of the empirical skeptic. It may take the form of mock humility or of the current agnosticism. I can not know. I can not even see through a glass darkly. I am a misologist and ultimately a pessimist. The Ego which creates and measures all objects of knowledge is only an empirical, sensuous Ego, and its creations are worth nothing. But this false humility easily changes into false pride: "Each believes his own." "The humility of the finite Ego changes into the arrogance of godless self-deifica-tion." "The everlasting yea" follows the "center of indifference," into which "the everlasting nay" had been precipitated. Shelley's Prometheus Bound asserts his divinity, and defies the wrath of Iove. The calcined Ego, the caput mortuum, the pessimistic shoe-black comes to realize and assert his greatness, to find a whole infinite in himself which he can not. with all his sophistries, quite bury under the finite. Thus, Schopenhauer is closed, and we open Fichte. Es leuchtet mir ein, "I see a glimpse of it." "America is here or nowhere." Cosmos appears in all its truth and beauty. The finite and the infinite are one. I am that one. It is not the empirical, egositic I, but the absolute universal I that focuses itself in me. We twain are no longer two, but one. Fichte, who represents the highest phase of this subjective idealism, indignantly denies that he means to make the world the product of the empirical Ego. It is the Ego that contains in its essential nature the finite and the infinite.* Fichte approaches very nearly to the true philosophical conception of the essential relation of the finite and the Infinite, as the concrete, organic system of thought which Hegel calls the *Idea* (Idee) Spirit, God. But mere subjectivity, even though it be that of the universal Ego, can never free itself from abstractions and lack of objectivity. Its unity of the finite and the infinite is one in which neither term gets full rights, and one upon which no religion is really possible. For religion demands that its God be absolute, self-creative, self-dependent, selfrelating, and not merely dependent upon the individual. In fact, as we can see historically, the highest flight toward religion on this standpoint soon falls back on the lower phase of agnosticism, epicureanism, and pessimism. The so-called left-wing Hegelians (Strauss, Feuerbach, Bruno Baur, Arnold Ruge) attempted to fasten this standpoint upon Hegel himself, and soon reduced themselves to the lowest phase of egoistic materialism. Only in man does God come to consciousness. It seems needless to say that it was the logical atheism of this position that Hegel combats throughout all his works.

^{*} Cf. Fitche's Science of Knowledge, by C. C. Everett, D. D., pp. 99, 253, 268.

He combats, too, the higher phase of this idealism which emphasizes, as Fichte did, the God-side of the content of the individual consciousness, saying that really no religion is possible on this standpoint. Fichte himself, it is true, lived and wrote under the sublime consciousness of God. Hegel's only contention is that, in the philosophy of Fichte,* the explication of the two sides of the religious relation is false. He insists upon passing outside of subjective idealism, in order that God and man may both be truly apprehended in the organic relation to each other that constitutes religion. His system is that of absolute Idealism, or the identity of thought and reality, which translates the whole experience into a universe of thought. It is only when the infinite God is cognized as thought, or self-conscious mind, as the Infinite who manifests himself in the differences of the finite world, and yet is not therein limited by something outside of himself, that finite man can be fully and adequately conceived.

He has shown that the finite does not get its due in the form of *immediate knowledge*, or in that of *reflection*, or the common understanding. What is demanded for thought is that our knowledge must be comprehensive and coherent, or systematic. Our ideas of nature, man, and God, of the finite and the Infinite, must not be conceived as discordant and heterogeneous, but as related to each other as necessary links of thought, so as to constitute one self-consistent system of truth. Hence, he passes to the *Rational consideration of the finite*. Fichte's position

^{*} I use Fichte as chief representative of this school, though Hegel does not mention his name in this work.

of the unity of the finite and the Infinite in subjective self-consciousness is the highest phase possible to reflection as the reason in understanding. The antithesis discovered by the understanding has finally been reduced to that of abstract identity. The finite and the Infinite are one. The God-consciousness is an indivisible part of my consciousness. I am naught without it, but it is also naught without me. The whole is subjective, within myself. In his Logic, Hegel shows the dialectic working upon this conception, exposing new discords and unities till the ultimate category of Spirit as absolute, self-conscious intelligent personality is reached, the steepest, loftiest summit of thought (Die höchste, zugeschärfste Spitze). Only with this conception of the Infinite can finite man be rightly, duly, and truly conceived. This is the work of his whole Logic. But here we can only note some of the most apparent steps in the process.

In the assertion of the unity of the finite and the Infinite, the finite has not really been put in abeyance. I may say, in religious fervor, I am nothing; God is all, and yet, philosophically, I assert the finite I as the point where the Infinite comes to consciousness and exists. Such a finite is the highest form of untruth and evil. To rise above this standpoint the subjective, finite individual must be annulled in a real, self-existent absolute, in which alone he can realize his true being. This is the standpoint of speculative Reason, as well as that of Religion. Philosophy only presents this relation in the form of thought; while religion, which is itself a sort of naïve instinctive reason, presents it in the form of figurative conception.

But this highest conception of reason is mediated by, passes through various partial statements. The Ego relates itself to another, which is seen to be more than a sensuous, and then more than an abstract Infinite. The demand is that it be in and for itself existent, or the Absolute, else I have only an empty, dead God. The demand is that it have objective existence, though not that of objective, finite things, else were it finite itself. "But now comes the question as to how the subject is related in this infinite object. It is as thinking subject that it comes into relation with this recognized object. Thought is the activity of the universal, having a universal as object. In this case this universal must be the absolute. Consequently, it is thought that constitutes this relation with this absolute object. We make the transition from mere subjective to objective thought." And we see that it is this absolute thought that is prior to, creative of, and the necessary ground and implication of, all finite thought.

"In thinking—that is, in reflecting upon anything—I am subjective, have my thoughts about it; whereas in thus thinking the thing itself, in thinking the thought of it, I withdraw my merely subjective relation to it and enter into objective relation with it. I have annulled my subjective individuality, and raised myself to the universal point of view. This is the same thing as to think the universal as my object. I actually herein renounce the merely subjective point of view. In humility, or confession of my own finiteness, I enter the life and activity of the objective." In thus thinking or cognizing the thing

^{*} Hegel's Philosophie der Religion, p. 190.

itself, or its thought, I pass beyond its mere phenomenal form and pierce into its essence, or the logical conditions of its existence. Here I reach real necessary being, which is no longer merely an object for me. It has self-necessitated and therefore objective existence. My thought is valid only as it is thus freed from mere subjectivity and finds itself anew in the objective though ideal universe of real existences. All such real being exists essentially sub specie aternitatis, and is only thus truly known by me. It is to be noted that the essential attribute of thought is that it is a mediating activity and thus itself mediated universality. We can not follow closely this dialectic of thought which forces it to the universal and absolute as its goal. Limit after limit is annulled, till the true, objective, self-limiting Infinite is reached. All our knowledge rests upon at least the tacit acknowledgment of this ultimate standard. We only know our own knowledge to be subjective and finite because we have this infinite, absolute truth by which we measure it. To be conscious of such a limit, as that of finiteness or subjectivity, is virtually to have already transcended this limit. In pure thought this transcendence of such subjective limitations is clearly and definitely made, and we no longer think as mere individuals, but pass over and share in universal thought or reason. This universal thought is not my own subjective creation, but that which really creates, sustains, explains, and gives partial worth to my thoughts. This presupposition of all knowledge is not clearly and definitely apprehended in all stages of knowledge. We pass through stages when it is even suicidally denied. But its very denial, if it is worth anything, appeals to it to prove itself. The

denial of skepticism is really only the denial of some false, pictorial abstract or logical concept. This it denies only by tacit reference to and affirmation of a higher and truer universal or absolute. It is in its very denial *mediated* knowledge, or affirmation that comes through the negation of a negation.

But to turn to the positive side again, we note that the mediating activity of thought may be overlooked, and we suppose that we know the Universal. or know God immediately. Really, however, this intuition in the subject is itself partly the result of many mediations, and only partly the result of the immediate activity of cognition. Nothing is further from Hegel's thought and method than pure a priori thinking. The inductive process goes pari passu with all thinking, and forms the mediation which leads to higher views. The a priori and a posteriori methods are united in every phase of knowing. That is, there is constant mediation and synthesis. Hegel is, of all men, least deserving of the reproach of being a merely a priori, transcendental spinner of metaphysical cobwebs out of nothing but his own consciousness. Mediation is the essential element of his dialectic in which the a posteriori is seen to be but the a priori in the making, until the whole of experience is seen in its concrete, ultimate form of organic Totality, which looks before and after, indissolubly, because rationally, connecting all. Thus he says we know God immediately, just as one plays a very difficult piece of music, instinctively as it were, as the result of the mediation of much practicing it over and over. The same process of mediation also results in those habits which have become a second nature to us. The discovery of America by Colum-

bus was the result of many actions and reflections.* The result of many mediations is that truths which we know to have been reached by a highly complicated and prolonged process of study, present themselves to us finally as almost intuitive. The expert mathematician has ready-made intuitive solutions of problems which others can only understand after a long course of explanation. Thus mediated thought appears in us as immediate. In worshiping, God is present with me. The thought present in this is that of God for me. It is really a definite form of my being as pure thinking. I love myself in Him, and then find myself again as finite as distinguished from Him who is the infinite fullness of which ocean I am but a drop, and yet a real drop, a real finite being, though only real in Him. This finite is much higher than the abstract one reached in the stage of reflection. This true finite is seen to be an essential phase of the infinite in the nature of God, so that we might say that it is God who finitizes himself in us. But this seems impious. Yet it is the same as the conception of God as the Creator of the world out of nothing but himself. The world thus becomes another than God and seems to limit, to finitize Him. But this is his own self-limitation. It is his world, having its only real being in him. Having thus reached the true finite as opposed to the false one, we have now to distinguish between the true and the false infinite.

(c.) Transition to the Speculative Idea of Religion.— The conception that we have reached of the true finite forces us to rise to a higher conception of the

^{*} Hegel's Philosophie der Religion, p. 191.

Infinite. To merely say, God is infinite and I am finite, is a very inadequate and false proposition. As the finite is not merely the non-infinite, but has its real being in the infinite, we can not conceive of this infinite as an immobile, lifeless non-finite. The two terms can only be conceived as moments or organic elements of a process. They are strictly correlative terms. God is not merely the infinite to the exclusion of the finite, as the finite is not merely finite to the exclusion of the infinite. We may and must distinguish, but can not absolutely separate the two without destroying both. They are parts of a system, which have no meaning when separated. In fact, we may say that we do not know anything except as in relations and ultimately as belonging to a system. The center of a circle is distinguished from, but is meaningless without the circumference, the positive pole in a battery without the negative, a cause without an effect, kings without subjects, parents without children. The eye is no eye apart from the body. "The single members of the body are what they are only in and through connection with their unity. A hand when hewn off from the body is a hand in name only, not in fact, as Aristotle observed.* We can speak of many of these relations between external things as necessary—i. e., the two terms are so intimately bound, the one to the other, so mutually and profoundly interpenetrative, that the changing or the suppression of the one is the changing or suppression of the other. The kind of relation that exists between things varies from merely external, mechanical, causal, chemical, vital, to spir-

^{*} Hegel's Logic, p. 310.

itual connection. Each higher phase of relation is a mystery to the lower conception. Life is mysterious from the point of view of inorganic nature, and yet life is higher and explains, while it contains and transmutes the lower. The relation between parent and child is one of unity, of consubstantiality, especially when this relation takes the form of mutual love. So too, the terms finite and infinite are indefinable nonentities except as correlated. It is only the action of the mere reflective understanding that tries to define them as separate, and thus produces all those discords and antinomies which it can not solve.

Another indequate way of defining the Infinite is to attach to it certain notions or predicates formed from other material—our notions about God—calling them attributes. They are not derived from the essential nature of God. They are limited, and so come into collision. The Orientals were right in their feeling that this is not the true way to represent God. They say that he is "the many-named," and vet not thereby defined. The true attributes of God can not be these relative ones, they must be essen-Activity, Life, Spirit, Absolute Personality, are such essential attributes. He is the living God who in his essential living process creates and transcends the finite, and thus is in organic relation to it. Thus it might be said that without the world God is not God. That is, if it were possible to conceive a time when all the wisdom, and goodness, and justice, and love manifested in the world, lay dormant in the Divine Being, then were he less God than he is now-the motionless, dead Brahm of Oriental

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, II, 230.

conception. The truth of this statement, however, can only be seen in the proper explication of the Christian doctrines of the Holy Trinity and the Creation. Plato and other Greek philosophers gave some hint of it in their doctrine of the limit (το πέρας). Limit gave chaos the order of cosmos, while lack of limit was lack of intelligence, order, law. The unlimited (το ἄπειρον) was the indefinite, lawless, bad. "We must free ourselves from the bugbear of the opposition of the finite and the Infinite. This bugbear is let loose upon those who desire to maintain that we can know God and have real communion with him. This is called pretentious arrogance, and much unction and irksome mock humility is used to decry it. Yet philosophy as well as religion maintains this pretension." If we do not slay this agnostic phantom, we degrade the Infinite as well as the finite; for it implies an impotence in the Infinite as well as in the finite. It says that God can not descend in relations with man. He must remain in himself in his powerlessness to get into the finite. "Every relative disability may be read in two ways: A disqualification in the nature of thought for knowing x, is from the other side a disqualification in the nature of x for being known. To say that the First Cause is wholly removed from our apprehension is not simply a disclaimer of faculty on our part; it is, too, a charge of inability against the First Cause." *

Jacobi very wittily characterized such an absolute as Kant's unknowable and unrevealable noumenon, or Ding an sich, as "enjoying a position of otium cum dignitate, which is the next thing to non-existence."

^{*} Martineau's Essays, I, 190.

Thought as mere understanding can not know God. The faculty is inadequate. It is limited to the field of the finite. But the microscope need not deny the revelations of the telescope. The understanding is not all of man as intelligence. It lives in a world where every term or product of thought preserves a stereotyped distinction from every other. It analyzes, separates, and defines everything and only unites them by abstracting from each its concrete qualities. Its universals are mere abstractions, squeezing the life and characteristics out of every particular embraced. Indispensable as is its work, great as are its results—and no one appreciated the greatness of modern Science more than Hegel-it becomes mischievous and false when it poses as the ne plus ultra of human thought. "Reason, when following the footsteps of the senses has short wings," says Dante. When following the understanding they are not yet developed enough for mounting the sky. The human spirit must not and can not restrict its observation to the sphere of the finite. In religion and philosophy there is a higher kind of experience claimed. Observation should sweep this field and compute results. Indeed, without accepting the testimony of the Spirit in this sphere also, the basis for knowledge in all lower spheres is taken away, and absolute, empirical skepticism is the latent and logical result. The ground of religion can not then be found on the standpoint of external observation. The observer must observe himself as in relation to the thing observed. In religion and philosophy he must therefore observe himself as essentially correlated with the Infinite. This is what speculative or comprehensive thought does. The observer here

sees the finite and the Infinite in organic unity. He himself is in this unity, and sees it in seeing himself as thus essentially related to it. He sees the totality in comprehensive view. This is the standpoint of the infinite observation, and of the *Idea*, the sphere in which the true *idea* of religion finds its

explanation and justification.

3. The Speculative Idea of Religion.—Reason is the ground upon which alone religion is at home. As speculative idea it is the rational explication of what is involved in the religious relation between God and man. Reason (Vernunft) is thus the faculty of the Infinite, as reason (Verstand) is that of the finite. The former is the faculty of insight into the life of organisms permeating, developing, and unifying all parts so as to make them very and essential members of the organism. What it thus grasps together and sees to be self-developing from the idea of the thing, the latter, or the faculty of outsight, sees as separate, contingent, and contradictory, at best only mechanically related and bound together. former sees the process of the self-development of the totality through the forms of sense and understanding, keeps its eye upon the whole throughout, and finds the concrete whole at the end. It sees the idea produce the whole in all its diversity. It sees, too, its own self in every phase of the idea. It finds itself at home everywhere in the intelligent universe. Reason thus making man at home, showing him his own larger self, in the ever-widening circle of experience, frees him from all finite limitations and necessity, and brings him to full self-consciousness. Hegel uses the term consciousness to express the phenomenal side of mind in knowing external things. Thus I am conscious of, feel, see, know relations to external things not myself. But intelligent spirit or reason refuses to be a stranger or alien anywhere in the intelligent world. It may "take the wings of the morning and fly to the uttermost part of the earth," and even there it finds only intelligence, spirit, which is its own truer and larger self. The more it goes out of itself the more it finds itself. Its heart is restless until it rests in God. In every act of conscious intelligence, self finds itself more and more adequately realized, and thus becomes selfconsciousness. But the real presupposition and inspiration of all knowledge is not my consciousness of myself as individual, limited by external things, but thought, or a self-consciousness, which is beyond all individual selves. It is the Absolute Self-consciousness, which the conscious life of all finite minds implies, and in finding which our consciousness becomes self-consciousness in the fullest sense of the word.

This comprehension translates all relations into which we come into self-relations, all determinism into self-determinism, all necessity into freedom, all chance into Providence, and all Providence into intelligence. When God is cognized as Him in whom we live and move and have our real being, when He is recognized within the soul, we come to full self-consciousness. The Philosophy of religion is the rational explication of this self-consciousness, or of the essential and immanent relation of God and man. I give this exposition of the general way in which Hegel uses these two terms—consciousness and self-consciousness—as preliminary to a crucial paragraph. As it is both difficult and pregnant, I translate it as literally as possible:

We have hitherto used the term consciousness to express the phenomenal side of the spirit, the essential relation of knowing and its object. In this I am determined by relations to objects. But the essential of spirit is not to be merely in such relations. Such consciousness is the sphere of the finite, and in it everything is itself and not another. But Spirit or concrete reason is not merely such knowledge, where the being of the objects is thus separated from the knowledge itself. It does not exist merely in relations or under this form of consciousness. It is in making abstraction of this relation that we speak of the spirit, and consciousness then becomes a phase or element in the being of spirit. We have thus an affirmative relation of the spirit to the Absolute Spirit. It is first in this identity that the cognizing spirit posits itself for itself in its object. This constitutes spirit or reason, which is its own object. Religion is thus the relation of spirit or reason with the Absolute Spirit or Reason. It is only thus that the spirit knows its knowledge (i. e., the cognizing spirit is the unity of the subject and its object). This is not merely the spirit putting itself in relation with the Absolute Spirit, but it is the Absolute Spirit himself relating himself to himself in that which we in consciousness posited as something separate and distinct. Thus religion is, in a higher way, the Idea (Idee) of the Spirit, who of himself relates himself to himself, or it is the self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit. This contains consciousness as an organic element. Consciousness as such is finite, the knowing of an object distinct from self. Religion is also consciousness (knows God as external, transcendent), and thus contains the finite consciousness, but contains it absorbed (as the tree contains the seed). For the object which the Absolute Spirit knows is himself. He is only Absolute Spirit as knowing nothing but himself. Finiteness of consciousness is the result of spirit distinguishing itself from its object. But this is a real element of spirit. It is the spirit itself which makes

this distinction, or posits itself as determined by its object. It is only by this mediation (through consciousness or finite spirit), by which it finitizes itself, that it comes to knowledge of itself or to self-consciousness. Thus religion is the knowledge which the Divine Spirit has of himself, through the mediation of the finite spirit. Consequently, in the absolute Idea (Idee) religion is not the work of a man, but it is essentially the highest determination of the Absolute Idea himself. . . . The Absolute Spirit in his consciousness is self-knowing, self-conscious. If he knew aught else, he would cease to be Absolute Spirit. This makes his knowledge absolute truth, and the whole of truth. It embraces all the riches of the natural and the spiritual worlds. It is their sole substance and truth. In it the truth of everything exists as a dynamic element.*

What have we here? This question will come to every one reading this quotation for the first time, without having thought himself fully into Hegel's meaning. It is so different from current conceptions of religion, that it may be dismissed with a smile as foggy metaphysics, or at best as pantheism. That it is neither, but contains the ultimate speculative comprehension of absolute religion; that it only puts in rational form the highest Christian theology and the profoundest Christian mysticism, I shall endeavor to show in brief manner.

But, first, let me epitomize the few remaining pages of this section of Hegel's work. This demonstration of the organic relation of the Infinite and the finite is the true content of religion, the self-necessitated development of thought starting from the immediate content of the religious conscious-

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, pp. 199-201.

ness. The course of thought is shown in another way in the Logic. There beginning is made with mere being or nothing, and the tremendous labor of thought is observed as it develops the implicit relations of each lower category until absolute Spirit is reached as the Ultimate—that is, as to point of departure, but really primal, implied in the lowest category. Thought is thus seen to necessarily make passage from mere Being, or the finite world (Beingthe most abstract and general term to express all finite existence) to its absolute presupposition, or God. What is reached in the Logic, as a process of thought, we found to be held naïvely as a moment in the religious consciousness from which we started in the Philosophy of Religion. What we have now reached is God as the Absolute First, and the course of thought in the Logic is seen to be the activity of the Idea of Absolute Spirit in itself. Mere being, the finite world, is the activity of this spirit positing an object for itself, making an "other" for itself. But this "other" moves itself back to its source, its home. It is met more than half-way. Spirit recognizes its "other" as itself. This activity constitutes the Divine life: 1, is the Idea in itself; 2, is its own selfposited "other"; 3, is the denial that this "other" is absolutely an "other"; and the recognition that "it" is itself. This Divine self-activity is only adequately stated in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, which is fully explicated in Part III.

The doctrine of creation, and of the relation of nature and man to the Creator, is vitally connected with that of the triune nature of God. It belongs to his nature to create. Creation is God's positing an "other" which is not an "other." The creation

is his, belongs to his being or essence. This involves the finite as his own self-posited object and self-revelation. It is necessary for God to create. Love, says Hegel, is only another expression of the eternally Triune God. Love must create and love "another." But, in loving this "other," God is only loving himself.

Spirit lives by difference, but still always finds itself in all its differences. Thus Spirit is, to use popular language, the Absolute Unity of the spiritual and the natural. Finite consciousness, to which God appears as an object, is itself only a self-posited phase of the Divine activity. But as this appearance or object, he is appearing to himself-coming unto his own. The recognition that finite consciousness has of God is, from another point of view, only God's own self-recognition, taking back this consciousness as an element of his own self-consciousness. was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself" (2 Cor. v, 19). The world of finite spirit has only truth and reality so far as it is thus annulled and taken back into God. The truth of all finite existence is thus not an immediate form of actuality, but of ideality, that wherein it recognizes itself and is recognized as an element of, as at-one-with, the Absolute Spirit. But these two moments of finite consciousness, its annulment in its fulfillment, may be considered separately.

In consciousness the Divine object appears as phenomenality or representation, on the *theoretical* side. The *practical* side is the fulfilling annulment of the separation. Here freedom, subjectivity as such, enters, and we have the process to self-consciousness to observe. It is this phase that consti-

tutes the *Cultus*, the field in which atonement and reconciliation are achieved.

C. Cultus, or Public Worship.

The text of which this section is an explication, is reconciliation with God through the double but mutually involved action of Divine grace and human self-sacrifice. That is, it is the death of the old man and the birth of the new man accomplished through

religion rather than through morality.

The first phase of Worship is faith, or the drawing near of the soul unto God. Formal faith comes through external means, through hearing the voice of God in the Bible, creeds, sermons, and services of the Church. But these must be merely the means for the begetting the higher form of personal faith which is known as "the testimony of the Spirit." Worship is a giving and a receiving, a giving up of self and a receiving of God, that the ideal self may thereby be realized. Morality can never affect this, which is the very essence of religion. At-one-ment of man with God is both fully realized and symbolized in the highest act of religious worship, while in morality there is always that ineffectual struggle that St. Paul depicts so graphically and piteously in the seventh chapter of his Epistle to the Romans.

Our striving after living communion with God culminates in self-surrender to him who is mighty to save. This is met by the divine gift and opera-

tion, which is received and enjoyed by us:

Worship is thus a double-sided activity. It is a religious act or sacrifice on my part, and the means of the Divine act of grace, a means of imparting grace which I receive and

enjoy. God's act may seem to overpower my freedom, but my true freedom consists in the knowledge and will of God (whose service is perfect freedom). And this can only come with the surrender of my own subjective knowledge and will. In this divine activity man seems a passive material, like a stone. The divine grace is to come to pass in me and through me. My giving up myself and receiving divine grace is my own act, and at the same time God's act, so that "it is no longer I that live, but God that liveth in me" . (Gal. ii, 20). I have to open myself to the incoming of the Spirit in order that I may be spiritual. This act of worship is at one and the same time my act and God's act. This paradoxical truth of the religious experience is certainly opposed to the merely moral standpoint of self-realization as held by Kant and Fichte. To morality the good is an unrealized something in a God-forsaken world, an ideal which the categorical imperative lays upon my subjective human will to realize. Thus the circle of moral activity is limited. In religion, on the contrary, the good, the reconciliation, is absolutely accomplished.*

I have translated this page from the section on *Cultus*, as presenting the very core of the Christian doctrine of salvation, and as illustrating, as a legitimate outcome, Hegel's "speculative *idea* of religion."

The finest chapter in Principal Caird's volume is that in which he interprets and illustrates this whole section with incomparable skill and appreciation (Philosophy of Religion, Chapter IX). It is the work of a disciple scarcely less original and subtle than that of the master, that I gladly refer to as a type of thorough assimilation and independent interpretation of Hegel.

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. ii, p. 222.

CHAPTER V.

THEOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND PANTHEISM.

LET us now return to the query raised by the passage quoted from Hegel: What have we here?*

We reply that we have—I. The highest form of theology, justifying to thought in terms of thought the deliverances of the religious consciousness of inspired writers and of Christian saints, theologians, and mystics of all ages.

- 2. We have a First Principle, adequate to originate and explain to thought in terms of thought all the phenomena of the world of nature and finite spirit and their fulfilling implications.
 - 3. We have not pantheism.
- I. First, we have here the highest theology in terms of thought. Religion is not content until it rises to the lofty conviction and apprehends the working whereby God is able to subdue all things unto himself, "of whom and through whom and to whom are all things." The religious saints have strained language to the utmost to express this absolute wisdom and power and goodness of God. God is, and is to be, "all in all." This is the goal of Christianity, the religion of reconciliation and of the consummation of all things. So, too, philosophy is not

content until it apprehend the ultimate synthesis of the totality-God, man, and the world. It, too, is restless till it rests in absolute Thought, in absolute Personality, as the very zenith of its self-necessitated flight. Thus in philosophy, whose whole object is to show reason in religion, religion finds its justification from the standpoint of thinking consciousness. sophisticated piety may have no need of this. possesses the true content in other form, and may fail to recognize it when thus translated into terms of thought. What is left of my religion in this philosophy it may ask. But this question springs from a misunderstanding of the difference between philosophy and religion. They have the same content, but in different form. The common form of religion is that of feeling and representation, while philosophy is that of thought. It is the same content which develops and repeats itself in feeling, imagination. and thought. But thought, thinking representation, thinks it into the form of philosophy or theology, thus transforming it for its own cognition. Feeling and imagination pass over and are immanent in this form. The philosopher becomes neither unfeeling nor unimaginative. Thought does this for itself and also for religion, so far as it seeks intellectual expression. It may mean much or nothing to the devout soul as an intricate mathematical demonstration may mean much or nothing to a pupil. Every science has its own object, and must have its own disciples. Philosophy has for its object the demonstration to thought in terms of thought of the absolute synthetic unity of all phenomena. The reproach, then, that is made against theology as well as philosophy, that they do not give back religion in its pictorial form,

is senseless. The "abstruse terminology" is needed for higher conceptions of the rational speculative comprehension of what really is in religion. Thus depicted, only "gray in gray," religion may seem to lack real flesh and blood vitality. But for thought, the new language interprets the new and higher conceptions, which can not be adequately expressed for it in terms of the lower ones. Thought has been forced to organically correlate what common thought holds as separate and distinct. It has been forced to its ultimate presupposition of the organic unity of the Infinite and finite, as absolute self-consciousness. Hegel's First Principle is God as this Absolute Personality—the νόησις νοήσεως of Aristotle, only developed in concrete and systematic form:

The true First Principle, which Hegel knows under the name of Idea (Idee), and Aristotle calls νόησις ή καθ' αύτην or ἐνέργεια ή καθ αύτην (which the scholastics translate Actus Purus), is God as Self-Conscious Reason. Subject and object of himself, Nature is his product as creator, and the world of progressive intelligent beings is his Image. This statement is odious to some who style themselves "scientific," for the reason that they are still obliged to be on the alert lest their dogmatism fall back into the mere implicit faith of Religion—an issue to be guarded against with all caution. But the strictest and severest logical procedure, followed out to its result, will inevitably lead to this Concrete First Principle—the Recognizing Reason. Mechanical cause (Matter) presupposes dynamical cause (Force), and this again presupposes Final Cause (the Ideal totality) as its condition; Final Cause presupposes Free Intelligence -self-determining and realizing-as its condition; and this presupposes only itself, and hence all dialectic ends here at

the First True and Concrete, the Highest Principle, and this is Personality.*

Hegel himself has elsewhere declared:

The highest, steepest summit is the Pure Personality, which alone, through the absolute dialectic forming its nature, *includes and holds all in itself*, for the reason that it elevates itself to Freedom.

Here we have a category that holds the totality of conditions self-posited, with no external "other" to condition it. Here the mechanical and fatalistic conception passes in ethical harmony into the highest freedom of perfect self-determination. At the same time it only annuls by explaining and realizing all lower categories or conceptions as self-posited moments of itself. Its true content is not the abstract isolated Personality of mere deism, but the systematic whole, the parts of which are falsely grasped as absolute fragments by the lower conceptions of nature, law, and necessity. "The Absolute Idea may thus be compared to the old man who utters the same religious propositions as the child, but for whom they are pregnant with the significance of a lifetime. The interest lies in the whole experience." † Again:

When we hear the *Idea* spoken of, we need not imagine something far away beyond this mortal sphere. The *Idea* is rather what is completely present; and it is found in every consciousness, although it may be in an indistinct and stunted form. We conceive the world to ourselves as a great totality, which is created by God, and so created

^{*} Dr. W. T. Harris, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, October, 1869. † The Logic, p. 234.

that in it God has manifested himself to us. We regard the world also as ruled by Divine Providence: implying that the division between the parts of the world is continually brought back, and made conformable, to the unity from which it has issued. The purpose of philosophy has always been to know the *Idea* by thought; and everything deserving the name of philosophy has constantly been based on the consciousness of an absolute unity, where the understanding sees and accepts only separation.*

Again: "This Absolute Idea is the unity of the theoretical (cognitive) and the practical (willing), and at the same time the unity of life with cognition." + In this First Principle, then, we have the absolute self-conscious life of reason and will-physically and metaphysically free, but morally necessitated—the necessity of Divine Love. We have the immanent Deity—at home in all his creation and not merely the supermundane deity, the Deus ex machina, who can only occasionally thrust his hand into the web of human affairs from behind the clouds. Too many Christians have accepted at the hands of deists this unethical conception of God. He is "the fullness that filleth all things" (Eph. i, 19), from whose presence nor man nor devil can escape. He is a God here and now, not merely then and there. No need to go "beyond the sea" or "up into the heavens" to find him, for the "heaven of heavens" can not contain him. He is omnipresent, the omne scibile of all existence.

Telescope and microscope may not find him, because he is so "nigh thee, even in thy heart and in thy mouth."

^{*} The Logic, p. 306.

Speak to him thou, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can meet;

Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.

He is not merely something outside and beyond our conscious feeling and thought of him. He is above but also below, without but also within; as St. Hildebert sings:

> Super cuncta, subter cuncta; Extra cuncta, intra cuncta; Intra cuncta, nec inclusus; Extra cuncta, nec exclusus; Super totus, præsidendo, Subter totus, sustinendo; Extra totus, complectendo, Intra totus in complendo.

The "heaven of heavens" can not contain him, how much less "this house"—the order, beauty, and life of Nature, the constitution and capacities of the human soul, all the large movements of human history—the whole rejoicing and groaning creation (κτlσις)—

... the light of setting suns, And the round ocean and the living air, And the blue sky and the mind of man.

"Is it not effrontery," asks Lotze, "to narrow down the Spirit of the universe to a series of events upon this planet?" God is not only immanent, he is also transcendent. Hegel holds with Aristotle that "the world has its principle in God, and this principle exists not merely as a form immanent in the world, like the order in an army, but also as an absolute self-existent substance, like a general in an

army."* Only Hegel substitutes for *substance* the full concrete Christian conception of *subject*. Hegel never tires of recalling and emphasizing this most vital distinction for Theism. It is that which differentiates his conception, as he constantly affirms, from Pantheism, and is absolutely required for proper Personality in the Godhead.

To doubt that Hegel means all that inspired writers and Christian saints and theologians and mystics ascribe to God in their most ecstatic moments of rapt devotion, is to doubt his plainest, oft-repeated, and always implied assertion. But this is not all that Hegel does. He maintains that Personality necessarily involves the triune nature of God. He rightly regards the doctrine of the Holy Trinity as the vital center of all Christian doctrine—the essential truth in the light of which alone it is possible to know God and to understand the meaning of nature and human history. It alone supplies all the conditions requisite for the absolute free personality of God, which issues in his creation of nature, and of man in his own image. Hegel thus makes religion immanent in the triune nature of God himself, finding in the mutual interplay of the three persons in the Godhead the absolute form of love, communion, atonement—that is, the essence of religion. This is what he means when he says: "Thus religion is, in a higher way, the Idea of the Spirit, who of himself relates himself to himself, or it is the Self-consciousness of the Absolute Spirit." From Divine Personality thus constituted issues the might of creative love—a creation free and yet morally necessitated by

^{*} Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, vol. i, p. 163.

the Divine love. Further, he says that "Religion is the knowledge that the Divine Spirit has of himself, through the mediation of the finite spirit." That is, God in loving man loves only himself. On the other hand, his children in knowing and loving God are only truly knowing and loving themselves-their true eternal selves. Again, it may be said our loving God is only God's loving himself, "reconciling the world unto himself," taking back this human love and worship as an element of his own self-consciousness. The two sides of this truth may be thus stated in paradoxical form, without swamping the true Personality of either God or man, and at the same time repelling that separation that is sometimes conceived to exist between these organic elements in the divine life and creation. Hegel's language here can easily be paralleled by that of numberless sainted writers.

To Part III also belongs the vindication by Hegel of all the vital Christian conceptions and doctrines concerning God, his attributes, creation, revelation, and his Church. I have said enough to show that Hegel does not ascribe less to God than the profoundest theologians and devoutest saints. The contention, however, is likely to be that he ascribes too much to God—that his Absolute absorbs and destroys personality, freedom, and immortality. Jealousy for man's place and worth may ignorantly attack Hegel's conception of God. Thus Prof. Seth seems to fall back from Hegel's lofty ontology because it is inconsistent with the antiquated conception of freedom held by Libertarians, Pelagians, and Arminians. have," he says, "a center of my own-a will of my own, which no one shares with me or can share—a center which I maintain even in my dealings with God himself." God is warned not to tread upon the holy ground of the individual will without first put-

ting off his shoes.

The English Hegelians prefer to call themselves Neo-Kantians, followers in "the path opened out by Kant, and further explored by Kant's successors," especially by Hegel. Some of the younger members of the school published a volume of Essays in Philosophical Criticism, dedicated to the memory of Thomas Hill Green, the leader of the Oxford circle, with a preface by Prof. Edward Caird, of Glasgow. Without exception they all, as well as older members of the same school, like Principal Caird and Prof. W. Wallace, attribute this profound Theism to Hegel. Mr. R. B. Haldane has, however, so far lapsed from Philosophy into Kantian Agnosticism as to criticise Hegel and Prof. Green for having any ontology and theology in their system. He esteems "the teaching us how to criticise our categories" to be the chief and lasting work of Hegel. Kant was right in "declining to identify the logical unity of thought with a divine or creative self," and Hegel was wrong in making this identification, though "he was under no greater necessity of making the identification," or "to identify this ideal with Divine Existence." But he did do so, as also did Prof. T. H. Green. Instead of confining the work to mere criticism of the categories, they did "transform the theory of knowledge into a metaphysic of existence, or absolute Philosophy, in which a transcendental Self, which for this theory has no meaning except as the implicate of all experiences is first hypostatized into an Absolute Subject and presently into an Absolute Cause." "But," says Haldane, criticising this, "all that is, is for knowledge"-not

either for an individual or an Absolute Subject. All that can be done, he affirms, is to stick to the critical method and criticise our categories. But knowledge can not be for *nobody*, nor can criticism of the categories be aught but arbitrary and fanciful without some standard of comparison. Prof. Erdmann, the venerable orthodox exponent of Hegel, well says, "The problem of all Science—i. e., to recognize Reason in the different spheres—can be solved *only* when one knows, first, *what Reason is*, and, secondly, how to find it"; "and affirms that Hegel identifies Reason with the creative self-conscious subject God.

Prof. Seth, who now criticises Hegel's and Green's Theism from the standpoint of individualism (i. e., knowledge is for somebody for the individual and de intellectibus non disputandum), says that "surely Hegel's system was to its author from beginning to end an ontology or metaphysic of existence," and "Hegel would have contemptuously tossed aside any theory that professed to do less." Criticism of categories is not the whole of philosophy, and it shirks its true task if it does not in some way identify thought and Being. If the Self-conscious Subject of Hegel is the ultimate category of thought, then we must use it as our best key to the ultimate nature of existence as a whole. As Mr. D. G. Ritchie says, "If the theological question has to be raised, and it can not well be avoided, the Idealist may at least claim the same right to use the name of God for the ultimate principle of the universe, which is assumed by every hotgospeller, who talks about God as he might do about 'the man in the next street.'" Certainly, as Mr.

^{*} Erdmann's Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. ii, p. 559.

Ritchie suggests, the Idealism of Hegel seems at least to render explicable, as no other theory does, why some of the world's greatest minds have held certain theological doctrines, which, though to the logic of "common sense," they appear as senseless ravings, can assimilate any results that Science may attain and yet make explicable the most mystical theology. Such a theory is at least as worthy of consideration as Deism, Agnosticism, or Materialism.

Prof. Seth, we have recently quoted * as protesting against Hegel for ascribing too much to God, in his lofty ontology. He betrays a jealousy of God rather than for God. He is jealous for his own individuality, not for human personality as personalized by God, which is really Hegel's conception. He warns God off from that inviolable holy ground of the subjective individual self.

II. In noticing this objection, we turn to our second point. We have here a First Principle adequate to originate and explain to thought, in terms of thought, the world of nature and finite spirit, and their fulfilling implications. We may omit reference to nature, and only consider the place accorded or left to man under Hegel's view of God.

No one that I have ever read maintains so stanchly as Hegel the full, rich, eternal content of human personality. But no one wars more strenuously than he does against the one-sided subjective and abstract individualism so prevalent in the eighteenth century, which is even to-day the bane of much philosophy and sectarian Christianity. His whole philosophy

^{*} Cf. the English quarterly, Mind, Nos. l, lii, liii, for these references to Haldane, Ritchie, and Seth.

may be said to be a protest against such atomic individualism as makes objective catholic truth impossible, and lands its upholders in agnosticism and pessimism. His whole conception of the true concrete qualitative Infinite as opposed to the abstract quantitative one, of the organic relation of the true Infinite and finite, is as much to vindicate and realize the infinite capacity of man, as it is to give the Infinite real concrete fullness of being. The Infinite is the necessary presupposition of the finite, in relation with which it alone can have and realize its being. Seth's contention, however, seems to be for the mere independent individual, apart not only from the Infinite but also apart from relation to the social organism. All reality and all knowledge, he says, is for the individual self, not for the universal self or consciousness, which he calls merely a logical abstraction. "Each self is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious, if I may so speak, to other selves—impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue." But denying a social, and finally a universal reality, involves all our experience in a contradiction. Such a principle of unity, such an all-embracing reality, is at least necessary to any cosmos of science or philosophy of man. Grant for the moment that it is a fiction of thought. It is at least a necessary fiction—one without which all thought is impossible. Such is the verdict of all philosophical theory of knowing. Kant's Transcendental Ego may be denied real existence, but its necessity for thought can not even be questioned. To deny that we can ever get out of our selves, or that anything outside of our impervious selves can get into us, is to deny that we can in thought transcend our own individuality and enter into a world of real reality that embraces and binds together all thinkers and all objects of thought. The real presupposition of all knowledge is not the individual's subjective consciousness, but a thought or self-consciousness, which is beyond all individual thought, which thinks in and through individuals—a thought which can not be a mere subjective notion or conception, but which carries with it the proof of its own necessary existence or reality.

The maintenance of sheer individuality may avoid Pantheism, and then arbitrarily posit a Deus ex machina which individualism soon reduces to the great Unknown and Unknowable, and ends in Agnosticism. It is true that the reality and worth of the individual must be stanchly maintained as the Alpha and Omega of ethics. Free self-conscious action, but regulated by infinite absolute law instead of arbitrary subjective caprice, is the very heart of morality. Any theory which makes man to be determined by any arbitrary external non-congenial power, or that reduces him to a mere cog in a huge machine that must move when and how and whither the crank turns, can not be too strongly condemned.

But here the term *personality* is much more appropriate and significant than the term *individuality*. An individual is, strictly speaking, an undividable, inseparate atom. *Individuus* is the Latin for the atoms of Democritus. But there is no such thing within man's knowledge. Even Seth acknowledges that "the mere individual is a fiction of philosophic thought" and "an abstraction of logic." Individuality, says Bain also, consists in "a conflux of generalities." We can no more conceive of such an

individual man, "who has not sucked at the breast of the universal Ethos," without ancestry and social relations, than we can conceive of a tree without soil and air and light. The so-called individual is a whole complex of hereditary and environing elements, held together in one consciousness, which itself is as differentiated as these elements. The whole precedes and environs all such individuals. They are only of absolute value as thus participant in an intelligent, social, and rational world. It is not the actual but the ideal individual that is of worth. It is this ideal individual which appears not as something ready made, but something which develops by living into the larger life about it; not something isolated and opposed to the world and humanity, but that which receives them into its own circle, loses its own life in them, in order to live its own life. Subjective individual freedom from all limits and relations really means inability to act at all. Freedom in vacuo is motionless. Forms of activity are objective. The individual must go out of himself to be himself. Denuded of external limits, relations, and duties, he is without form and void. So, too, there is no merely individual self-consciousness. Even in his simplest act of consciousness, not-self is one of the factors. Consciousness overlaps both the ego and the non-ego. An eternal omnipresent not-self is necessary to real self-consciousness. Altruism is complemental to egoism. Both are parts of every self-conscious individual's life. Shut up the individual from others, and he finds no "other" to nourish his own life. He must have at least some low sky against which to strike his sublime head, in order to know that he has a head. But man, as such a progressively realizing self, is

differentiated from the abstract individual by being a person. A person, at least, is the quality of being an object to itself in relation to other persons and things. He finds himself, is at home in all the larger life about him. A native-born Robinson Crusoe on his island might be an individual, he could not be a person. Society is to the person what language is to thought. Unus homo nullus homo. Multiply your relations, and you increase yourself; minimize them, and you dwarf even to annihilation. It is in the objective ethical world of social relations of family, society, state, and church, that the individual attains ethical personality. He is relatively complete only in this social life. Man is by nature not an individual, but a social being (πολιτικον ζοον), and can realize his personality only because it is as *social* that he realizes himself. To live his own life, he must live the life which is not merely his own, and yet is most emphatically his own. The individual must die, in order that the person may live in an organism of persons. The external duties to family, neighbors, and state are his own duties; the welfare of these is his own welfare. Living for others is the highest form of living by others. Die to live is the ultimate law of all life. The objective social laws exist as an external must, as forced necessities to the individual, while to the person they exist as a personal categorical imperative. The person is autonomous, gives these ethical laws to himself. Thus the subjective penetrates and lives in the objective, the individual in the relatively universal. Enthusiasm of humanity is enthusiasm for self, and self-realization is labor for the welfare of humanity. Thus the largest altruism is the truest egoism, and genuine self-culture is genuine philanthropy. The egoistic *individual* does not thus recognize and interpret all external obligations to family and neighbors as his duties, does not impose them upon himself, while the ethical *person* does. Apart from the fulfillment of these duties, the person knows that he is not himself. Mere selfish, individual pleasure becomes real self-denial to the larger self of personality. We know, in theory at least, how we might thus realize ourselves, by transcending while fulfilling the relations of narrower spheres, until we enter the largest cosmopolitan life of humanity and become the thoroughly socialized person. Prof. Green says very finely that we have reached—

that stage in which the educated citizen of Christendom is able to think of the perfect life as essentially conditioned by the exercise of virtues, resting on a self-sacrificing will, in which it is open to all men to participate, and as fully attainable by one man, only in so far as through those virtues it is attained by all. In thinking of ultimate good he thinks of it, indeed, necessarily as perfection for himself; as a life in which he shall be fully satisfied through having become all that the spirit within enables him to become. But he can not think of himself as satisfied in any life other than a social life, exhibiting the exercise of self-denying will, and in which "the multitude of the redeemed," which is all men, shall participate. He has other faculties, indeed, than those which are directly exhibited in the specifically moral virtues—faculties which find their expression not in his dealings with other men, but in the arts and sciences, and the development of these must be a necessary constituent in any life which he presents to himself as one in which he can find satisfaction. But "when he sits down in a calm hour," it will not be in isolation that the development of any of these faculties will assume the character for him of ultimate good. Intrinsic desirableness, sufficiency to satisfy the rational soul, will be seen to belong to their realization only in so far as it is a constituent in a whole of social life, of which the distinction, as a social life, shall be universality of disinterested goodness.*

The individual personality is thus realized rather than destroyed by large social limitations. And yet the person is only relatively realized or complete, even in his most perfect organic relations with them. His ideal still flies before. His spirit forces him to transcend even these lofty forms of the finite, and rise to the Infinite and Absolute. He has a potential infinitude as his ideal capacity, and the highest possible merely human social life gives him only a relative infinitude. He is not complete in any or all of them. It is Carlyle's shoe-black again with his infinite craving, "wanting God's infinite universe altogether to himself." It is Alexander sighing for more worlds to conquer. It is the illimitable limit that the human spirit posits for its god Terminus. And to be conscious of a limit is to be already beyond it, and to claim this beyond as its native inheritance. But his self-realization in these spheres which threaten to limit and ingulf the individual may help us to understand how the finite is not absorbed and destroyed by relation to the Infinite and Absolute First Principle that Hegel proposes. More than this, it may be said that the spirit's transcendence of them is through and by means of them. Or, to put it from the other side, they are the media of the divine immanence in the finite spirit. Through them God descends to man, and through them man ascends to God. He can realize himself in them only so far as he sees that they are such media. And he can only

^{*} Prologomena to Ethics, p. 414.

transcend them and rise to the Infinite by using them as media. "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he who loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?"

Man then realizes his personality in and through the social spheres. But the highest conception of humanity, abstracted from God, and the most complete identification with its life that one can make. still has a limit, and forces the flight of the spirit into the beyond. Man can only be relatively complete as an organic member of the most perfect form of social organism. It is in art, religion, and philosophy, not as separate from but immanent in and through all these spheres, that the finite spirit recognizes and attains its full consummation in its unity with the Absolute First and Final Principle of the universe. Man is never absolutely an independent individual never a little god by himself. Man is man only as he is reconciled and united with God. This, it is to be noted, is not the individual, but the social man-"till we all come, unto a full-grown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ." Not in separation from God, not in opposition or rebellion against God, but in living organic union with him, can social man become perfect. The individual is organic to a larger life in the family, and that to a larger life in civil society, and that to a larger life in the nation, and that to a larger life of humanity in universal history, each sphere taking up into itself while transcending the lower one. But that which takes up and transcends all these spheres, and which is their eternal presupposition and life, is the life of God in the mind and heart of social

man. The whole progress into this completeness is "a progress in the consciousness of freedom." This is a progress in man's consciousness of God, learning that God's "service is perfect freedom," because learning that the will of God is the perfect law and real content of perfect human will. The perfect man, the true head of the race, could say no more nor less than "Lo, I am come to do thy will, O God."

The apostles speak of Christians being "partakers of the Divine nature" and "partakers of his holiness," and "the temple of the living God," as "dwelling in God and God in them." They never speak of the true life of men other than our Saviour did, that is, as being in intimate organic union with the Father and the Son through the Holy Spirit. Christ's prayer to the Father was that they might all be "one in us," "even as we are one."

That is, the Christian conception of the realization of the personality of men is based upon organic union with the Personality of God. Deistic conceptions may lower this genuine Christian view, but true philosophy absolutely vindicates and maintains it. The presupposition of intelligent, moral man attaining unto completeness of personality, is the perfect Personality of the Absolute Reason, or God. Hegel's First Principle is thus adequate to originate and explain and fulfill the personality of finite spirits. All the language of Scripture and devotion, and of mystical and of Catholic theology unfalteringly ascribes man's redemption, regeneration, and sanctification to the work of Divine Grace. God is all, and man nothing without God. We pray God for the "spirit to think and do such things as are right," because "we can not do anything that is good without thee," and "that by thy holy inspiration we think those things that are good, and by thy merciful guiding may perform the same." In all this there is no thought of the loss of our own personality through the overshadowing almightiness of God, or through his breaking through our *impervious* selves and absorbing all into himself. Yet we recognize "the eternal purpose" revealed in Christ to be that "God may be all in all." In this consummation we are confident of our own completion in him, "perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect," because we are indissolubly one with him.

Thus all the teaching of Scripture, of theology, and the language of devotion is open to the same jealousy of individualism that has been manifested toward Hegel's First Principle. In fact, his First Principle, and the correlate doctrine of the organic unity of the Infinite and the finite, are but the intelligent expression in terms of thought for thought of the very heart and life of Christianity. And it is so professedly. This is fully established in Part III, where he explicates the Christian religion as the absolute and ultimate religion for man. Dr. E. Mulford, a profound theologian as well as a profound student of Hegel, says, "I believe that Hegel himself may be taken at his word, and instead of being a pantheist or panlogist, or whatever may be the last word invented to define his position, he has sought the reconciliation of philosophy with Christian truth and life."* The coming of God into man, his breaking into the individual's impervious self, means larger

^{*} Article on F. D. Maurice, Scribner's Magazine, September, 1872.

freedom, fuller life, and more perfect personality for man. It gives him that life of the spirit which raises man above the categories of death and absorption.

No one, I affirm, attributes a larger, fuller, or more eternal content to the finite spirit than Hegel does. His First Principle is adequate to this perfection of the individual, because it is identical with the God St. Paul preached to the Athenians, as "not far from every one of us; for in him we live and move and have our being"; implying, also, that God lives and moves and has his being in us. God is all in all, and yet finite spirit is perfected in him. That which God creates, redeems, and sanctifies, he reconciles and receives unto himself. The wisdom and love and goodness he realizes in man are not a foreign "other" to his own nature. This is what Hegel means by these sentences in the passage previously quoted: "Religion is not merely the spirit putting itself in relation with the Absolute Spirit, but it is the Absolute Spirit himself relating himself to himself"; "it is the knowledge which the Divine Spirit has of himself through the mediation of the finite spirit": it is "God's own self-consciousness," "his own self-recognition." God owns his own. In that knowledge of him which is our eternal life, in that love of him which he creates in our hearts, we may surely say that he knows and loves himself. Deism may put up impervious barriers between God and man; but God, in his self-revelation to man, and man in his devout communion with his Father, breaks them down as figments of the mere understanding. "It is God himself that worketh in us, both to will and to do of his good pleasure," and when it is done it is his own. We work out our own righteousness

by letting God work his righteousness into us. And yet in all this we are living, growing, and developing true personality. Dr. Mulford says, with Hegel, that "there is in personality the highest that is within the knowledge of man. It is the steepest and loftiest summit (die hoechste zugeschaerfste spitze, says Hegel) toward which we move in our attainment."* Dr. Mulford goes on to speak of personality in God and man in Hegel's own spirit. The personality of God is the same in substance as it is in man, only it is infinite, and is revealed that man may rise into infinite and everlasting life. The personality of man has its ground in that of God, and through it God reveals himself to man and communes with him. No hylozoic, protoplastic, unanthropomorphic unknown something as the ground of all things and of all men, can offer any ground of communion between itself and man. Lotze goes so far as to say that "perfect personality is to be found only in God, while in all finite spirits there exists only a weak imitation of personality." Hegel would criticise this as not allowing enough reality to human personality, which indeed advances into fuller and stronger life in and through the God-given social relations and institutions of the world. But its relations to these institutions and to God himself in and through them are not merely external. The relation of one person to another is not between but in them. The relation of parent to child is more than that of one member of a physical organism to another member. "The self-communication of the Infinite Spirit to the soul of man is such that man is conscious of his relation to a Conscious

^{*} The Republic of God, p. 22.

Being, who is in eternal perfection all that man has it in him to be... He is a Being in whom we exist; with whom we are in principle one; with whom the human spirit is identical, in the sense that he is all which the human spirit is capable of becoming." These are the words of Prof. T. H. Green,* whom Seth criticises for holding Hegel's view of Personality. I have elsewhere † shown Green's position,

and gladly repeat it here.

Prof. Sidgwick, in a polemically critical review of Green's Ethics in Mind, No. XXXIV, character-

of Green's Ethics in Mind, No. XXXIV, characterizes it as the "one about which our ethical discussion is likely for some time to turn," and its author as one who "never wrote for victory." This is the highest praise generously accorded by one whom Green criticises very keenly in his volume. I lay it down after a studious reading, with a profound regard for the moral fervor and for the deeply religious spirit that pervades it throughout, as well as for the philosophical breadth and acumen and the close and powerful reasoning it maintains from first to last; thankful for the ethical tonic it has given as well as for the interpretation and comprehension of ethical experience which it contains. Its enthusiasm for human perfection, or well-being, in its most catholic sense, too, is nourished by the most unwavering faith that man is not the orphaned child of an absent Unknowable. Theism is the vital breath that animates the whole. I take it as the highest type of theistic as well as philosophical ethics to-day. I can not attempt even an exposition, much less a criticism of

^{*} Prolegomena to Ethics, pp. 197, 349.

[†] Theistic Ethics, The Church Review, October, 1887.

the whole volume, which is too compact to admit of abridging without marring. I can only indicate his leading principles and results. It is another of those books which would "be much shorter if it were not so short," which could be more easily and lucidly expanded than condensed.

The lamented author died five years ago. He is generally referred to by the Scottish philosophers as the "recognized leader of Hegelianism at Oxford." Hegel never wrote on the subjective side of the ethical question. He presents his ethical doctrine in his Philosophie des Rechts on its objective side, as realized, in the customary morality of family, community, and especially in that of the state, the highest manifestation of universal reason in the sphere of practice. Kant, on the other hand, emphasized the formal, subjective good-will as the essence of morality. Green's volume also deals with the subjective side, and is an exposition of the development of this side through Fichte to Hegel.

He maintains that a metaphysic of morals is both possible and necessary, as the proper foundation of every system of ethics. The reality of the ideas of freedom and duty can only be maintained by a metaphysic that makes man to be something more than a derivative product of mere nature. If we can not demonstrate a *meta*-nature for man, we can have no moral science other than the natural history of how men do act, not how men ought to act. For "it is obvious that to a being who is simply the result of natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning." Hence, "at the risk of repelling readers by presenting them first with the most difficult and least plausible part of his doctrine," he be-

gins with the exposition of the metaphysic of morals. The metaphysic of anything, we may say, is the conditions implied in its being, it is the total environment which its existence presupposes, the totality of those relations which its own analysis and interpretation imply and demand, the larger, truer self that does not appear at first glance to the naked physical eye. Such a metaphysic or meta-natural basis there must be for Ethics. As merely one of the natural sciences, it would cease to be possible. No historical research into sub-human and pre-moral conduct, coupled with laws of physical evolution, can afford an explanation of mental and moral phenomena. Back of, beneath, immanent in $(\mu \epsilon \tau a)$ all things physical, there is that by virtue of which they are their larger self. What is the metaphysics of man, mental and moral? Answered plainly in a word, it is God. Man alone does not create his own universe, does not exist alone—there is not far from every one Him in whom alone one can live and move and have any real being. Proof of this, in the common sense of the word, is out of place. But it is the only conception that enables us, reflecting on our moral and intellectual experience conjointly, to put the whole cosmos of experience together, and understand how (not why) we are and do what we consciously are and do.

This theistic conception is the only key that fits into all the wards of the complicated lock of life. Such, and the correlated doctrine of God making man in his own image, is the result of the first two books of this volume, translated out of the technical form of the text. But I will let the author speak for himself. The First Book answers the question, "Can

the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature?" or, otherwise stated, "What conditions on the part of consciousness are implied in the fact that there is such a thing as knowledge?" The reply to this gives the metaphysics of knowledge, and consists in an analysis of knowledge itself. He goes straight through the *hysteron-proteron* of empiricism, and the absolutely irrational subjective Idealism and its correlated Agnosticism of Kant, to the Absolute Idealism of Theism.

There is no unknowable *Ding an Sieh*, nor any *mere* matter in the universe. The synthesis in man's consciousness, which we call knowledge, implies and demands an absolute consciousness.

Our consciousness has a history bounded by time apparently. "But this apparent state of the case can only be explained by supposing that in the growth of our experience, in the process of our learning to know the world, an animal organism which has its history in time gradually becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness" (p. 72). Again: "The attainment of knowledge is only explicable as a reproduction of itself, in the human soul, by the consciousness for which the cosmos of related facts exists—a reproduction of itself, in which it uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ." Man's brain differs from that of animals, because it is organic to knowledge, and so is not affected by any processes of evolution, or empirical history by which his physical existence has been developed. "If there are reasons for holding that man, in respect of his animal nature, is descended from 'mere' animals—animals to whom the functions of life and sense were not organic to the eternal or distinctively human consciousness—this does not affect our conclusion in regard to the consciousness, of which, as he now is, man is the subject; a conclusion founded on analysis of what he now is and does" (pp. 77, 87)—that is, we may add—

A man's a man for a' that.

"God is the Eternal Spirit or self-consciousness subject, which communicates itself, in measure and under conditions, to beings who through that communication become spiritual. He is a Being in whom we exist; with whom we are in principle one; with whom the human spirit is identical in the sense that he is all which the human spirit is capable of becoming." This is distinctly the Christian doctrine of God, the Creator, breathing into man the breath of mental and moral as well as of physical life. General readers will not care for a reproduction of the close, sustained, analytical, and philosophical arguments by which he reaches this pronounced theistic conception, and I would advise them to omit this First Book, which he himself characterizes as likely to repel readers.

In Book Second he takes up the Metaphysics of moral action in the same method. "What are the conditions on the part of consciousness implied in the fact that there is such a thing as morality?"

We find our moral activity, like our mental, conditioned by sensational elements, inextricably interwoven with physical instincts, animal impulses, wants, and desires. But an animal want is not the whole of man's moral motive. It runs into, or rather is taken up by, a self-conscious subject, making it a wanted object for self.

"It only becomes a motive, so far as upon the

want there supervenes the presentation of the want by a self-conscious subject to himself, and with it the idea of a self-satisfaction to be attained in filling the want" (p. 93).

"It is this consciousness which yields, in the most elementary form, the conception of something that

should be, as distinct from that which is" (p. 92).

He defines a motive to be "an idea of an end. which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realize," which he maintains is sufficient to differentiate moral action from natural, necessitated, physical activity. One can be said to be determined by his desires only so far as he consciously makes them his objects, or seeks his self-satisfaction in them When, for example, Esau sells his birthright, an animal want conditions his motive, but the motive itself is his idea of himself as finding his good in the satisfaction of the animal want. Otherwise he would not be responsible. It is this identification of himself with the animal want, this making it his good, that constitutes it his strongest motive, and at the same time makes him responsible. He has said to himself, that will satisfy me, that is good, thereby constituting freely the strongest motive and determining himself. The good which one thus chooses is always comparative. This formal freedom will not become real freedom till the ends or goods in which self-satisfaction is sought are such as can really satisfy the perfect man. The real nature of any act of will thus depends upon the nature of the object which one chooses as his good, and this choice depends upon the character of the chooser. All moral action thus is the realizing of the good, better, best self within us. We thus mold circumstances, wants, and impulses. Esau chose a good, but not a better nor the best. All this seems implied in Green's exposition, though not explicitly stated. And this implies the privative or comparative view of sin—the choice of an inferior good.

This, too, must be taken in connection with his metaphysic of morality, which is that of an eternal self-conscious subject, which makes the processes of animal life and impulse organic to a reproduction of itself, which reproduction is qualified and limited by the nature of those processes, but which constitutes free, self-conscious subjects—sons of God made in his own image.

Indeed, "alike as in God, as communicated in principle to men, and as realizing itself by means of that communication in a certain development of human capacities, the idea can have its being only in a personal—i. e., a self-objectifying—consciousness" (p. 203).

The more man realizes his personality the nearer he approaches God, and the better God can recognize and love himself in those thus made perfect in his image. This realization we have seen is through the secular institutions of the Spirit. Through them man pierces beyond them to the perfect Personality. Such relation to the Divine Personality gives life and freedom. God's law is recognized by man as his own law. Nature, a Universum, and Unknown, can never relate itself to man so as to give this freedom. Ultimately fear and despair result from all such conceptions of "the power not ourselves." The individual may exalt himself to promethean or satanic might and majesty; he may reach the acme of human culture and of power over nature, and yet the outly-

ing, overshadowing of something simply infinite will finally crush his spirit and wring out the pessimistic exclamation, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity." With Prometheus he may

Suffer woes which hope thinks infinite, and Defy power which seems omnipotent;

but he will still be bound till his spirit faints and quails, and he becomes the despairing pessimist or the servilely superstitious man. Such is the outcome of every "age of Augustus" of the *Éclaircissement*, die Aufklaerung and the eighteenth-century rationalism, so far as merely human, and divorced from conscious relations with God. Such, too, will be the outcome of modern culture and science so far as divorced from, or failing to recognize, the Divine Personality as the Spirit

. . . that impels _ All thinking things, all objects of all thought, And rolls through all things.

Unless "the power not himself" is personal, he can not have that confident congenial relation with it, that is essential to free, ethical self-determination and

to "the blessed hope of everlasting life."

With Hegel, Personality is the ground of all things, the head and heart of the universe, in which alone human intelligence and love and culture are possible and valid. Through these he rises above the finite, and holds communion with the Infinite Power not himself. In and through them as media he comes face to face with God, and enters the life immortal and personal. Beyond and about him is the life of God which he recognizes as his

life, even as God recognizes his life as His own. Thus it is impossible to speak of the personality of God or man without speaking of both.

Philosophy thus comprehends for thought what religion holds in its heart. It thinks its creed in terms of thought, and thus itself becomes religious. Thinking is worshiping. Completed thought compels reverence before the august Personality which it reaches as its ultimate attainment and recognizes as its primal and sustaining source. In this Part First, thought is thinking only or chiefly the first article of the Creed: "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." In Part Third, Hegel shows us thought thinking all the other articles of the occumenical creeds, following in the lines of the Church's great "saints of the intellect as well as of the heart." Full justification of his Philosophy of Religion, therefore, can not be evinced until proper exposition of that part be made in a Second Series of Studies.

Some Christians will not need, and some will not care to have, their creed thus thought into an organic, systematic, and absolutely necessary whole. But those who are asking for the reason of the faith can not rest in the reasons which current apologetics give, or on the ultima ratio ecclesiæ, until these reasons and this authority are vindicated by the reason of absolute thought and authority. Philosophy may show the inadequateness of modern evidences and of church authority on its way to a point whence it can return and reinstate them as valid evidences and authority, giving the reason of these reasons and the authority of this authority. But we have thus far seen, at least, the point of view, the

spirit and method, by which Hegel vindicates the necessity of religion as the very heart of thought. Let me go over once again the central station of this conception of the universe as thought—this Weltanschauung.

I can indicate the point of view of his interpretation of the universe no better than by saying that its key-word is organic unity, as opposed to merely arbitrary or mechanical relations of the great objects of knowledge—God, man, and the world, as set forth in empirical philosophy, common logic, and deistic theology. In place of the abstract principle of identity and contradiction, by means of which one—

The parts in his hand he may hold and class, But the spiritual link is lost, alas!—

there is given the principle of *organic unity*, which, without losing the identity of the objects, also preserves them from the annihilation that would otherwise be effected by their differences. Shelley has delicately expressed the sentimental side of this truth in his Love's Philosophy:

The fountains mingle with the river
And the rivers with the ocean,
The winds of heaven mix forever
With a sweet emotion;
Nothing in the world is single;
All things, by a law divine,
In one another's being mingle—
Why not I with thine?
See, the mountains kiss high heaven,
And the waves clasp one another;
No sister flower would be forgiven
If it disdained its brother;

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And the sunlight clasps the earth,
And the moonbeams kiss the sea—
What are all these kissings worth,
If thou kiss not me?

Philosophy rules out the subjective idealism and pantheism of an absolute *identity* of all objects, as well as their empirical *separation* by absolute differences. For philosophy requires that subject and object be distinct. The physical universe is not all in the eye of the beholder, but is a real object of intelligence. Man is not identical with nature, nor God with man. But the reality that each possesses is that which, in spite of differences and distinctions, is of the same kith and kin in all. The resolute maintenance of this is a distinguishing mark of what we may term both English and American Hegelians. The personality of God and man, and the objective reality of the world, are strenuously maintained by them all.

Modern philosophy takes its start in the science of knowing, and passes from knowing to being. How can we know? Let us go back and begin anew from this point. This the great fundamental problem of Philosophy, connected, as it is, inseparably and organically with the problem of Being. What is it for a man or for any thing to be? What is being? Is reality the object of knowledge? It is naught unless we can know, unless we can experience its reality. Knowing is thus the key to being. But how is knowledge possible? How can we know? It seems a very simple question to ask, How do I know? What is knowledge, and how do I come by it? What is its relation to the subject and object of knowledge? What part of knowledge is supplied

by external objects? What part does man supply? What is the relation between the two factors and the result called knowledge? Is it an unknown tertium quid, compounded of two other unknowns? We are familiar with the answer of English Empiricism, of which Hume's absolute skepticism as to any knowledge is the logical result. The current Agnosticism is but this skepticism apotheosized. The subject and object, and their synthesis, are inherently unknowable. Isolated as they are in time and space, in no living relation, as the theory holds, nothing can bring them together in other than a merely mechanical relation, and, therefore, no synthetic judgments a priori, are possible or valid. We are familiar, too, in a popular way, with Kant's solution of the problem. That gives the reverse and isolated side of concrete experience, and thus, only reaching Agnosticism by a more intellectual route, mind and matter, God and nature, man and all objects of possible knowledge, according to both the empirical and the transcendental solutions, are isolated, and can only be brought into a mechanical relation à toute force. They are inherently, or as to their natures, unrelated. They form a loose aggregate, not an organic whole. Theist, deist, and skeptic alike, on either of these solutions, can give no rational science of knowledge, and so can apprehend no reality, no real being.

But, in order to any knowing or known being, the subject and object must be in organic relation—must have something in common, and live together. Intelligence must be an energy in connection with energetic reality. The mind is not simply like a piece of blank paper upon which ob-

jects impress themselves, which is the favorite figure of sensationalists. The mind is active in receiving and unifying those impressions. Nor, on the other hand, are all objects of knowledge chaotic unintelligence, which the synthesizing power of the mind forces into the strait-jacket of categories, to which these objects stand in an attitude of indifference or rebellion. The idealist's solution, too, fails. Appeal must be taken to experience, to the full content of consciousness. But this experience is other and greater than either sensationalist or idealist allows. Subject and object are both in consciousness in the act of knowing. They are not indifferent to each other. Their coming together is neither accidental nor arbitrary. The rather they are complemental and inseparable. Each implies, and is most intimately one with the other. The object becomes object only as it becomes part of the subject, for all experience is that of self-consciousness. Again, the subject becomes subject only as it merges itself in its object, for all consciousness is also objective consciousness. Thus the fundamental relation of subject and object in the process of knowing is one that can only be called organic, or the relation of particular to particular through the organic identification of both in the universal. It is a relation of life, of living subject and living object, in and through a Universal, which (as God) gives life and light to all reality. Neither are they mere space-occupying atoms, nor are they merely sensible entities or nonentities, mechanically separated from each other. They actively unite in one, and yet keep themselves differentiated from each other. Knowing is thus a unifying pro-The subject, to use a sensible analogy for a

spiritual process, passes over and loses itself in its object, and, finding its larger self in the object, it passes back to its subjective starting-point. Only in this way can the subject be aware of or know its object, or itself as its own object. In losing its life in the object, the subject finds its own fuller life; wherever it goes it is still "at home." The more it goes out of itself, the fuller experience and wider wisdom it requires. The undifferentiated subject would be a blank nonentity. Nothing intelligible is alien to the knowing subject. Its object, or its "other," is always larger than itself. In every act of conscious intelligence, self-consciousness finds itself reflected, or rather realized. It is an intercommunion of mind with reason, spirit with spirit. knowing agent thus finds himself set in the midst of an intelligible world of which he is a part. The forms of his intelligence are the forms of the world's existence. He is both the interpreter and the interpretation of nature. Hieroglyphics as strange as chaos have finally been deciphered, because they contained intelligence. Otherwise they would never have been more than the scratches of a lion upon the rocks. Man can only decipher a riddle that holds a meaning, contains thought. Intelligence subjective finds its larger self in intelligence objective, both being organically articulated as members of absolute intelligence. This last is not merely an inference from, but it is an implicit content of, concrete experience. Reason, both subjective and objective, is personal. It is not only that of the individual man, but of man as a race. Nor is it only of sense-conditioned man. It exists independently of all knowing men. But, as it can exist only in self-conscious personality, it exists in Absolute Spirit. All concrete experience is the apprehension of objective consciousness by subjective consciousness. Both have their reality in organic synthesis. Thought within finds thought without. The microcosmic deity within finds its macrocosmic Deity without. Man geometrizes and finds the diagrams writ large by another hand in nature. He finds God speaking to him, and God finds him intelligent to his intelligent self-revelations.

But man's intelligence is not creative but rather recreative; not an absolutely independent center but the planet of a central Sun. Absolute intelligence existed before he began to have self-conscious intelligence, in which alone can his own live and move and have its being.

The finite self-consciousness involves and reveals its dependence on an absolute self-consciousness which, provisionally, we can only call, in agreement with philosophy and religion, the self-consciousness of an Absolute and Divine Spirit.*

This passage from a knowing agent to intelligent Absolute Being is inevitable. Knowing implies real being. The self-conscious intelligence of man implies the absolute intelligence—God. Thus the problem of knowing lands us in, and is identical with, the problem of being, and only ideally distinguishable from it. The spirituality of Absolute Being—which is the presupposition of Religion—is the attainment of Philosophy. Philosophy only comes to analyze, and redemonstrate, or point out this reality, livingly possessed by Religion. Thought is

^{*} Prof. George S. Morris, Philosophy and Christianity, p. 56.

prior to being with us. Being is prior to thought in us. But, absolutely considered, there is unity of thought and being. But it is not our own individual thought and being that are absolute and identical. But the absolute object of our intelligence, the unity of being which our every act of knowing implies, is that of Absolute Spirit. The real presupposition of all knowledge is not my own consciousness of myself as an individual, but thought or self-consciousness which is beyond all individual selves, which is the unity of all thinkers and all objects of thought. That universal Self-consciousness, which the conscious life of all finite minds implies and on which it is based, is Absolute Spirit—God. We know only in part, but are known in toto by the Absolute Intelligence. What man is by his self-conscious personality imperfectly, that God is infinitely, perfectly, independently. Man's intelligence can thus extend in ever-widening circles over the universe without ever missing its larger image. Wherever it goes it is still at home. With increasing intelligence, he loses his sense of isolation, and ceases to feel a stranger anywhere in the world. Nothing true is foreign to him, but all reality is, as it were, bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. In all its discoveries, in Science, Art, and Religion, it discovers itself. So of all revelation—it is a revelation of intelligence to kindred intelligence for its enlargement. Thus too God, as Absolute Spirit, is everywhere at home in the universe, and the Deistic conception, which has had so pernicious currency in Christian thought, is no longer tenable. Our Father in heaven is also our Father on earth, his footstool. Within the inmost closet of our heart he is as much on his throne as on fiery Sinai.

The Scriptures represent the Christian life as most intimately and indissolubly bound up with knowledge. To know God is eternal life. This is real spiritual knowledge, and differs from the merely individual and relative. St. Paul says, "I know nothing by myself," and declares that "we are not sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves." In Christianity, as in Philosophy, the Universal is the category of living reality. The individual subject must "lose his life" in that of the Universal, in order "to find it." Christian knowledge is realized only through a participation in God's truth through organic union with the Logos. It is to be begun, continued, and ended, not in mechanical or a pantheistic process of evolution, but in God. God is the Author of all our true thinking, doing, being. It is only by his holy inspiration that we think those things that are good. Thus all true knowledge is of the nature of revelation. Thus, too, no revelation can be merely mechanical—the presentation of a foreign topic, previously undreamed of and unlonged for. For all revelation is in form and kind of selfrevelation—the revelation of intelligence to intelligence. In all true knowledge, either philosophic or religious, one knows only one's own larger self, and in all one's findings finds that same larger self. Only as we know God, and are partakers of the Divine Intelligence, is this larger self graciously bestowed upon us as the precondition of true and eternal existence. The voice of God is the voice of man—that is, of man according to his true nature and intent. The perfect man was the God-man, Jesus Christ. He is the perfect revelation of living truth. This revelation may not be completely apprehended by us, in

all its details, but, in its substance, it must be intelligible to us. Jesus must be our elder brother, as well as our unquestioned master. Unrealized, the Eternal Son had yet ever been "the light of the world." Misunderstood, or even verbally denied, the Christ is yet to-day the light of all true knowledge. It is the revelation of intelligence to intelligence. telligence must find its own larger lineaments prefigured in every dogma." For true and proper man, no truth is or can be essentially mysterious, nor could any revelation of such be either made or received by intelligence. I gladly bear witness to the pregnant significance of Dr. Mulford's views of Revelation in his Republic of God, commending them for a studious perusal to all possessing a thoughtful interest in the subject. Hegel's theory of true knowing and real being should prevent any hasty conclusion from his words to a vulgar rationalism, which he opposes as strenuously as any of us could wish. His whole philosophy is a protest against the individualism of so-called free thought. It is only as our individuality increases and develops into personality, by entering into the larger life in religion, society, and art, only as we become organically one with these larger forms of intelligence, only as Deus nos personat, that we are able to think anything truly. But the same philosophy is no less a strenuous rebuttal of all sorts of Agnosticism, scientific, philosophical, and religious. It is because our experience is a fragment of a living organic whole, that we may read in it the law and nature of the whole. Now, "I know," though only in part. When my union with the Divine Spirit becomes perfect, "then shall I know, even also as I am known."

Against such (Christian) reason, the epithets of rationalism and naturalism are only ignorantly and vainly hurled. Such views are as vitally supernatural and hyperrational as any thoughtful Christian can maintain. They consist most kinly with a supernatural naturalism. The Divine element is asserted as the presupposition of all true experience. is transcendent no less than immanent. The Deistic conception which has been so largely regnant in English apologetics set the natural and the supernatural over against each other as almost contradictory opposites. The canon of formal logic that "A is not non-A," being applied, there resulted either a low naturalism or a merely mechanical supernaturalism of sheer brute power to interfere and direct as from without and above. But true experience denies that man and the world are naturally isolated from God, strangers and foreigners to him in their essential being and activity. Against such conceptions Hegel's most trenchant criticisms are directed. His Philosophy of Religion is not all spun out of a priori elements. He claims to do nothing but to think the creed, to comprehend religious experience.

Religion, he says, is spirit thinking naïvely, while philosophy is the same spirit passing beyond this immediate apprehension of vital truth and through the bewildering skepticism raised by the reflective or critical understanding when it attempts to analyze and think together again this content of feeling and representation, to the *speculative* comprehension of the same content. It presents the content intelligized for the intellect. Thinking this content, it attains to the ultimate and everywhere vitalizing *idea* of religion,

and then proceeds to re-read religious experience in the light and under the necessary forms of this idea. In Part III Hegel identifies his philosophy with Christianity, and seeks to "rehabilitate genuine Catholic dogma" after the iconoclasm of the Aufklaerung. He died, says one, with the firm conviction that he had established eternal peace between theology and the wisdom of the world; and this, too, he sought not in the way of eviscerating Christianity of its divine claims and content, nor in the way of weak rationalizing away from dogma all that was offensive to the cultured rationalism (Aufklaerung) of the eighteenth century. He believed firmly in the necessity of positive dogmatic theology. He is said to have seriously blamed Tholuck for his lack of zeal in defending the doctrine of the Trinity. Certainly no one could ask for more explicit maintenance of the Church as the Keeper of the Keys and the guardian of the truth in the shape of Catholic dogma than that which he gives in Part III. The Church is "the realm of the Holy Spirit," and thinks the gospel into the form of valid and authoritative creed and dogma.

And now our *third* reply to the query (p. 154) What have we here?

III. We have not Pantheism.

It seems scarcely necessary to add to what we have already said as to Hegel's maintenance of both the Divine and human personality. The pantheism which is the "peculiar and just horror of the religious mind" is that ontology which ascribes no proper personality to either God or man. Hegel's philosophy is not pantheism. If further argument were needed, it might be put in the ad hominem form. If Hegel was a pantheist, then also was St. John: "In

the beginning was the Word, . . . without him was not anything made that was made." His life is "the light of men . . . that lighteth every man that cometh into the world." Then also was St. Paul a pantheist: "In him we live and move and have our being." Then also was the Psalmist, vainly trying to flee away from God, a pantheist. Then also was Isaiah a pantheist: "We are the clay and thou our potter." Then also was Jeremiah a pantheist: "I am a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord." Then also was Christ himself a pantheist: "That they all may be one . . . even as we are one . . . I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one."

Nearly every great saint of the intellect and heart in the Church can thus be accused of pantheism. St. Augustine writes thus:

To call upon Him I must call Him into myself. . . . Is there, then, O Lord my God, any room so spacious in me that can contain Thee? Or can the heaven and the earth which Thou hast made . . . contain Thee? Or is it so, that since nothing that is could be without Thee, therefore whatever is must contain Thee? Since, therefore, I also am, why do I ask that Thou come into me, who could have no being, if Thou wert not in me? For I am not now so low as hell, and yet Thou art even there also. Therefore I should not be, O my God, I should not be at all if Thou wert not in me, or rather I should not be if I wert not in Thee, of whom all things, by whom all things, and in whom are all things. It is even so, O Lord, it is even so.*

The Platonic Bishop Synesius sang thus:

^{*} St. Augustine's Confessions, vol. i, p. 2.

Thou art the begetting
And the begotten.
Thou art the illumining
And the illumined.
Thou art the manifest—
And the hidden—hid by thy glories.
One and yet all things thou.
One in thyself alone,
And throughout all things one.

The mediæval mystic Eckhart, founder of the large school of religious thinkers of whom Tauler and the author of the Theologica Germanica were chief representatives, writes thus: "God and I are one in knowing. The eye whereby I see God is the same eye whereby he seeth me. Mine eye and the eye of God are one eye, one vision, one knowledge, and one love. . . . God has become man that I might become God." And yet he maintains that in this union with God our personality is restored to its true personality by becoming active in and with the personal God!

St. Gregory the Great ascribes all to God. He says:

God dwelleth within all things. He is outside all things, above all things, beneath all things, above by power, beneath by sustentation, outside by magnitude, within by subtility; ruling above, containing below, encompassing without, penetrating within. Nor is He higher in one part, lower in another, nor abiding outer in one part and inner in another, but one and the same in his entirety, everywhere sustaining by ruling, ruling by sustaining, penetrating by encompassing, encompassing by penetrating; and whencesoever He is ruling above, thence He sustains below; and whence He outwardly encompasses, thence He inwardly

fills; ruling above without unrest, sustaining below without toil, piercing noiselessly within, encompassing outwardly without extension.

The language of lofty theology and of deep devotion is almost invariably that of what may be stigmatized as pantheism, if that term be used without criticism and proper definition. Whose books of devotion are the companions of devout souls, books that we flee to in hours of spiritual conflict and ecstatic rapture? They are, after the Psalms and Isaiah and St. John, the volumes of Tauler and De Sales, Thomas à Kempis, Fénelon, and William Law-men who had no jealousy of their God, but who would gladly empty themselves that He might fill them. This argument ad hominem will come home to every one who has ever felt the thrill of genuine devotion, who has ever been on the Mount of Transfiguration, who has ever felt the Everlasting Arms beneath him and the Infinite Love within him. Yes, we are all pantheists in moments of our most exalted devotion and thought.

But what is pantheism? What multitude of sins this ambiguous term has been used to cover! "One of the first uses of this word is by Toland in the Pantheisticon (A. D. 1720), where, however, it has its ancient *polytheistic* sense. It is a little later that it passes from the idea of the worship of the whole of the gods to the worship of the entire universe looked at as God." Since then it has been one of the consecrated terms of theological polemics. Bayle's vigorous criticism of pantheism amounted to about this, that pantheism so diffuses God that he is as much in an ass as in an angel; and that vulgar method is often

^{*} A. S. Farrar, Critical History of Free Thought, p. 414.

vulgarly used to-day, based upon a supposed etymology of the word Pan, all, and Theos, God. The all is God. He is the quantitative sum total of all things. This is atheistic pantheism; but the emphasis may be put upon the other part of the word, and for Pantheism we have Pantheism—that is, God is all, the only reality, all things being evanescent nonentities. This is acosmic pantheism, as Hegel styles Spinoza's system. This form is, at least, anti-materialistic. Its first principle may be so impersonal as to exclude all religion, or it may rise to theistic or even Christian content and become what we may call personal pantheism, as with Eckhart, Schleiermacher, Malebranche, and Berkeley.

But even where the First Principle is made personal, God may be conceived as "all in all" in a way hostile to human personality and immortality. The emphasis may be placed upon the physical attributes of omnipotence rather than upon the ethical ones of love and righteousness, so that the souls that He has made fail and shrivel up before him (Isaiah lvii, 16). The Calvinism of Jonathan Edwards certainly is open to the charge of such unethical personal pantheism. It is only a relatively higher form than impersonal pantheism, which yields only emanation cycling back to primal source. Pantheism becomes ethical theism only when it develops its first principle from impersonal Substance or Force or Will into the personal form of Self-conscious, loving intelligence; but then it is no longer obnoxious pantheism. It might better be termed hyper-deism. It is that of Jeremiah: "I am a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off. Do not I fill heaven and earth?" Immanence is added to transcendence. On the one hand, God is conceived as eternally perfect, self-communicating, and self-participating love and communion in his Triune nature. On the other hand, creation is conceived as the free act of Divine love morally necessitated and the incarnation as the goal and summit of this creation.

Far more vital significance is thus given to the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the sonship of man, created, redeemed, and sanctified in his image made perfect as he is perfect. God is in no wise limited by the increasing number of his dear children. Neither are they made less in thus growing into his perfection. As they become perfect, God recognizes himself in them, and their complete self-determination completes his self-consciousness. It is Hegel's assertion that the self-consciousness of man is the completion of the Divine Self-consciousness that gives any seeming likeness of his ontology to pantheism. has been interpreted to mean that God first comes to consciousness in man, that He passes from an unconscious state to consciousness first when finite creatures become conscious. This is obnoxious pantheism. It is the doctrine of Schopenhauer and of some of the left-wing Hegelians, who did not pretend to say that it was Hegel's teaching, but what he ought to have taught. None but either ignorant or willful perversion of Hegel's thought and express words can attribute to him this atheism of making God to be selfconscious only in finite consciousness. Neither is the kindred charge that he makes mere finite spirit Divine or one with Deity true. This horrible distortion of Hegel's thought was made by Strauss and Feuerbach. To maintain as they did that the empirical ego-the natural man—is divine or spiritual, is as far from

Hegel's as from St. Paul thought.* No man is divine or spiritual, but man as man is made capable of the Divine. But this capacity can only be realized by the refining away the rubbish of the natural man through an age-long labor under divine education. "Die to live" is the command to the old man and the promise to the new man. In so far as this is realized in man, God is conscious of himself in spirits infinitized into his own image, and man attains consciousness of his own true self in God. This is implicitly realized in true religion, in which man has this reality through justification by faith, so that God can love and own him as his own flesh and blood. God and man are not side-by-side beings, nor are they confusedly mixed and identified. Hegel's conception avoids the deistic separation and the pantheistic confusing together of God and man. Prof. Pfleiderer says that this "is not only the most correct interpretation of the Hegelian philosophy, but is right in itself. This, I think, is beyond doubt" (Religions-Philosophie, vol. i, p. 590).

Obnoxious pantheism is an exotic in Occidental thought. It is at home in the Orient. Oriental pantheism is justly the horror of our religious mind. Instead of making God the spiritual, ethical unity of all things, it makes him either the quantitative sum total of them or denies any reality to them. In either way it makes far too little of the place and worth and destiny of men. Consciousness is conceived as a temporary, finite, unsubstantial phase of

^{*&}quot;When man is said to be divine, or the mere finite spirit as natural spirit identified with God, this is sheer pantheism. The Church declares that only through the death of the natural man can be be united with God" (Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, p. 211).

the immobile Brahm or of the blind Will of the Universe.

Hegel's doctrine is that God is eternally self-conscious and can never be other than self-conscious. It has nothing to do with time. It is the "form of eternity." Men's consciousness rises to this as they recognize God as their Father, and his will as their own Their consciousness of him becomes self-consciousness. They are complete in him, God having reconciled them unto himself, the ultimate purpose of his creating them being to reflect and complete his eternally complete self-consciousness in them. Until man reaches this perfection he is not himself. He is bad by nature and good through grace, prevenient, circumambient, permeating, and sanctifying; bad as merely conscious and opposed to God, good as his self-consciousness is completed in his perfect reconciliation with God. Evil is an essential element of mere consciousness, and "the prodigious labor of the world's history" is the progress of man, through Divine grace, into the freedom of self-determination, making God's will his will, thus realizing self-consciousness and completing God's self-consciousness or perfect reflection of himself in his sons. Here Hegel as well as Christianity is transcendental as regards the world of time and sense. Both carry us out of and above the temporal and visible to the eternal and invisible. Both look upon man sub specie æternitatis.

Hegel's doctrine of the creation, as springing from the love in the triune nature of God, involves a relation to humanity which may be called a natural or an essential tendency to incarnation. Here he gives the Scotist view. This tendency became actualized in the man Christ Jesus, the true organic head of humanity. Hegel considers the incarnation as the central doctrine of Christianity on its temporal, historical side, as he considers the doctrine of the Holy Trinity the central one on the Godward side. also explicates the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church, in the perfecting of its members as a body, realizing in them God's reconciliation of the world to himself in Christ. Here "the important element," he says, "is the certitude of the individual subject of its own, infinite, unsensuous essence, knowing himself to be infinite, eternal, and immortal" (ii, 312). The Holy Spirit is the immanent life of God in the Church militant working toward a transcendent life in the Church triumphant. Pantheism has no place for personal immortality. But Hegel's Philosophy gives the most exalted conception of the place, worth, and destiny of immortal mortals. Deus nos personat now and forever. With Hegel personality is immortality. It is the end of the journey toward God, to such realized self-consciousness that God can say, "In you I am well pleased, I am reflected in you." Hegel extols the Egyptians for having so profoundly conceived the thought of immortality. Dr. W. T. Harris says, "It is a profound mystery to us how any one can express a doubt as to Hegel's belief in the immortality of the soul, for this may be considered to be the subject-matter of Hegel's entire philosophy." He accounts for such doubts by the fact that "Hegel is known more through the traditions of his opponents than by faithful study of his own works" (Journal of Speculative Philosophy, v, 88). Hegel is always engaged with showing what is immortal and what is not immortal throughout the universe,

and that is concrete personality. He maintains that immortality is a quality of mind which is already present and need not first be mediated, as it also can not be destroyed, by death. Of course, he does not allow that we can form any valid picture-conception of the conditions of our existence after death. He would reply as St. Paul did to the query, "With what body do they come?" "Thou fool" (I Cor., xv, 36). Goeschel is rightly considered as the best exponent of Hegel's own contention that philosophy is the same in content as evangelical Christianity. He published a volume on "The Proofs of the Soul's Immortality" (translated in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, xix, xx), from which I quote only one passage:

This concept of soul-permeated corporeality has, however, its presupposition in Personality; this Personality we have recognized as the concrete concept of Spirit; only in the light of this concept is the body transfigured and transparent. This transparent corporeality in its final analysis is the obedience of the body to the soul in the spirit—an obedience which is free, because identical with that which determines it. The final consummation is the obedience of the creation toward God in God. Therefore, it has been said that all the paths of God end in corporeality.

The "non omnis moriar" of pagan hope is changed into the Christian assurance of the resurrection of the body "in incorruption," "in glory," "in power," "a spiritual body," though "flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God"(I Cor. xv, 42–50).

As opposed to modern enlightenment, which deems God freedom and immortality, dreams of children and uncultured men, we read in every part of

Hegel these words of Novalis: "Philosophy can bake no bread; but she can procure for us God, freedom, and immortality."

Such pantheism is Hegel's in common with the Catholic saints of head and heart of all ages. Such pantheism is far higher Christian theism than that of the mechanical *deism*, which too commonly masquerades as orthodoxy, deceiving and belittling its own self and its disciples. Surely this gospel, according to Hegel and the saints, is far higher than the gospel according to both Mansel and Spencer.

Deistic orthodoxy is temporarily compatible with that "sober, common sense, unemotional, anti-mysterious type of religion that soon dies of dry-rot, not being rooted in the soil of the immanent Deity. True, vital, exalting and impulsive religion always needs the incoming and indwelling of that higher pantheism of the immanent Holy Spirit."

Hegel called his philosophy that of Absolute Idealism. He was, like St. John, a born Platonist, and, like St. Paul, a converted Aristotle. "The ideal is the real, and the real is the ideal." Dr. Erdmann calls it Panlogism.

Hegel has been criticised for over-emphasizing the *thought*, the $\lambda \delta \gamma \sigma s$ in all things, and for not emphasizing sufficiently the elements of will and love. But he conceives all thought as the *voluntary* outgoing of Love on its return to Love:

Denn das Leben ist die Liebe, Und des Lebens Leben Geist.

God is Love in all his works. Hegel read this immanent Love into the form of thought (λόγος) as identical with real being (ὄν). All such thinking be-

gets the loftiest and purest emotion. Intellectual ecstasy merges into ecstatic union with the Divine—intellectual comprehension of the incomprehensible love of God humbles and exalts us infinitely.

If Jacobi's reading of Kant's moral argument for the existence of God could raise sufficient emotion to bring on a violent fit of palpitation of the heart, surely the study of Hegel—of nearly every one of his works—will both humble and exalt the soul with floods of devotion, and wing its flight heavenward, as do both St. John and that Christian before Christ, Plato. Nor can one doubt that, with Hegel himself, this work of thinking the thoughts of God after him was a genuine act of devotion. These are his own (spoken) words: Das Denken ist auch wahrer Gottes-dienst.

Note.—I have elsewhere (p. 64) referred to these pregnant words as possibly legendary. I have since had it on good anthority that Hegel's wife vouched for their genuineness. He was a good German churchman, but not a constant church-goer. Frau Hegel once remonstrated with him for not attending public service more regularly, instead of spending so much time at intellectual work. He replied with unaffected seriousness, "Thinking is also genuine worship."

CHAPTER VI.

THE METHOD OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION.

Comparative Religion would have seemed superlative blasphemy to Christians of the early part of this century. To-day it is recognized as one of the sciences which is most fruitful in its aids to faith. It is not yet, however, entirely free from elements of irreverence and skepticism. In fact, the most subtle attempt to desupernaturalize Christianity—to reduce it to a merely natural though lofty product of the religious spirit of man—comes from this source and sharpens its weapons upon its material. This is one of the chief forms of attack that apologetics must face to-day.

The historical method of investigation, which, applied to the New Testament writings ofttimes to destroy their genuineness and authenticity, has resulted in such fruitful triumphant Christian scholarship—this same method is now applied to the study of all religions, ofttimes, too, in the interest of skepticism. We believe that it is already resulting in most fruitful scientific and philosophical vindication of Christianity as emphatically the revealed Religion. Skepticism here, as so often, leads the way into new fields. Christian scholars, sometimes trembling, follow to claim all the new truth discovered and to lay it at the feet of Jesus. Thus this investigation, this

study of the great religions of the world, becomes a department of apologetics. The supernatural character of Christianity is to be vindicated by arguments that come from the historical investigations and comparison of the religions of the world.

A slight sketch of the rise and progress of this work may be of interest, and also show that Christian scholars and missionaries have been most helpful in the work, it having been closely connected with the kindred science of comparative philology.

We might begin with the Renaissance and the Reformation. The first of these revived knowledge of classical literature and made men thoroughly familiar with the religion of Greece and Rome. The latter gave the spiritual impulse and the intellectual freedom which have been at the root of all modern progress. Another century saw the dawning knowledge of the great religions of the East, obtained through travelers, missionaries, and commercial intercourse. It was this faint knowledge that was sufficient to lead the freethinkers of France to suggest the setting up of Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, and Mohammed as rivals to the founder and apostles of Christianity. Every noble doctrine and moral excellence was attributed to the Oriental religions. Voltaire very naïvely attributed the superiority of the Chinese in morals, philosophy, and general culture to their ignorance of Christianity. Nothing else was needed, to put an end to all the miseries and disputes of his day, but the adoption of the Chinese religion throughout Europe.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century (1783), Sir William Jones began the real work of revealing the great literatures of the East. His was the envi-

able vocation of adding a whole continent of literature to Western wealth. A born philologist and lover of truth, like a young knight-errant, his enthusiasm rose to the level of his wonderful linguistic capacity. About the same time (1771) Anguetil du Perron, whose spirit and work were no less enthusiastic and much more romantic, opened to Europe the treasures of Persian literature. These leaders have ever since had devoted followers, profiting by all the modern means of investigation. Then Protestant missionaries, who, however, had been anticipated by Romish missionaries, began the accumulation of an enormous amount of ethnological and philological material; missionary dictionaries, grammars, and translations gave the apparatus for the study of many unknown languages. French, Danish, and German scholars in an illustrious succession have labored on the same continent of learning.

The discovery of the Rosetta stone in 1799 was the key which Champollion used for unlocking the vast religious literature of Egypt, therewith opening the door to a library of monuments and papyri in myriads of volumes. A very romantic and impressive outcome of the study of Persian literature is that the modern disciples of Zoroaster-the Parsees of India—were first furnished with the meaning of their own sacred books through the labors of European learning. Until 1859 their language of worship was an unknown tongue. On the publication of Spiegel's translation, a wealthy Parsee gentleman, living in England, had it rendered into English and sent to his fellow-worshipers for use in Bombay. the whole course of these twin studies-comparative philology and religion - would make volumes of

thrilling romance. The result is, that we have a large and scientific material for the appreciative and comparative study of the faiths of the world. This, too, is now made accessible through the editing by Max Müller of The Sacred Books of the East in twenty-four volumes. But, with all this, and abundantly more material, the task of judging justly these foreign religions is a difficult one. The personal equation comes in here, as elsewhere, to the prejudice of just comparison and truthful appreciation. This is seen in the three methods, or stages of method, of this study, which we may style the eighteenth-century Christian view, the old skeptical view, and the new scientific and Christian view.

I. The eighteenth-century view was that all the religions of the world except Judaism and Christianity were false religions, the result of wickedness, priestcraft, delusion, fanaticism, or quackery. All other religions were disparaged, that the Christian apologist might the better exalt and prove the supernatural origin of Christianity. This a priori view did not encourage a proper study of them. Indeed, in its special pleadings, the evils, rather than the truths, were eagerly sought for in them. The rigid line of distinction between the converted and the unconverted in Christendom was extended into the classification of all religions as "Natural and Revealed," "False and True," or "Paganism and Christianity." Christianity was the wholly true, and heathen religions were the wholly false. They could not be considered as having any Divine significance. They were worse than no religion. They were corrupt, superstitious, and the offspring of fraud and delusion. The utmost allowed to them was the utterly perverted and darkened light of a primeval revelation. This preconceived theory held that all false religions were corruptions of the Jewish religion or offshoots of a perfect primeval revelation, which had come down from heaven ready made for perfectly developed man. But, all remnants of that having utterly disappeared, there was nothing true in them, and no true faith exercised by their believers.

II. The eighteenth-century skeptics cheerfully acquiesced in ascribing the origin of these religions to delusion and fraud, only going further and placing Christianity in the same category. But this view of the origin of Christianity by skeptics and of all other religions by Christians has, I believe, once for all been abandoned. The relation of priestcraft to religion is found to be that of statecraft to nations—not that of creating, but that of created. Carlyle utters this fervid protest against the theory of quackery in reference to paganism and every other virile ism: "Quackery and dupery do abound; in religions, above all in the more advanced, decaying stages of religions, they have fearfully abounded; but quackery was never the originating influence in such things; it was not the health and life of such things, but their disease, the sure precursor of their being about to die. Let us never forget this. It seems to me a most mournful hypothesis, that of quackery giving birth to any faith even in savage men. Quackery gives birth to nothing; gives death to all things. We shall not see into the true heart of anything, if we merely look at the quackeries of it, if we do not reject the quackeries altogether as mere diseases and corruptions." In the same spirit he retorts upon those who claim that Mohammedanism owed its triumph solely to the sword, "But where did it get its sword?" Faith forged its sword and was the inspiration of its first armies.

Scholarly skepticism soon gave up this flimsy, unworthy, and irreverent view of Voltaire, and began the course which we may represent as these three stages: 1. That of looking for the good, true, and beautiful elements in all pagan religions. 2. That of tracing the origin and growth of all religion to the lowest forms extant—finding its ultimate source in the sensuous needs, the timidity, and terror which characterize the most barbarous tribes, so as to cast discredit upon it in all its later forms. 3. Its latest and best phase, which, while finding the source of all religions in its lowest forms, generously, sometimes genuinely, maintains that its real value is not to be determined by its empirical origin or by the accidents of its outward history, but by its own inherent worth —by that to which it developed from very humble beginnings, making sacred anthologies, bestowing an ignorant admiration upon them in place of the sweeping condemnation of Christian writers; seeking thus to depress Christianity the rather by exalting them to its level, or at least maintaining that Christianity is nothing more than a synthesis of the good and also of some of the evils of all previous religions. Evolution can do as great things for man's religion as it can for man himself. Mr. Herbert Spencer's article* on "Religion; a Retrospect and Prospect," is the best statement of this phase of the modern skeptical view. He deliberately proposes the Ghost-theory origin of religion, and follows through its various

^{*} The Nineteenth Century, 1884.

stages of evolution even to the far-off future millennium of the agnostic absolute religion. The man's ghost, or double, is at first "equally material with the original." This is gradually dematerialized or deanthropomorphized into the present conceptions of God, which process is to go on until all conception is destroyed, and the idea sublimated in the unknowable, unnamable something or nothing which the coming agnostic man will nevertheless worship as truly and devoutly as his barbarous gnostic progenitor worshiped fetiches.

III. This brings us to what we may call the modern Christian scientific method. We might call it the Christian view of organic evolution. It is Spencer's evolution minus its materialism and plus a Divine Evolver. It is the Hegelian evolution of the free personality of both God and man. It is that of organic evolution, with all that the adjective organic signifies, and with all the primary and continuous involution that every evolution implies. We may accept the fact that the method of organic evolution is the method of the nineteenth century. We may be thankful for its merit, and use and baptize it with the Spirit of Him whose is all truth. We start, then, from the basis of the Christian consciousness, which has been formed by the facts of historical Christianity, applied and inwrought by the Holy Spirit through the Christian centuries. It is the view of the Divine indwelling in the whole historical evolution conducting it to its conclusion. Its view-point of the faiths of the world is that of the Divine education of the race—the evident Providence in history. This fruitful idea, broached by Lessing, and anglicized by Bishop Temple, though hooted at by Orthodox,

Evangelical, and Tractarian, is now regnant. But it is not wholly modern. It was the cherished view of the fathers of the Alexandrian school. Clement, who Neander says was the founder of the true view of history, opposing those who condemned all paganism as wholly false, declared that all the good in heathen religions "must, therefore, be included with all the rest in God's plan of education for the human race"; that Greek philosophy as well as the Jewish religion was a positive preparation for Christianity. Speaking of the progressive steps in the Divine education of humanity, he represents the Logos as the θείος παιδαγωγός, declaring: "All men belong to him, some with consciousness of what he is to them. others as yet without it; some as friends, others as faithful servants, others barely as servants." The doctrine of the whole school was that God had revealed himself to all nations by his Logos, Christianity being his highest revelation, or a pleroma. Even earlier, Justin Martyr employed this view for setting forth Christianity as the central point, where all the hitherto scattered rays of the Godlike in humanity converge—the absolute religion, in which all that has thus far been fragmentary and rent piecemeal, is brought together into a higher unity, and for comparing all the partial and alloyed revelations of the λογὸς προφορικὸς with the full and unalloyed revelation of the absolute, Divine Logos in Christ. Thus early, then, we find the science of comparative religions starting from the standpoint of the Christian consciousness. Thus the method of comparison was one of the apologetic tactics of the Greek Fathers of the Church. And the standard of comparison was the Christian consciousness. The comparative religious content of every pagan religion was its frag-

ment of the pleroma of Christianity.

We may well accept this revived Christian method in this study. This method may be called a priori—a philosophy rather than a science. But it is both. For no science is without its metaphysical element, its intellectually vivifying principle, even if it be so bathetic as the philosophy of the Unknowable.

Let us, however, turn aside to notice briefly this method on its inductive side. The scientific study of religion consists in observation of facts, comparison of views, induction of principles and verification of these principles from the course of history, and, finally, the connected synthesis of all these results in a supra-scientific view—in a Philosophy of Religion though this term may be objected to by both skeptic and Christian. Certain phenomena are by general consent classified as religious. These are to be noted, and, when occurring in different bodies of people, to be compared with each other, to see what they are, wherein they agree, and where they differ. primarily a department of natural history. All religious facts are to be noted, whether enshrined in the form of myths, legend, story, dogma, ritual, or life. All its visible or historic phenomena are to be collated. Then comparison inevitably follows—a comparison of the sacred books, the teaching about God, duty, immortality, prayer, sacrifice, and life. It is to study these facts dispassionately, to aim at doing justice to all phases of this manifestation of the human spirit—to study them in the spirit of a judge, rather than that of the special pleader. This precludes the supposition that any form of religion is wholly false. It demands that we take an interest in the

study of each one of them—an interest that is sure to come and increase with continued study. It demands a hospitable mind, that esteems everything human of interest. But thus science must pass on from this analytic to its synthetic stage. Deeply impressed by the fact that man is eminently and everywhere a religious being-that the highest and truest history of any nation or age is the history of its religion—the student of this science unavoidably finds himself trying to generalize definitions of religion, God, revelation, that are either implicit or explicit in all religions. From Religions he passes by synthesis to Religion, and then turns back upon his previous study to read the laws of its development to read its course either as a progressive Divine revelation and education, or as the necessary dialectic of the idea. Development of some kind is assumed by all. We may call it the nineteenth-century postulate in regard to all life and institutions. It is the philosophy that underlies its science, the metaphysic of all its physics. Thus all, Christian or skeptic, are led unavoidably from the mere science of Religion to a Philosophy of Religion, which indeed is implicit, and vitalizes its every form as a science.

But the contest with the skeptic is not here, as it is not with the facts collated and classified by the science. Indeed, we may go further, and yet not be at the real issue. All comparison both presupposes and produces a standard of comparison. That standard we may say is Christianity, and not be challenged by any one. All grant that Christianity is the highest and best form of religion—the standard of comparison for measuring all others. Christ is formally at least invited to the highest scat in the world's Pantheon.

Before noticing more at length the method and its results, we may briefly indicate the crucial point, whence issues in theory the life or death of all re-

ligion.

It is when we ask, What is religion, what its cause, subject-matter, worth, reality, and final end? Skeptics say in fact, though often in most graceful and euphemistic periphrasis, that it is wholly an illusion, beneficent or baleful, a necessary product or a parasitic excrescence of human life. The question, What is religion? must and will be asked; and to be answered it must pass through the laboratory of science and the crucible of philosophic intelligence. Has it an imperishable substance of reality, or are its visible forms only held up by the sand-ropes of illusion, prejudice, and ignorance? Has it concrete reality, or is it, as with Herbert Spencer, only apotheosized ignorance? And thus it merges into the larger question, which includes that of the reality of all our knowledge-into the ultimate philosophic question of knowing and being. The answer divides thinkers today into the two schools of skepticism and faith, of total agnosticism and of partial but real gnosticism, without which God, the world, science, and philosophy are dead, and the inexplicable puppet man ought to cease to think, speak, and be. Silence unutterable is the only becoming companion of ignorance absolute.

But leaving agnosticism, which has no defense, no root or ground in the universe, we take the other philosophical view of Natural Realism, or of the reality of knowing and being, in a concrete organic nexus of living relations. Being, knowledge, life, all of these imply and may best be viewed under the

method of development—the process of vital, or-

ganic, progressive relations.

We may be told that we have only finite knowledge and being. But real answer is made when we show that our finite portions are not isolated, but that they are in organic connection with their correlative, infinite and absolute being and knowledge that man and man's history have never been isolated from his other infinite side of being, that his connection with Absolute Spirit has been as real and continuous as his connection with the earth—that in God all men have lived and moved and had their quantum of real being. The mechanical isolation of God, the world, and man, the complete and essential separation of concrete man from Absolute Spirit, of his self-consciousness from the element of God-consciousness, this old, barren, mechanico-logical view, which is responsible for much intellectual skepticism, can no longer be held. Real logic is found to be a process, and is manifested in all life and not in the forms of the syllogism. Man's being and knowledge are processes in organic relation to God. These relations are implicit in every man's life, but come into the conscious experience gradually. We need not reply to the exclamation, "What an assumption!" when it is that which alone gives reality to anything; when it is positively given in self-consciousness and its implications.

It is in this implicit organic relation of man with God that we find the root of religion. From this we may educe a definition of religion and trace its conscious evolution or "coming to itself," in the historical life of the race, with which it is conterminous.

We may briefly define religion as the conscious

relation of man to God. We may amplify this and say that it is the process of man's coming to full realization of the implicit relations of his own consciousness—the process of man's feeling after God and finding him, in whom all live and who is not far from, but in organic relation with, every one of his own offspring, though they worship Him ignorantly. It is the surrender of the partial, isolated self to its truer self—the striving after real life in conscious identity of mind and will with the Divine, that the old, false, fragmentary self may no longer live but give place to the realization of the perfect life—its native dower, its forfeited birthright. It is the truest life of man in communion with God, attempts after which give various expression to that latent consciousness of an Infinite Being and Life which is bound up with man's very nature as a rational and spiritual being.

But all this definition gives only one side, and that the finite side, of the religious relation. If we are in organic relation with God and seek to realize this, if we seek after the living God, it is no less true that God seeks after us his offspring, seeks to manifest his part of the vital relation, to reveal himself unto us. He does not sit in the inaccessible heavens and watch us vainly striving to fall upward to his feet. God is not foreign to man his creature—his wisdom and love are in vital relation with him, for of him, and through him, and in him are all things. If man's spiritual nature can only fulfill or realize itself in union with God, there must be some vital relation of God with man. Of an organic relation, all parts are vital; and this is the truth slighted alike by deist and pantheist and many professedly Christian writers upon the philosophy of religion.

Combining the two sides, we may better define religion as the reciprocal communion of God and man. It is the product of this double attempt to realize this organic relation. But its Godward side is its deepest and strongest—God striving to so manifest himself to us that we may know, love, and live in him. Revelation is, therefore, a constituent of all religion, and is an historic process as well as man's side of religion—a process that includes the revelation to primeval man, the continuous natural revelation through nature, history, conscience, and life, and all special revelations—all manifestations of the infinite Divine side of man's environment.

This definition of religion is the product of the study of the various religions, and in turn the test to try the measure and worth of each and its place in the progressive development. That there has been an organic development of religion the Christian much more than the skeptic is bound to hold. That there has been a providential control of the religious experience of mankind means, too, that there has been an order of progress—" first the blade, then the ear, afterward the full corn in the ear." The religious experience of the world, followed intelligently through its historic manifestations, gives us the stages of this evolution, of what was from the beginning involved in man's destiny or true nature. At any step in any phase of this experience we may put this measuring test, How much divine light and love and how much human response to it is to be found here? We may begin at the lowest recorded stage, though we may never begin at the ultimate origin, which neither tradition nor historic research can penetrate, and trace its course to its fullness. But this does not imply, and research does not show, that this process is identical with the successive phenomena of religious history of particular races or with the chronological order in which the various religions have succeeded each other. The colligation of facts is only the primary step in the science of religion. Then comes interpretation, or the finding of intelligence, order, progress—the eliciting the hidden presence of rational relations, of an objective reason, of God's activityin the collated and compared religious facts of the world. Every science starts with the presupposition that its subject-matter is intelligible, that there is reason or thought in it which it seeks to exegete. The student of the religious experience of mankind makes only the same presupposition. He traces the steps of this intelligence by viewing his material in the light of the definition of essential religion, and by comparison with it he determines the relation of the various religions to each other.

This gives him the true classification of religions instead of the prejudiced classification of "natural and spiritual," or the arbitrary and inadequate division into "polytheistic and monotheistic." Passing by all external and arbitrary resemblances, which ofttimes are most wonderful, and all differences, which ofttimes are only dialects of expression, we ask, to what extent each religion fulfills or realizes the fundamental idea of religion? The answer determines the moment in the process that each represents; and the working out of the answer is the task of the comparative study of religions involving a detailed examination of the religions of the world. The labors in this work have been abundant. Dr. J. Freeman Clarke, in his sympathetic study of The Ten Great

Religions, gives a good bibliography on this science. It is sufficient to refer to his list of authors and works, including those given in the preface of Part II of this valuable work.

To this definition and method of religion, two objections will be raised. The first is that the idea of an organic development of religion reduces it to a merely natural growth and gives no assurance of its objective truth. This arises from the materialism and the pantheism that have largely but wrongly claimed the method as their own. With them there is no place for the free personality of God and of man. It becomes merely a physical or a metaphysical process of necessary development. But to yield the method to these now almost united views, is neither wise nor right. The organic unity of the free personality of God and of man leads to an organic development of this relation in historic processes which are neither merely physical nor metaphysical, but are concrete freedom. We have risen far above the old theological antinomy between God's sovereignty and man's freedom. The solution, or rather the comprehension, of this antinomy is essentially also that of this question of an organic development of religion. It is identical with it.

The second objection to this method will come from its implying an *essential* relation between Christianity and other religions—an incorporation of Christianity into the unity of the *idea* and the history of religion. This objection is overstated when it is asserted that this view reduces Christianity to the level of other religions, or at least implies that it is the result of their synthesis. But this it need not and does not imply. Christianity is easily differenti-

ated from other religions even under this method, as the absolute religion, in the sense of being the perfect realization of the idea which underlies and gives significance to all others. All Christians claim that Christianity stands in organic connection with Judaism, both being parts of a gradually developing system, and draw from this one of the strongest arguments for the Divine origin of Christianity. But can we refuse to extend this connection in some degree to other religions? If the heathen nations were subject to a providential training, if God was in their history in any degree, as all grant, is not this relation essentially granted? Rome's work of the unification of mankind and Greece's work of philosophy have indeed always been allowed to come into this organic connection, but only, as it were, by a side door. As a matter of fact, the Greeks and Romans were found more ready to receive Christianity than were the Jews. It was this that startled the apostle St. Paul, who soon came to recognize a true seeking and finding through an ignorant worship of God underneath their superstition. It will not do to eviscerate his speech on Mars' Hill by pronouncing it "a masterpiece of ingenuity and eloquence." He believed what he said.

Indeed, the extending of this connection to others, besides Judaism, only strengthens the argument for the Divine origin of Christianity. Not only Judea, but the whole world, becomes a theatre for preparation for it, the whole order of human history pointing to Christ, who was the true "desire of all nations." Philosophy demands this, and much more does theology; for the doctrine of God, as Light and Love, without whose notice not even a sparrow falls to

the ground, necessitates us to take it, and thus to read the history of all religions as the record of his manifestation and of man's very imperfect apprehension and acceptance. God can not be wholly banished from any human history. Christian apologists to-day point out how Christianity meets "the unconscious longings of heathendom," and trace anticipations of Christian doctrine and guesses at truth in pre-Christian religions. It is even allowed that their vitality came from some lingering elements of a primeval revelation. It is also pointed out that Christ came "in the fullness of times." Divine Providence is allowed to have made external preparations for his advent, such as the facilities that the Roman Empire and the Greek language afforded for the diffusion of Christianity. But, as another has said, "It is surely not a less reverential view, to trace a deeper preparation in the movements of men's minds, in the convergence of manifold spiritual tendencies, in the gradual discipline of the human consciousness for the reception of the universal religion," and in the gradual human apprehension of Divine truth in the various religions. It is a shallow and irreverent conception which regards all pre-Christian seeking after God, and all pre-Christian seeking of God after men, as abortive experiments, the outcome being utter failures and worse than no religion, and their preparation for Christianity merely negative. The method of comparative religion will not admit this conception. Neither will it admit nor does it involve the concession that there is nothing more in Christianity than a synthesis "of pre-existing elements, or that its originality consists simply in the reproduction, in collective form, of ideas contained in the religious,

philosophical, and ethical systems of the ancient world." In reply to such a conception of Christianity, Dr. John Caird * has well said that "it is not more historically improbable than it is inconsistent with the true idea of organic development, which is absolutely antagonistic to any such a notion as that Christian doctrine is a mere compound of Greek, Oriental, and Jewish ingredients. To apply the ideal of development to human history is by no means to find in the old the mechanical or efficient cause of the new. For, in organic development, the new, though presupposing the old, involves the introduction of a wholly original element not given in the old. Hence we are not to conceive that Christianity could be elaborated out of pre-Christian religions and philosophies, any more than that life could be elaborated out of inorganic matter. But the connection of Christianity with the past, which we here assert, is a connection which at the same time involves the annulling and transmuting of the past by a new creative spiritual force. To assert it, therefore, is to hold that Christianity neither borrows nor reproduces the imperfect notions of God, be they pantheistic, dualistic, or anthropomorphic, in which the religions of the old world had embodied themselves. In the light of this idea we can perceive these imperfect notions yielding up, under the transforming influence of Christianity, whatever elements of truth lay hid in them, while that which was arbitrary and false falls away and dies. Thus, whatever elements of truth, whatever broken and scattered rays of light the old religions contained, Christianity

^{*} Philosophy of Religion, pp. 354. 355.

takes up into itself, explaining all, harmonizing all, by a Divine alchemy transmuting all—yet immeasurably transcending all—'gathering together in one all things in heaven and earth' in its 'revelation of the mystery hid from ages' the revelation of One who is at one and the same time Father, Son, and Spirit—'above all, through all, and in all.'"

Indeed, it is not without supposing the human race to have been annihilated and a new race created, out of all connection with the former, as the recipient of Christianity, that we can think of it other than as being essentially, organically related with the whole antecedent course of man's religious life. This method does not prejudge either how much or how little real movements of the process are found in any of the pre-Christian religions. It does not, indeed, assert a priori that Christianity is the absolute religion, the pleroma, which fulfills all religions as it does Judaism, with something infinitely above them, though implicit in the lowest. But this we may say is a result, granted by all, of a fair comparison—a result, too, from its fulfilling the definition given of religion. Being the concrete idea of religion, it thus becomes, like it, the standard of comparison. Nor can it, as the absolute religion, be divorced from its historical origin. The facts of the Apostles' Creed will ever continue to be the basis of its special apology. For comparative religion is all in the air, when it leaves the concrete historical basis, at any moment of the process. But being, in its historical manifestation, the absolute religion - that is, the perfect realization of the idea which underlies and gives significance to all religions — Christianity becomes the concrete standard of comparison. We thus pass

from the assertion that Christianity can not be fully understood unless viewed as an organic relation to ethnic religions, to the assertion that these can only be understood when viewed in relation to Christianity—that Christianity is the only religion, from which, and in relation to which, all other religions may be viewed in an impartial and truthful manner, and their significance as steps in the process of the revelation of the ideal and true relations of God and man be appreciated. Wherever there is any religion there is some revelation. In the absolute religion there is perfect revelation, which subsumes all previous revelations and passes on to special revelation, in the whole historic setting of the Incarnation—the perfect union of God and man.

The implications, inferences, illustrations, and the present results of the application of this method in the study of the "faiths of the world," are as innumerable as they are interesting. But notice of these is the work not of an article or series of articles, but the appropriate task of the great science of comparative religion. These indeed are as interesting as the statement of the method may seem dull. But the method is necessary to the attainment of the best and truest results of the science. A false method is cultivated in this science which yields anti-Christian and even atheistic inferences—which issues not in life but death. But this is due to false method, not to the real character of the study itself, which is a realm of human experience demanding study. For the science is an overwhelming demonstration, not only that man was made for religion, but also of the perfect religion for which he was made, and which was made for him—realized and being realized for him as briefly set forth in the creeds of the Church.

CHAPTER VII.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE POSITIVE (PRE-CHRISTIAN)
RELIGIONS.

THE previous essay on the Method of Comparative Religion was written before I had read Hegel on this topic. It may, however, be fairly styled Hegelian in method and spirit. Hegel makes extended notice of the various positive (bestimmte) religions in his Philosophy of History, translated in Bohn's Library. In his Philosophie der Religion he devotes a large part (Part II) to an explication of these religions. After having worked out the general idea (Begriff) and content of religion (Part I), he turns to the study of the various inadequate forms in which this idea has been embodied. He notes what part, member, or moment of the true idea of religion each one of the great world religions embodies—how each one of them dimly perceives and emphasizes some isolated element of the idea, or rather how the idea itself embodies itself in these inadequate forms. His method and work have been of the greatest value, really the inspiration and guiding method of all that has recently been accomplished in the study of re-Moreover, as both Prof. Max Müller and Prof. Sidgwick affirm, the present predominance of the historical method in all departments is largely due to the influence of Hegel. This must not be interpreted to mean that Hegel was merely an empiricist, or that his Science of *Religion* was merely a Science of *Religions*, but only as abating the charge that he was wholly an *a priori* expositor. He first grasped the fundamental *idea* of religion through the Christian conception of it, then watched the dialectic process by which this *idea* determined itself in various forms, and illustrated these forms by their corre-

sponding external or positive manifestations.

The Science of Religions has gathered and classified very much additional knowledge of these various positive religions, which would modify his use of them as illustrations of the moments of the idea. This is especially true of the lower forms, or Nature-religions, while his characterization of the Greek, Jewish, and Roman religions remains wonderfully significant. He would have admitted that the Science of Religions must modify the descriptive or illustrative portions of the Science (Philosophy) of Religion, while he would deny that it could change its method—i. e., that of the self-explication of the idea of religion. This idea is absolute, and is itself a living process of self-explication or of organic development, entering the world of time and space and embodying itself in various historical forms, but always with immanent finality, present in the lowest forms and gradually advancing through more adequate ones till it reaches that of Christianity.

A merely empirical study of the various religions, tracing them back to their historical origins, never adequately apprehends them. It is merely dealing with the temporary and accidental elements of the *idea* beneath which is their true reality. This *idea* is the organic relation of God and man. As Aristotle

long ago announced, the true first cause is the final cause of each and of all that is. The *idea* is implicit in and uses all the merely empirical causes for its own purpose. The historical origin is always itself caused by the *idea*. Living thought is immanent in, and truly causal of all, that exists and develops. It is not only true that whatever is must be transmuted into thought before we can know or understand it, but it is also true that without thought was nothing made and nothing exists that does exist.

The thought of things is their reality. We know them when we have brought them into our system of thought. The thought of the architect is the reality of the cathedral rather than its stones and mortar. So, too, the mere stones and mortar—the wood, hay, and stubble—that form so large a part of every positive religion, including historical Christianity, are not the real foundation or the gold, silver, and precious stones which the fire eternal that trieth all things temporal shall find enduring. The real cause or origin of all religions is not the empirical antecedents and surroundings of its historical appearance, but the idea (Begriff) of religion itself in the mind of the Absolute Idea (Idee). The last in time is first in thought, the

one far-off divine event To which the whole creation moves.

The study of religions is too often the ineffectual search for their temporal sensible origins. But Philosophy seeks for the origin of these origins, for their essential ideal, vital, creative origin in thought, of which they are only moments or representations of its moments. Thought, while identical with real being, is also prior to the sensible, positive, inade-

quate forms of real being. Temporal evolution only evolves the involved *idea*. The involved vital *idea* the rather evolves itself. Any other conception of evolution is both blindly fatalistic and chaotic. All the empirical conditions of the plant do not explain its origin and growth. It grows according to its idea. Man may have historically developed from lower forms of sensible existence—from protoplasm—but he is now, or rather is now being, developed according to his idea and not according to the idea of a plant or an animal. He is a man "for a' that and a' that," and not an anthropoid ape. Thus, too, no form of religion is explicable by all the empirical origins and conditions that history may discover. The history of religion presupposes and finds the idea of religion throughout.

The various positive religions are the self-posited determinations or differences of one and the same idea: and the Philosophy of religion is the Science, the intelligent recognition of the idea in its various self-posited differences. The various religions are sensible representations of these different moments of the idea. We may say that actual, historical Christianity is the sensible, positive form or illustration of the absolute religion. We may decline to affirm that historical Christianity, as a positive form of religion, is identical with the absolute or revealed religion. It is the representation in positive form of the absolute religion. Its idea is the idea of religion; but in no time or place or form has it been identical with it. This is simply the Christian view of the Church on earth as being the Church militant, looking forward to its final realization as the Church triumphant. It is only saying that the Christianity of men has always been profoundly inferior to the Christianity of Christ. The Christianity of any age, of any sect, of the Catholic Church of all ages, is inadequate to its idea. In idea it is the absolute, the revealed, the ultimate religion. In its actual realization of its idea, it is still seen in the process of development, with all the distortions and limitations which all historical development implies.

So it may be said of the various positive religions. They are not only inadequate to the *idea*, but they are also inadequate representations of the subordinate phases or moments of the *idea* which they illustrate. The method of the self-explicating idea is an illuminating, revealing torch that we may carry with us as we dig among the ruins of antique religions. It is a key to their ciphers that renders them intelligible. The thought of God and of man's relation to him is the soul and key of all religion. Christianity is ultimate and absolute in its idea of real organic union between Personality and personalities, and thus becomes the standard of comparison by which to measure and grade the phase of truth and error in all others. This standard of comparison is the *idea* of Christianity, and not its actual, positive manifestation in either Romanism or Protestantism. There have been phases of both these positive forms so very inadequate to the idea of religion as to repel wise men from the East in quest of a nobler religion than their own. Thus it has been possible for an educated man to write, "Why I am a Buddhist, and not a Christian." Thus it has been possible for Japanese studying Christianity in London to return home and advise against its adoption, because inferior to Buddhism in good works. But the Christianity of Christ is sublimely superior to that of men. It is the *idea* of Christianity that is absolute and ultimate, and so the standard of comparison.

There are different methods used in the study of religions to-day. There are two correct methods, the historical and the philosophical, and two false ones which are perversions of the true ones. Mere empiricism is the exaggeration and caricature of the historical, and abstract ideology of the philosophical method.*

The empirical method studies religions as a branch of natural history of human weakness. It compiles masses of information as to the positive forms that religion has assumed in cultus, dogma, and practice at different times and places. It tries to get back to an Ur-religion, and trace the growth of the human mind to no-religion as a progress into freedom. This is a perversion of the historical method, which also starts from the phenomena of religion, but seeks to trace through them both an intellectual and moral progress.

No human institution ever dropped ready made from heaven. Everything has grown, developed. Even the *Ten Commandments* had a history, and there were historical preparationes evangelicæ for the advent of Christ. The various stages of the growth and development of religion are searched out, and the successive environments which have coaxed or forced the rude germ into higher forms are noted. One phase is compared with another. Goethe's famous maxim as to languages is appropriated, and reads, "He who knows one religion only, knows none." Each is related to the others—springs out of them either by force of kinship or of hostility:

^{*} Cf. Bluntschli, Theory of the State, p. 5.

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All are needed by each one, Nothing is fair or good alone.

Too often the historical method contemplates all creeds, and holds none; but often it is thoroughly penetrated by the philosophical method, and becomes its supplementing and correcting handmaid.

On the other hand, abstract ideology, a priori theory, doctrinaire conceptions scorn the empirical and historical and evolve all from within. They only ape while caricaturing the philosophical method.

This true method seeks the real, the rational in the actual. The ideal side, the moral and spiritual life of the positive historical forms, engages its attention. It is concrete thinking, uniting together ideas and facts. It looks before and after, and seeks the indissoluble organism of thought, the *Logic* of all life. It can not move without history. But it gives history its philosophy. It interprets facts and history, but is not overwhelmed by the mere mass, nor confused by the manifold complexity that these afford.

Such is the method of Hegel in his study of the *Positive* religions. Having tried to comprehend the *idea* of religion and its necessity, he proceeds to interpret the mass of information gathered by empiricism and the historical method, in the light of this living, self-differentiating, and self-unifying *idea*. He follows the history of religion as the vital organic evolution of the *idea* in positive forms, asking what element of religion each religion represents, in order to give to each one its comparative philosophic content. The *idea* of religion as the reciprocal communion of God and man may be viewed from either side. On the one side, we have men so created by God

"that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him, though he be not far from every one" of his offspring. On the other hand, we have God seeking men, loving and coming "unto his own," lightening "every man," pleading with men, laboring with the might of omnipotent love to bind his children in organic union with himself. On the one hand, we have man seeking to find his true self in God, to become complete in him; to come to the full, self-conscious personality of a son of God. On the other hand, we have God seeking to find himself, to realize himself, to complete his self-consciousness by reconciling men unto himself, that he "may be all in all." Religion is thus God's effort to reveal himself to men so as to win them to himself in love, and man's effort to receive and live by this revelation.

This gives the essential basis for the classification of all forms of religion. Ask of each one as we find it in history, how has God been able to reveal himself to men through it, and how has it enabled men to approach, love, honor, and obey God? How has each one realized this idea of religion? What conception of God does each one supply? And then, is theretraceable through them all a progressively more adequate conception of God and realization of the idea of religion? Is there an organic development of the manifestations of the idea, corresponding to the inherent essential phases of the idea itself? Is there a common element or life running through them all, from the lowest to the highest, ever dying to old conceptions to live in new and higher ones, until Christianity appears as the manifestation of the full content of the idea, the manifestation of the Absolute religion that absorbs, annuls in fulfilling and transcending all the partial attempts of God and man at living, loving, organic and eternal union? All these questions Hegel would undoubtedly answer in the affirmative. His conception of religion demands it, and his treatment of religions implies it.

Before giving his classification of religions I wish to note (1) some implicit corollaries; and (2) some other classifications of the religions of the world:

I. A history of religions is the necessary subjectmatter of a philosophy of religion, and a philosophy of religion is necessary for any Science of Comparative Religions. Religion is as old as man qua man. It is an implicit, essential part of his nature. assumes local and temporary forms; is modified by climate, geography, and race. It is sometimes allied with the most inhuman barbarities, and sometimes with transcendent ethical life. Philosophy interprets the religion there is in all these diverse manifestations. It measures their content by the idea of religion. The Science of comparative religion can not move a step without the aid of Philosophy. It tells Science what phenomena are religious, gives the standard of comparison, and helps to interpret and classify them. It is to this science what mathematics is to astronomy, making it to be more than a mere mnemonic tabulation of religious phenomena. really gives to the current theory of evolution the imperfect method which it uses. It contributes the idea of organic development, which evolution, however, uses in an empirical and mechanical way. For this follows at best the analogy of a physical organism even in its study of spiritual organisms.

It debases the spiritual necessity of self-determination to the physical necessity of external compulsion, and thus vitiates all its results. Such is the central vice of the method used by Spencer and the whole school, in the study of man, social, ethical, and religious. The doctrine of Evolution is no longer in the air. It is in everything. It has come, seen, and conquered large realms of knowledge, and has come to stay. It has come to modify many traditional conceptions of God, man, and the world. Hence the need that it be rightly conceived and applied.

Spencer's evolution may well be styled Hegel's philosophy turned upside down, or an inverted pyramid. Hegel starts from spirit and traces its movement away from and back to itself throughout creation. Spencer starts from the matter or force unknowable, but is forced onward in ever-increasing nearness to spirit. But he is always cramped and confined by his non-spiritual starting-point, and never raises man above the form of the sphinx—half brute, half human -spirit struggling to tear itself loose from nature without more than partially succeeding. In the study of religions his school agrees with Heraclitus that "Religion is a disease, though a noble disease." It finds religion at the cradle of every nation, and agnostic philosophy at its grave. Hegel finds religion as essential to man as man. No religion, no man-mere brute. Perfect religion, perfect man-the Son of God. Between these two are the diverse forms of religion in organic relation, culminating in the incarnation as the manifestation of the idea of absolute and perfect religion. There is a progressive revelation, and a progressive reception of it, and not a mere progress out of religion.

Such a philosophic conception is necessary to beget that true, tolerant, and sympathetic study of the lowest forms of religion. This tolerance springs from confidence in spirit working everywhere to its ultimate self-conscious realization. It does not fault the seed because it is not the tree, or the uncomely parts of the body because they are not the comely parts. It seeks to recognize the place and worth of each element of the spiritual idea struggling back to spirit, person to Person. A famous utterance of Lincoln may justly be adapted so as to characterize Hegel's spirit in the study of religions: "With malice toward none, with charity toward all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive" to gather up and synthesize the element of truth in every religion, in the unity of the Holy Spirit and in the bonds of peace. He who knows but one religion, knows none; and he who knows the ultimate one rightly, knows all others as absorbed, annulled, transmuted, constituent elements of it. So to study them is to find them convincing evidences of Christianity, evidences of that Power which is not, and which is, ourselves working throughout the ages to reveal and realize our divine kinship—sonship. This is "the mystery which in other ages was not fully made known to the sons of men." Only in "the fullness of times" are all things seen to be gathered together in one in Christ, and Gentiles recognized as fellow-heirs and of the same body.

No need, then, to depress pre-Christian religions in order to exalt Christianity. No need to minimize the light which lighteth every man. No need to fear to recognize "every good gift and every perfect gift as from above." No need to fault Justin

Martyr for attributing inspiration to the Sibyl, or Clement of Alexandria for drawing no distinction in kind between the inspiration of the sacred writers and that which he believed to have been imparted to the great Greek philosophers. No need to decline to see the testimonium anima naturaliter Christiania in the great and good of all religions. No need to deny the "light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn and the day-star arise." Better say, with Clement and Origen, that the night of paganism had its stars to light it, and that they called to the morning star that stood over Bethlehem; that God has never forsaken or ceased to be the God of the heathen. No need to use the theological fiction of a primitive, supernatural, and perfect revelation of which all forms of paganism are but the corruptions.

Such a theory is not only without biblical foundation, but is also disproved by all the results of historical and scientific study, as well as being a priori unlikely. It assumes that man was naturally un-religious, and that religion must be implanted, readymade, and perfect from without. As well assume that language and art and science and social institutions were thus imparted by a primitive revelation. Better say that man is by nature religious, seeking after the Lord as the Lord seeks after him. No need to make the Jews the only nation not forsaken by the Lord. Grant them all their special privileges and attainments, but do not refuse to recognize the divine training of other nations for the advent of the perfect religion to fulfill all things—Jewish and Gentile—in the fullness of times. Study them all as "landmarks on the road humanity has followed in its return to God who awaits it—rather let us say to the God who

comes to meet it."* History and science, as well as philosophy, emphasize the essential unity and solidarity of the religious consciousness in man. The formations of the great religions of the world represent great crises of religious experience—the work of Infinite love and patience being continually tried by the failure to fully reveal itself in winsome form to its own offspring:

They are but broken lights of thee, And thou, O Lord, art more than they.

The Divine Spirit, the great Oversoul, has always borne witness in the under-souls of all flesh. To deny this seems to be as positive atheism and inhumanity as the dead ancestor or ghost theory of the origin of religion.

As opposed to the false, unscientific views springing from the theological bias, the eighteenth-century rationalists had also their false and unscientific theory and classification. They abstracted some supposed rational truths from concrete religious phenomena and labeled them natural religion. All else they decried as superstition or the invention and tool of priestcraft and statecraft. This was later followed by another reaction against the theological classification into true and false religions, and all religions were regarded as equally true. Similarities and resemblances were sought for and diversities ignored. Sacred anthologies were made from the ethnic Bibles to show that all religions were nearly equally good— Jehovah, Jove, and Lord, were different names for the same God. Happily, all these unscientific views and

^{*} Pressensé, The Religions before Christ, p. 13.

classifications are now effete. One would as soon think of classifying nations or languages as true and false or as natural and unnatural or as all equally good.

Hegel has thus censured this last view: "In every religion there is a Divine presence, a Divine relation; but it does not follow that because it is a religion it is wholly good. We must not fall into the lax conception that the content is of no importance, but only the form "(Philosophy of History, p. 204).

2. All modern classifications of religions may be termed historico-scientific, largely leavened with the philosophical element. Max Müller contends for the ethnological classification, following that of language, into the Aryan, Semitic, and Turanian. Prof. A. Reville adopts the severely criticised classification of Polytheistic and Monotheistic, including under the first all but Judaism, Christianity, and Islamism (History of Religions, p. 98). Prof. J. Freeman Clarke follows the classification of religions into that of Tribal, Ethnic, and Catholic. Prof. Kuenen confines his attention to National (Ethnic) and Universal (Catholic) (The Hibbert Lecture, 1882, p. 3).

Prof. W. D. Whitney classifies them into National and Individual, or race religions and those proceeding from an individual founder. The principle of the one is nature, that of the other is ethics. The former are generally local and the latter catholic. By all students there is an effort to give a morphological classification. Prof. Pfleiderer gives the classification into (1) Naturistic, Ethnic, and Catholic. Prof. C. P. Tiele includes all under the same morphological classification as Prof. Whitney—i. e., Nature religions and ethical (Individual) religions, though previously pro-

posing and using the following classification: (a) Animism; (b) Polytheistic national religions; (c) Nomistic religions, founded on a law or sacred writings; and (d) Universal or world religions which start from principles and maxims.*

From all these we may generalize the following as the accepted historico-scientific classification of religions. It leaves the primitive Ur-religion to psychology and philosophy to determine. That is pre-historic. (1) Naturism, including animism, fetichism; (2) Tribal; (3) Ethnic; and (4) Catholic religions. In no department has the modern historical method been more faithfully, ardently, and resultfully applied than to this study of religions. With glad mind and heart have its students found this study of man in his religious activity the most intensely interesting and rewarding. Man is by nature a religious being. Such is the verdict of its research. Starting as mere empirical positivism, collecting and tabulating religious phenomena, the Science of Religions has come to find a vital current throbbing organically throughout the essential unity and solidarity of the religious consciousness of man. It has found, like all other sciences of human activity, that it can not tarry in the realm of mere physics; that its physics implies a metaphysics; that there is everywhere present a differentiating and synthesizing universal, which both creates and interprets the mass of particular religious phenomena. In other words, it finds religion as the union of man and God to be an organic development, member bound to member, each stage containing

^{*} Cf. Tiele's History of Religions and Encyclopædia Britannica, article Religion.

while annulling and transforming the lower and less perfect ones, and all living realized and contained as organic members in the ultimate and true religion—that is, each and all are viewed in the light of the fundamental *idea* of religion, and this means that the Science of Religions has unavoidably been led to recognize that it is really the *philosophy of religion* that has been inspiring and guiding its study to its richest results. Thus, the historical process of religion, its evolution in historical conditions, is seen to be a process of thought, an unfolding, self-explication of

the idea of religion.

This brings us to Hegel's philosophico-scientific classification which he gives in the division (Eintheilung) of the positive religions.* This classification begins with the idea of religion and follows the logical development of this idea as illustrated and manifested in the positive religions, each one being recognized as a moment or element of the idea itself. All other classifications are external and mechanical. This classification is the movement, the act itself of thought, of the idea which differentiates and reunites its differences in their organic unity. It is, indeed, only because any one religion is a difference, a member of a unity, that it can be classified. If it has nothing in common with other religions, if it is a difference outside of religion, if it is totally a false religion, then it is an outcast from all classification. Every religion included in the classification must realize and express, however faintly, the idea of religion. Religion is the mutual relationing of God and man. The idea of God is fundamental and fontal. Reconciliation or vital re-

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. i, pp. 255-262.

lationship is the motive of all religions, with however much extraneous matter this central motive may be allied. Each one is a specialization, a more or less imperfect manifestation of the *idea* of religion, which is only finally and fully realized in Christianity. Christianity is the true and perfect religion, not because it excludes all others, but because it includes them. It came to destroy by fulfilling them all—by filling up their poor little conceptions with the fullness of the truth.

The lowest savage is a man. He manifests the idea of man. The idea is in him, making him as much of a man as he is; but he is not perfect man, not the fully manifested idea of man. Only in the God-man is the idea of man and of religion fully realized. At first man is only implicitly man, and religion is only implicitly religion, according to its idea. It is of the earth earthy. The implicit, undeveloped form of the idea is like all undeveloped organisms-homogenous. Hence the lowest form of religion is that of nature-religion. Here the consciousness has not yet distinguished its object from its sensuous self. The object is immediate and identical with its sensuous self. The manifold indeterminate objects of nature are worshiped. The subject has not yet distinguished himself from his own sensuous existence. When this step is taken, when the idea enters its first stage of differentiation, the subject also distinguishes the essence of nature from its sensuous form. God becomes transcendent. Hegel thus makes the distinction between nature-religions and the religion of spiritual individuality the center of his classification. Otherwise stated, this distinction is that of substantiality and subjectivity in God. He distinguishes all

pre-Christian religions by this antithesis (1) Naturereligions and (2) Religions of spiritual individuality, between which he places a class of religions in transition to spiritual individuality.

I. Nature-religions comprise:

(a.) Immediate sensuous religion, the magic and

witchcraft of savages.

(b.) The disruption of the religious consciousness in itself. Here the subject still considers himself as a natural sensuous existence, but opposes to himself a substance or essence of nature. He is nothing: nature as substance is all. But this implied elevation above the merely natural is not fully developed. Consequently, we have a mingling of the natural and spiritual, as seen in—

(a'.) The religion of measure of temperate conduct, secular life—the Chinese.

(b'.) The Religion of *Phantasy*, of inebriate dreamlife—Brahmanism. This is a pantheism of imagination rather than of thought. This leads to universal deification of the objects of nature. Its mythology is a wild extravagance of fancy. Brahm is anything

and everything and nothing.

(c'.) The religion of Being-in-itself, or of self-involvement. The all is nothing, and man must make himself nothing by his own might in order to become this all, this nothingness. Buddhism is the return of the negative spirit upon itself. The man Buddha is its ideal and becomes its God in place of the essence of external nature, the Substance of Brahmanism; but it is the Buddha who has universalized himself into that quiescence which can only come when all individual desires and aims and the thralldom of things of time and sense are renounced as evil.

Classification of the Positive Religions. 251

(c.) This contest between the natural and the spiritual leads to the contest of subjectivity. Pantheism is falling before the increasing consciousness of the individual. Yet the spirit has not yet subjugated the natural.

Under this we have three forms:

- (a'.) Parsecism, the religion of the Persians. This is dualism, or the antithesis of light and darkness. Its god has yet the form of a natural object, or rather of a formless object—Light. The principle of this transition is that the Universal Essence which we recognized in Brahm now becomes perceptible to consciousness and acquires a positive import for man. Man, too, becomes free, separate from the universal. though a partaker in that essence; but darkness is yet a felt power warring against the good and to be warred against by men. The world has not yet been reduced to unity; but the conflict has begun, and with this begins strictly the world-history which is to culminate in perfect freedom. "In contrast with the wretched hebetude of spirit which we find among the Hindoos, an exhilaration of spirit meets us in the Persian conception." Spirit emerges from its substantial unity with nature as found among the Hindoos.
- (b'.) The religion of Pain—that of the Phœnicians and Syrians.
- (c'.) The religion of *Enigma*—the Egyptian. Hegel regards the Sphinx as the symbol of the Egyptian spirit. Spirit has still, as it were, an iron band around its forehead. It does not attain to free consciousness of its existence. This is its problem, its enigma. But in its doctrine of immortality, which first appeared among the Egyptians, is involved the inherent infinitude of spirit.

- II. Religions of freedom, or of spiritual individuality. These rise above nature in the thought of a Final Cause:
- (a.) Of the absolute might and wisdom of the one God, who made nature, and consecrated from among the nations one to his exclusive service. Among the Jews we find the spiritual entirely purified and freed from nature; the pure product of thought. This forms the separation between the East and the West. We pass clear from Substance to Subject. "Spirit descends into the depths of its own being, and recognizes the abstract fundamental principle as the Spiritual. Nature is now depressed to the condition of a mere creature, and Spirit now for the first time occupies the chief place. God is known as the Creator of all men, as he is of all nature, and as Absolute Causality."* Spirit is all, nature is merely external and undivine. Spirit, which had hitherto been dishonored, here first attains its due dignity. But, like all protestantism, it goes too far. "Nature is undeified, but not yet understood." At a more advanced stage only can the Idea recognize itself in this alien form of nature. But true morality and righteousness now for the first time make their appearance. And yet the severe religious ceremonial hampers the concrete freedom of the individual. Absolute Spirit is not yet fully revealed, and hence concrete individual personality can not fully realize itself in the Absolute. Hence the lack of a belief in the immortality of the soul. It is the patriarchal family, the nation, which is of substantial and imperishable worth.

^{*} Philosophy of History, p. 203.

(b.) The religion of the free cultivation of individual perfection—that of the Greeks.

(c.) The religion of universal political dominion—

that of the Romans.

Hegel also characterizes these three thus: (a.) The Jewish—the religion of sublimity. (b.) The Greek—the religion of Beauty. (c.) The Roman—the religion of prosaic conformity to an end. "The

prose of life appears here."

The study of religions since Hegel's day undoubtedly compels considerable change to be made in the characterization that Hegel gives of some of them. But it does not change or invalidate the method, which can readily adapt itself to any amount of new information as to religious phenomena. The *idea* passes through these phases, and is indifferent as to just what one religion shall represent any one phase. They are all inadequate to the *idea*. They are all false so far as they claimed finality, and all true so far as they embodied and illustrated any phase of the *idea*. They failed and died, as everything imperfect must; but in and through them the human spirit had been educated beyond them, and prepared for the full revelation of Absolute Concrete Spirit in—

III. The Christian religion, in which the *idea* attains its adequate reality. This is the last, the highest, the ultimate, the religion of the perfect at-onement of the human spirit with the Absolute Spirit. It is the religion of truth, because in it spirit has spirit for its object. It is the religion of freedom, because in it the "other" of both God and man has been transformed into phases of self-consciousness. Through the incarnation in Jesus Christ the union of the Divine and human spirit has been accomplished,

the goal of creation attained. God is recognized as concrete personal Spirit, only when he is known as triune. "This new principle is the axis on which the history of the world turns. This is the goal and the starting-point of history." But this only appears "when the fullness of the time was come" (Gal. iv, 4). The mystery of preceding stages was now "made known unto the sons of men that in the fullness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, and that the Gentiles should be fellow-heirs in the same body" (Eph. i, 10, and iii, 5, 6). Thus Christianity, as the Absolute and the Revealed religion, is the truth of all which preceded it, and in vital organic relation with them. Such is the conception of Hegel. He first * attempted this unification of all religious phenomena in history, and a permeation of them by one principle and one method. However much, I have already said, his characterization of various religions as illustrations or manifestations of phases of the one essential, vital idea may have to be corrected by new information as to the history of these religions, his method and principle seem to be ultimate.

Christianity contains the fully developed and synthesized elements of truth of all preceding religions. Not one of them was absolutely false. All were incomplete—some as rudimentary as the lowest form of organic matter is compared with man. All had their roots in the needs of humanity estranged from God, yet seeking after him who has never been far

^{*} Puenjer says that Hegel's is the first complete system of a philosophy of religion (History of Christian Philosophy of Religion, p. 2).

from every one in seeking after them. All have contributed to the education of the race, though often temporarily contributing to the degradation of some parts of it. It is not necessary to overlook this debasing side of religion, when allied with crime, war, persecution, sensuality, and arrogance.* And it is necessary to pronounce all imperfect ones false when they arrogate perfection to themselves. it is also necessary to seek for the vital kernel that animates them both for good and evil, to discover the living root whence they have sprung, whose distortion forms their evil; to find the phase of the idea of religion that they represent, and to trace their slow modifications by which they perish only to survive as subordinated elements of a larger phase; to find fragments of truth, dismembered, partial, and dying in the effete religions of humanity, and true religion in none of them. It is also necessary to trace how they die as systems to live as members of a larger system; to trace the lineage and genealogy

^{* &}quot;Religion builds by turns, and fires the world-in its pureness the ornament and strength of society, in its perversion the scandal and scourge of nations. It supplies the first rudiments of society; it forecasts the social destination of man; leader in all progress; vanguard of all stability; source of revolutions the most prevailing; champion of the boldest adventures; pioneer more eager than commerce; explorer more patient than science. Religion is acknowledged the mistress of arts. She reared the temples that make Egypt venerable, and the marbles that made Greece renowned. While gratefully acknowledging the multifold service of the great benefactress, we can not forget that religion has been the worker of evil. No agent that has wrought in earthly scenes has been more prolific of ruin and wrong. The wildest aberrations of human nature, crimes the most portentous, the most devastating wars, persecutions, hatred, wrath, and bloodshed, more than have flowed from all sources besides, have been its fruits" (Hedge, Ways of the Spirit, p. 36).

of each new one containing these elements; to trace the continuous vital *idea* that lives and increasingly realizes itself in and through, thus annulling and fulfilling them.

Each member is worthy of study, though not of . equal worth. One is truer, more adequate than another. One may be a vessel unto dishonor, another one unto honor. Both the historical method and the theory of evolution yield their best results from being vitalized with this philosophical conception of movement by affirmation, negation, and absorption of the old into the new. It is on stepping-stones of dead ancestors that we rise to higher things, and have an inheritance to preserve, increase, and transmit. A philosophy of religion should aim at finding the logic of the life of the religious consciousness in all phases of its manifestations, stripping off the external, accidental elements and expressing in terms of thought the process of development, the ultimate kernel of each, after the chemistry of time has dissipated the unessential circumstances. The stages in the evolution may seem to some to follow each other by accident or by mechanical necessity. Each one is utterly refuted. Truth is nowhere, even in part. Truth is not living, vitalizing all. The result is a museum of the aberrations of the human spirit, a pantheon of dead gods.

When any living organic progress is thus denied to the history of religion, its study hecomes the most comfortless and disheartening. It asks the profane question of Pilate, "What is truth?" It answers with the equally profane words of Macaulay, "Who are the wisest and best, and who is to be the judge of that?" It banishes life, love, spirit, God from

the world. It turns cosmos into chaos. But philosophy is thought, reading living, loving, thought everywhere, especially in religious phenomena. It is the reading of the dialectic of love, annulling, absorbing, fulfilling its inadequate forms toward the goal of adequate form and self-revelation. It reads God in religious history. Because it sees God fully revealed in the Christian religion, it can also see him faintly revealed and apprehended in the lower forms which Christ annulled and fulfilled "in the fullness of times."

Christianity, though the highest and ultimate form of this organic development, is not merely an external summation of the preceding ones. It is not merely a "golden thesaurus" of the best elements in all of them. Though every petition in the Lord's prayer, and every sentence of the sermons of our Lord on the mount and in the temple and valleys and on the sea, could be found in the Bibles of other religions, yet would Christianity be other and greater. No such artificial patchwork could faintly resemble the living coherent organism of Christianity. A mausoleum for ghosts might thus be constructed, but not a living temple of the Holy Spirit for living worshipers. It is in no such merely mechanical way that Christianity contains and fulfills all preceding religions. We may grant all the valuable results obtained by Bauer and his school in the study of the origins of Christianity. We may thankfully accept all the moral, religious, and intellectual elements that they show to have been waiting in the great alembic of the Roman Empire at the advent of Christ, and yet maintain that the new life is beyond the analysis of historical chemistry, as all life is beyond the formula of

chemistry.

The originality of the character and work of Christ is the most easily maintained of historical theses. Genealogy, environment, the invention of loving disciples, genius, mythology, it is not too much to say that all these have confessedly failed to account for "the great surprise of history," whom "all men seek." Reverently speaking, he was a provincial man, born in the smallest nation, and among the narrowest people, never traveled as a "citizen of the world," never read universal history, nor studied the classics of the Gentiles, and yet he was neither Jew nor Greek nor Roman, but man. Nor was he the mere copy of any Messianic idea, Jewish or Gentile. Nor was he the creation of loving disciples. As Theodore Parker was forced to say, it would take a Jesus,* to forge a Jesus; or, as another puts it: "We know that they could not have originated it, as we know that Peter could not have chiseled out of marble the beauty of the Apollo Belvidere, or Paul have painted that wonder of art, the Sistine Madonna."+ All the world wondered and still wonders at that man,

† Rev. Newman Smythe, Old Faiths in New Lights, p. 225.

^{*} The whole passage from Parker is worth recalling: "Consider what a work his words and deeds have wrought in the world. Remember that the greatest minds have seen no further, and added nothing to his doctrine of religion, that the richest hearts have felt no deeper and added nothing to the sentiment of religion, have set no loftier aim, no truer method than his, of perfect love to God and man. Measure him by the shadow he has cast into the world—no! by the light he has shed upon it. Shall we be told such a man never lived, the whole story is a lie? Suppose that Plato and Newton never lived. But who did their wonders, and thought their thoughts? It takes a Newton to forge a Newton. What man could have fabricated Jesus. None but Jesus."

the goal of creation. Yet it is possible, nay necessary, to hold this doctrine—of Christ as incarnate God—and at the same time to connect Christianity organically with *all* preceding religions and cultures. Hegel affirms not only the necessity of the incarnation as the completion of the creative purpose, but also maintains that it was accomplished, and could occur only *once for all*, in the man Christ Jesus.*

Thought will not stop short of this conception of the organic development of religion, including all forms of its manifestation. And Christianity is not degraded but exalted by this view which makes it the culmination of the development, the complete ideal realization of what religion is. It is only when the figure of the mechanical development of a physical organism is used in place of that of a spiritual organism, that we can rightly object to it. The time has passed when it was considered derogatory to man to trace his physical antecedents to lower forms of life. We speak of man as a microcosm, containing in transmuted form all phases of lower physical existence. But he is a man for all that, and not a stone, or tree, or animal. It is only so far as he has yet the elements of the lower, untransformed in him, that we find him degraded. If he has yet a stony heart, a wooden head, and merely animal motives and aims, he is like a miniature sphinx, an imbruted man.

We trace the growth of architecture through a succession of crude conceptions manifested in rude forms, till the great architect appears who annuls and fulfills all lower conceptions in giving birth to the ideal cathedral embodied in stone. Without

^{*} Philosophy of History, p. 337.

them he and his work could not appear. No human thing drops ready-made from the skies, not even Christianity itself. Christ did not first become "the light of the world" eighteen centuries ago. Christ is, and is not, the great surprise of history. The surprise would be greater if he had not come in the fullness of times to fulfill the constitutional Christ-want of humanity. The incarnation is not unnatural nor accidental. It was natural and necessary, considering the nature of God and his creative idea. It is the completion of the self-necessitated creation and revelation of the triune God. And completion implies a beginning and a process. First, this is seen in the earthly life of Jesus. He who was "the first-born of every creature," "the beginning of the creation of God," was incarnate, and "was made man," thus showing that "the finite is capable of the infinite," and the infinite of the finite, or that Divinity involves humanity.

Yet this was a mediated process, begun in the kenosis, completed in the plerosis of Christ. "And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man" (St. Luke ii, 52). The growing union of God and man begun at the nativity was only completed in the ascension and session at the right hand of God the Father. The whole mediation of his three-and-thirty years of life in organic relation with humanity in family and civil and religious relations and genealogy reaching back to "Adam which was the son of God" (St. Luke iii, 38), was essential to his being made perfect man. He grew, increased in wisdom, confessed his ignorance of "that day and that hour" (St. Mark xiii, 32). temptations, trials, sorrows, passion, and death were real and human, and only through them the completion, or the excarnation, the return process occurs. There is no degradation, but the realization of genuine ethical divine-human love, in all this. The degradation would only have been if Jesus had stopped in any one of these stages of his ethical humiliation, if he had not passed through them all triumphantly, increased by means of them into the measure of perfect man.

Again, it is necessary to regard the incarnation as a process from the Godward side. His coming must be viewed as the fulfillment of a supernatural order, the consummation of the Divine, self-necessitated creation. Immanent Divine Love, a conception only possible with the Christian doctrines of God's triune nature, is the source and motive spring of all creation, a creation which must go on till love returns home, and God be all in all. God so loved that he created the world, and "so loved the world that he must give his only-begotten Son." "God is love." "Now we see only in part," but we see the essential principle immanent in his creation, in the light of which we must try to spell out its working in the tangled mass of phenomena.

This ideal truth of creation we seek, then, to read in the religious history of mankind, as its unbroken organic life and *Logos*. All admit this organic connection of the Christian with the Jewish religion. How can we hesitate to extend the connection to all? How can we decline the additional "aids to faith" and "evidences of Christianity" thus afforded by the scattered rays of the light which is always self-imparting love? Nay, how can we, without heresy against both the gospel and thought, seek to exalt Christianity, which is not envious, by depressing all

dimmer perception of the light? The solidarity of man in sin and salvation is a chief topic in St. Paul's preaching of the gospel to Jew and Gentile. The essential Christ, the new Adam, is throughout human history to be seen beneath the debased image of God in the first Adam. This was the conception of Christianity of the Greek fathers. Justin Martyr says: "We are taught that Christ is the first-born of God, and we have shown above that he is the Word, of whom the whole human race are partakers. And those who lived according to Reason are Christians. even though accounted atheists, such as, among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and those who resembled them, and of the barbarians (Jews) Abraham, Ananias and Azarias, Misael and Elias, and many others; from going through the list of whose names and actions, knowing that it would be tedious, I now beg to be excused." *

We are familiar with Clement's view of the Logos as the universal Divine pedagogue in the cosmopolitan school of all nations. One quotation out of many specially significant ones must be given: "In the whole universe all the parts, though differing from one another, preserve their relation to the whole. So, then, the barbarian (Jewish) and Hellenic Philosophy have torn off a fragment of eternal truth from the theology of the ever-living Word (Logos). And he who brings together again the separate fragments and makes them one, will, without peril, contemplate the perfect Word, the truth." †

As immanent Deity, constitutionally and organically related to humanity, the Logos was, to a certain extent, universally incarnate or immundate. "the

^{*} Apology, i, chap. xlvi. † Stromata, vol. i, chap. xiii.

Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." Jesus is the Christ, the absolute man, the perfect union of God and man, who comprises the prius and posterius of all history in himself in an absolute and unique manner. The incarnation is meaningless, and would have been impossible, without this organic relation to the religious consciousness and experience of man both before and after. Yet after and before there are elements of unwisdom, unrighteousness, and inhumanity connected with this work of the essential Christ. Only in him, the man Christ Jesus, was perfection realized. We demur to associating Christianity with the debasing superstitions of false religions. If the Christ were such a puritan, he might demur to associating his name with many phases of historical Christianity. Principal Caird has well said, as to this aversion to the idea of the organic connection of Christianity with previous religions: "The real ground for humiliation is not in the fetichism out of which religion is said to have sprung, or in the childish supersititions and irrational observances that have been the accidents of its history; but rather in the element of fetichism and unreason that often still clings to it, in the admixture of magic which still deforms its worship, and the remains of meaningless and irrational dogma which still corrupt its faith."*

Jesus Christ was the perfect realization of the religious idea. But *after*, as well as before him, I have said, we have not the perfect realization of religion. And yet we do not read Church history as *profane*. We call the Catholic Church *holy*. We believe in God in history, and in the Divine guidance of the Holy Spirit. We decline any puritanical

^{*} Philosophy of Religion, p. 344.

conception of Christianity as heretical and schismatical, because it denies this. Both the evangelical and the Anglo-Catholic reversion to earlier forms are equally uncatholic, only different phases of the same denial of the guidance of the Holy Spirit and of the presence of the Logos in all subsequent universal history.

But all such work betrays the utmost artlessness of unhistorical and unphilosophical comprehension. True Catholicism receives, digests, and transmutes into present belief, all that which has been believed "everywhere, always, and by all," in a far wider and truer sense than Vincent of Lerinus meant. kingdom of heaven—the ideal society of Jesus—was likened by its divine Founder himself "to a seed that a man should cast into the ground, which groweth up he knoweth not how, because the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself." He who made the seed made also the fertile earth into which he casts it, so that the seed can not retain its primitive, undeveloped form, but must spring up and take nutriment and form from earth and air, first as the blade, then as the ear, and after that as the full corn in the ear. So Christianity is the result of the incarnate Logos and the earth of secular life into which it was cast. The two can not be separated. They have been divinely given as elements of an organic process. Pagan and Jewish conceptions of the kingdom and its Divine service, Greek philosophic conception of its intellectual content, Roman conception of its law and order and manifold other human institutions and conceptions, were the earth prepared to receive this seed. Christian history has been the history of this growth of the original implicit force of the seed in its earth and air energizing and modifying environ-

ments, the history of the Church, or of the gospel in secular life. Each generation takes up the past, but, instead of receiving it mechanically, it transmutes it into the fuller corn of the ear. This is the logic of Christian history, the infinite cunning of Reason that develops we know not how, through apparently most uncongenial environments. All the conceptions of God, of the Christian religion and Church, diverse and discordant as they are, must be elements, assimilated not mechanical, of our truest conceptions to-day. The history of Christianity is not intelligible apart from a divine government of its necessarily organized form of secular life—the Church. Its immanent logic is the ruling Logos that is a vital, self-realizing principle, that assumes and then transcends increasingly adequate expressions of its own life. This is the dogma of the guidance of the Church by the Holy Spirit. The instrumentality of Greek philosophy in introducing or formulating the Nicene symbol is no sufficient ground for asserting that it is foreign to Christianity. No more are the influence of Jewish or pagan conceptions of religion and the Roman conception of organized law and authority sufficient grounds for asserting that the ecclesiastical and sacramental development of Christianity, to which they so largely contributed, are utterly foreign to the spirit of the gospel. All these are but the prepared ground through which the Spirit manifests increasingly the full concrete logic of the divine life on earth. Christianity was never intended to be abstract, all in the air, remote from the secular sphere of life. But in the historic life of its Founder and in the historic life of the Spirit, which is a quasi-secular incarnation in the Church, it appears as the most

concrete manifold life of which men can conceive. And puritanical criticism, of whatever type, is of such a one-sided, abstract character that it can not be accepted. We no longer conceive of or argue about the soul as an abstract unity. We know soul as the unity of body and spirit. So we know Christianity as its Founder meant us to know it, as the union of the *Logos* and secular life—never yet, indeed, perfect in its manifestations, but moving toward the most full concrete life of which humanity is capable. The true continuity of Christian thought is wider and deeper than that of either Greek or Latin conception. The nineteenth century conceptions of God, Christianity, and the Church are only catholic and in the line of the logic of history as they receive and transmute all previous partial conceptions, and thus, as heir of all the ages, gain the richer and fuller life of the Spirit.

This is the true way of reading Church history, to read the sacred immanent in the secular, to see the leaven leavening the whole lump, to see the progressive reincarnation of the perfect man in the whole of his redeemed humanity. Christianity is a life, permeating and inspiring the good in the whole range of the secular life; and yet all is not good, and all good is not equally good. We rejoice to see Christ preached in any and all ways, and to recognize his presence and power in all the truly human secular institutions and pursuits, as well as in that form of his kingdom organized for specific religious services, the Church—the most divine, as far as it is the most genuinely human secular institution.*

^{*} Cf. Canon Freemantle's Bampton Lecture, 1883, p. 299, and Mulford's Republic of God, p. 169.

This has been the way of the Spirit, and the method of the Logos in history after his incarnation and excarnation. We decline to profane the history of his kingdom come, need we, dare we ungenerously profane the history of his kingdom coming? The world was made by him, and he was in the world, preparing, educating humanity, Gentiles and Jews, for his advent in visible incarnate form. That view which represents the preparation of the world for his advent to have been merely negative, all the seeking after God to have been in vain, is certainly an unchristian and untheistic view, denying the love of God, seeking after and going out to meet his returning prodigals; denying his education of the world to have had any results, and evaporating all meaning in the expression "in the dispensation of the fullness of times." The Scribes and Pharisees murmured at him for holding communion, eating and drinking with publicans and sinners. The irony of his reply should enter our souls, when we shrink from acknowledging his adumbrated presence in all pre-Christian religions: "They that be whole need not a physician. . . . Go ye and learn what that meaneth, I will have mercy and not sacrifice." And when we seek to exalt Christianity by our righteous depreciation of other religions, we surely will hear his words to other Scribes and Pharisees: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at them." The marvel and the mystery to us is, not that we find so much good in them, so great results of the divine education, but that we find so little. But, little as it is, we ascribe it to the one essential, persistent, organic light and life of men.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION.

In Part III Hegel gives first the metaphysics of the Absolute Religion, and secondly the speculative view of Christianity as the revealed, positive, or historical form of this perfect religion. I present the larger part of it chiefly as a translation of the text. The first eight pages is a full translation. This may only serve with some to show how useless a literal translation of Hegel is, how much it needs to be retranslated in the form of expository and critical paraphrase. With others, it will lead to an appreciation of the severely scientific procedure of Hegel's thought and to a study of the original. I may add that Mr. Louis F. Soldan gives an excellent literal translation of this part.*

We have now reached the *perfect* religion, that in which the *idea* of religion has been fully realized. We have previously defined religion as God's Self-consciousness. This self-consciousness of God is to be distinguished from finite consciousness. God knows himself in a consciousness which is distinct from himself; but this differs from finite consciousness by being *implicitly* God's *own* consciousness. Further, it is also *explicitly* God's own consciousness, being conscious of its own identity with God through its negation of

^{*} The Journal of Speculative Phliosophy, vols. xv, xvi.

finiteness. God distinguishes himself from himself so as to be his own object, and yet remains absolutely identical with himself in this distinction. That is, God is *Spirit*. This constitutes the content of religion. This perfect *idea* is now realized. Consciousness knows this content, and knows itself as inextricably bound up with it. It is a phase of the process of the *Idea* of God himself.

The finite consciousness knows God only so far as God knows himself in it. God as spirit recognizes himself in the spirit of his Church—that is, in the spirit of those who revere him. In this perfect religion we have the revelation of God. He is no longer an unknown Being afar off, for he has acquainted man with himself, and that not merely through external history but in his consciousness. This is the religion of the revelation of God, since he knows himself in the finite spirit. He is absolutely manifest. Such is the present relation. We have seen in the positive (pre-Christian) religions how this cognition of God as free Spirit was still burdened with finite limitations. It was the work of the Spirit to overcome these limitations. We have seen in these pre-Christian religions how the misery and pain revealed the nugatory character of these limitations to consciousness, and thus formed the subjective preparation for the consciousness of Spirit as an absolutely free and therefore Infinite Spirit.

(A.) First, let us notice the general character of this sphere.

The absolute religion is (1) manifest (offenbare) religion. But religion is manifest only when it has become an object to itself according to its idea, free from finite objectivity. That is, religion according to its general idea, is consciousness of the absolute essence. But all consciousness distinguishes. So we have here the two, consciousness and absolute essence; and primarily these two are external to each other, and thus finite. And so consciousness cognizes absolute essence only as something finite and not what it is, in

truth. God himself is consciousness, distinction of himself in himself. But as consciousness he gives himself as object, is himself his own double, and thus annuls all limitation.

We, on the contrary, always have two things in our consciousness, which are related to each other as finite and external. But if religion comprehends itself, then the content and the object of religion are themselves the totality. That is, it is consciousness related to its own essence, the cognition of essence as itself, and not as another. Thus Spirit is the object of religion. In it there are no longer two—consciousness and its object—but one; that is, religion which is filled with itself, which is revealed. The object is not another, but Spirit, self-knowing essence. Here for the first time Spirit becomes the object and content of religion, and spirit exists only for spirit.

This is the abstract determination of this Idea (Idee), or religion is, in fact, the *Idea*.* For the *Idea* in the philosophical sense is the *idea* which has itself for an object. It has determinate existence, reality, objectivity, which is no longer merely internal or subjective, but which has objectified itself. But this self-objectification is at the same time a return into itself. So far as we call the *idea* the aim, it is the realized, the accomplished *idea*, and thus objective.

The object which religion has for itself is its own existence, the consciousness of its own essence. It is therein objectified. It now has real existence, whereas it was at first merely subjective *idea*. The absolute religion is the revealed religion, having itself for its content.

This, too, is the perfect religion which has spirit for itself, which has become objective in itself—that is, the *Christian* religion. The universal and the individual spirit, the finite and infinite, are inseparably combined in it. Their absolute identity constitutes this religion and its content.

^{*} Note the distinction between idea (Begriff) and Idea (Idee), which signifies the Absolute Idea.

Instead of abstract substance, we have the concrete Absolute Subject, making itself known to finite spirit. Yet, this is but a phase (moment, a dynamic element) of universal spirit, and thus the latter, even in this separation, returns into itself undivided.

Ordinarily theology has for its aim the cognition of God as something purely objective, absolutely separate from the subjective consciousness, like the sun or any other external object. But the *idea* of the absolute religion, on the contrary, has to do with religion itself, rather than with these external elements. The unity of the representation which we call God, or the Absolute Subject, is the object-matter of absolute religion.

Many to-day profess that the chief thing is to have religious life, to be pious, thus making the object of little importance. In fact, they say that the object, God, can not be really known. The chief concern is our own subjective piety. But even this standpoint contains an important advance in recognizing the validity of its infinite element—the subjective consciousness of the individual. In fact, this cognition of the absolute worth of the individual may be said to be the great attainment of our day. Individual subjectivity is a very essential determination of religion. But it must be asked how this determination has come about

Upon this we may offer the following remarks: Religion, in the determination of consciousness, is so conditioned that her content flies ahead, and thus seemingly remains a foreign object. From the standpoint of consciousness, any and every content that religion may have, seem to be foreign. Even when the content is accepted as revealed, it remains for us an external affair. Such a conception of religion, as something that can not be cognized, but only passively received by faith, leads also to the subjectivity of feeling, which is the end and result of the worship of God. Thus the standpoint of consciousness is not the only one.

The worshiper sinks himself, with his whole heart and devotion and will, in the object of his worship. In the height of his devotion he has annulled, or rather absorbed and realized into unity, the separation which exists at the standpoint of consciousness.

But this annulment of separation may then be conceived as something foreign, as the divine grace or mercy to which a man can only passively submit. Against this separation is turned the determination that makes religion, or man's subjective feeling, the chief thing. His will is only God's will. In him these two are inseparate. In other words, then, the subject is throughout the whole matter the real and essential relation. Thus the subject, the individual, is raised to an essential element. Along with this comes the freedom of spirit, which it has so restored that there is no place where it does not find itself. The idea of the absolute religion implies the objectivity of religion, though the consciousness of this idea does not. In the form of this consciousness, where piety is held to be the main thing, and the object of religion of little knowledge or matter, there is a lack of content and objectivity.

But it is the prerogative of truth that knowledge finds its absolute content in religion. At this standpoint, however, the content appears only in a stunted form. It is contingent, finite, and empirically limited. Hence a certain resemblance to that of the age of the Roman Empire. The subject is indeed conceived as infinite, but as the abstract infinite, and hence limited and finite. Here freedom is only such as allows a world beyond to exist. It is a longing which denies the distinctions of consciousness, and thus rejects the most essential element of spirit, leaving nothing but spiritual subjectivity.

Religion is the spirit's knowledge of itself as spirit; this is not substantial but subjective knowledge. Subjective consciousness does not know this limitation of its knowledge. It finds this abstract infinite as involved in its feeling

of its own finiteness. It takes it as the absolute though abstract ground of its own finite actuality. It is rather a feeling of longing for the inexplicable beyond (Yenseits).

The absolute religion, on the other hand, contains this category of subjectivity, or of infinite form, which does not differ much from the category of substance. Here the infinitely substantial subjectivity makes an object and content for itself. In this content the finite subject is again distinguished from the infinite object. God as Spirit, dwelling apart by himself, or not dwelling as a living spirit in his Church, is only looked upon as a one-sided limitation, as an external object.

The absolute religion is the *idea* (Begriff) or notion. It is the *idea* of the absolute *Idea* (Idee) in its perfect realization. Here we have spirit as the reality which exists for spirit, which has spirit for its object, and therefore this religion is the revealed religion: God reveals himself. Revelation means this judgment of infinite form which can determine itself and be for another. This self-manifestation belongs to the essence of spirit itself. A spirit that does not manifest itself is not spirit.

We say, God has created the world. The act is looked upon as a completed act, which could not happen again, or as something that might or might not have happened. Thus we say that God might or might not have revealed himself. But all such predications are arbitrary and accidental, and do not belong to the *idea* of God. For God as spirit is essentially this self-revelation. He does not create the world only once. He is eternally creating, eternally revealing himself, eternally working. This is the conception and the definition of God.

Revealed religion which manifests spirit to spirit is thus the religion of spirit. It does not lock itself out from another which is only temporarily foreign to itself. God himself creates the *other* and abrogates it by fulfilling it. It is the nature of spirit to be its own phenomenon. This is its

very deed and life, to manifest itself to itself. What is it that reveals God, we may exclaim, if it be not his own self-revelation? He reveals the infinite form. Absolute subjectivity is that which characterizes itself by the positing of distinctions, of content. He thus reveals his power to create these distinctions in himself. He gives and retakes. Thus it is revealed that he is for another. This is the characteristic of revelation.

2. This religion which is manifest to itself is also called the *revealed* (geoffenbart) religion. This means, on the one hand, that it has been revealed by God to man, and on the other that it is revealed in the sense of being bestowed upon man by a power outside of himself. In this last sense it is also called *positive* religion.

But what, we may ask, do we mean by this conception of positive?

Absolute religion is certainly positive in the sense that everything existing for consciousness is something externally objective to it. Everything must come to us in an external way. Thus the sensuous is positive; and everything spiritual comes to us in the same way as first finite or historical, and then as spiritual. All such external spirituality is positive.

The laws of liberty as posited in social codes show us a higher and purer spirituality. Though this is of the nature of pure spirituality, it comes to us in the first place externally as instruction, education, or doctrine. It is thus mediated and certified to us. The laws of society and of the state are also *positive*. They meet us, they are for us, they are valid. They have not merely such kind of existence that we can ignore them, but such as are subjectively essential. They are the real laws of our true selves.

When we comprehend and find it rational that crime should be punished, we can say that it is both valid and essential for us not only because it is positive law, but also because it has internal validity in our reason as something essential because rational.

Being positive does not make it irrational and unnatural. The laws of freedom have always a positive side; they are manifested in external contingent reality. Laws must be limited; and in placing limits to the quality and the quantity of penalty, we have this external element.

The positive element can not be omitted in penal laws; but in this there is something not rational. Thus, in pronouncing penalty, a round number is generally taken. Reason can not apportion the exactly just penalty. Whatever is purely and arbitrarily positive is irrational. To a certain extent it must be limited in a way that is not primarily rational.

This is also a necessary side of revealed religion. It comes in a historical or externally manifest way. This opens the way for the positive and contingent element—that is, it might be manifest in this or in that historical way. The merely external always admits the purely positive or contingent.

But we may distinguish between the purely and the formally positive. The law of freedom may be formally positive; but it is more than this. It is really valid, not simply because it happens to prevail, but because it is the characteristic of our own rationality. Thus, too, religion has a positive element in its didactic side; but it must not stop here with the merely positive and thus remain a mere matter of memory or of imagination.

In regard to the verification of religion, its external positive element must testify to the truth of the religion, must seem to be the ground of its truth. Sometimes this verification has the form of the purely positive. Such are miracles and witnesses when given as proof of the divinity of the one proclaiming these revelations and of his having taught such and such doctrines.

Miracles are sensible changes in the sensuous world, perceived through the senses. Perception of them is itself sensuous, and as such is their positive side. This side of them, it is said, furnishes a verification for the sensuous man; but this is only the beginning of a verification, an unspiritual verification, by means of which alone the spiritual can never be verified.

But this side of miracles is not, Hegel asserts, to be over-emphasized. When it is, then the understanding insists upon trying to explain them in some natural way, and so to really explain them away. But reason as such refuses the verification which the merely positive or external part of miracles offers. Spirit can only accept spiritual verification of spiritual things. This is the doctrine of the testimony of the Spirit. Christ himself rejects miracles as a true criterion of truth. At the last day he will reject many who come saying that they have done many miracles in his name * (Matt. vi, 22). The evidence of the spirit may sometimes be very indefinite. In studying history we find our spirit strangely moved and won by what appears as noble, sublime, moral, and divine. But it may also take more definite and intellectual form, depending upon the activity, the insights, and the self-consistency of our thought. It may take the form of intellectual or of moral maxims, forming the causal principles of our rational activity.

There are many degrees of spiritual need and culture. But the highest need of the human mind is true thought, which transcends merely sympathetic, maximatical, and inferential evidence. This highest form of the testimony of the spirit is philosophy. Here the conception (*idea*), purely as such, develops the truth out of itself. And in this thinking development of the truth the spirit cognizes its necessity, and consistency. The necessary is the self-consistent,

and the self-consistent is the necessary. It is the absolutely rational, as contrasted with the vulgar rationalism of the understanding. But we can not expect all men to apprehend the truth in the philosophical or speculative way. As we have said, the testimony of the spirit is as manifold as the needs and culture of men. Thus we find many men in that stage of development that conviction comes to them from their confidence and belief in external authority. At this stage miracles have their worth, and Christ recognized it. Many believed on him for his miracles' sake. They awakened the conviction of sympathy. They touched the heart. But the heart and feeling of man are not the same as of the animal. It is always the heart of a thinking man. It is a thinking heart. And so religion of the heart can not be divorced from thinking. Christian doctrines may be stated in a very positive external way in the Bible. But when spirit gives its testimony for them, it is in man's innermost nature. They become harmonious with his spirit, his thinking, his reason. They find him, satisfy him, his spirit, and so are believed. As a thinking being, however, he can not stop at this point, but must proceed to further thoughts and reflections about them. This leads to theology or to the philosophical comprehension of the truths of religion. And this is the highest form of the testimony of the Spirit.

It is perfectly true that the Bible is itself sufficient for some men, and makes them very good and religious. But they are not thinking Christians, not theologians. Mere quoting of Scripture does not make one a theologian, else were the devil one. In fact, very few Christians refrain from explaining and

interpreting holy Scripture. And the main point is, whether interpretation, their reflective thought about it, is correct or not.

It is of no avail to say that all their inferences and explanations are based upon the Bible; that their theology is biblical theology. This is a favorite expression with the school of Ritschl in Germany today, which professedly discards all speculative interpretation of Scripture, such as the doctrine of the holy Trinity, of the atonement, and of the person of Christ. For as soon as we make any formal and connected statement of Bible truths, we do so with certain intellectual forms and mental presuppositions. Thus, the purest form of biblical theology gives us the contents of the Bible in the form and the mode of current thought. Thus, there is as much imposition as there is exposition in all such theology. But it is further to be noted that the very words of the Bible, as the utterance of the Spirit, are rational words, and connected in the form of thinking, not merely diverse and scattered leaves of a thoughtless Sibyl. The biblical theologians of the middle ages found the utterance of the Spirit in the Bible to be in the thought relations of formal logic. The spirit spoke, according to Aristotle, and it might have spoken according to much less true form, as some biblical theologians to-day would fain have it do.

There can be no theology without philosophy, and when it turns against philosophy it is either unconscious that it uses it, or else it deceitfully chooses to use some arbitrary, accidental, antique, or modern form of thinking. But all such arbitrary thinking is to be disparaged. Pure, catholic, self-consistent

thought is to be demanded. This is only to be found in the purely speculative, in the self-explication of The Bible is the utterance of the Idea. the Idea. The Logos gives it form and meaning and life. The mere letter, or the letter interpreted by any accidental, arbitrary, or sectarian presuppositions, fancies, or philosophies, killeth. The spirit of man in receiving the truths of the Bible, can not be passive and mechanical. It grasps and knows them by thoughtactivity, according to various concepts, categories, and principles. Some thus get more and some less, for some grasp with lower categories and conceptions. But all must do some thinking in order to obtain anything - even those biblical theologians, who, in their exegetical activity, imagine that they are purely receptive. Unconsciously surrendering themselves to arbitrary and accidental presuppositions of finite thought, these theologians to-day deny the very fundamental doctrines of Christianity. The whole school of Ritschl thus deny the presence and the activity of the Holy Spirit in the work of the thought of catholic Christianity. What they deny now, it was the work of philosophy under Hegel to maintain and preserve.

In considering Christianity Hegel proposes to begin in the opposite way. Instead of beginning with the external and historical, he sets out from the *idea* (Begriff) of Christianity. This historical study he presupposes as a necessary requisite to his present work, and he no more undervalues it than the most humble and simple-minded disciple of Christ. He does not propose to evolve Christianity out of nothing but his own subjective consciousness. For him it is revelation done in history,

and wrought into the hearts and minds of men through the external media of Bible, Church, and sacraments.

But, presupposing all this, he proposes to examine and to comprehend the thought-process, the *logic*, the *idea* thus revealed and received. It is a study of the forms of this thought-activity in receiving Christianity. Consciousness is directed toward the course of the categories or concepts in such activity, toward such thinking as has verified and known itself through a discrimination between essential and accidental, between finite and rational categories of thought.

3. Thus absolute religion is the religion of truth and freedom. The spirit is for spirit, and is, therefore, its own presupposition. We begin with the spirit as subject, which is the eternal intuition of itself, and is, therefore, comprehended only as a result or end. This capacity of being both subject and object is the truth of real spirit; and this is also the idea and the absolute Idea of spirit. It is truth. Absolute religion is also that of freedom. Abstractly, freedom is the relation to something external that is not strange or hostile It conciliates this external object, recognizing it as an element of its true self. Such reconciliation is freedom, as that of God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself (2 Cor. v, 19). But each one of these (reconciliation, truth, and freedom), being an activity, is a general process, and can not, therefore, be expressed in a single proposition without being one-sided and therefore untrue. The chief conception is that of the unity of the divine and human nature. God has become man. This unity is, in the first place, only implicit or potential. But it is also eternally being actualized. This progressive free reconciliation only takes place because of the inherent potential unity of the divine and human. This unity has sometimes

been conceived as an abstract identity—e. g., as the substance of Spinoza. But with us the unity is that of subjectivity or Spirit which eternally actualizes itself, makes man in his own image and freely reconciles the estranged world to himself.

This conception of God, the absolute *Idea* (Idee), as the absolute truth, is the result of all philosophy. It is both the *real logic* of thought, and also the logic observed in the concrete world. We can better express it by saying that in the absolute *Idea*, or the philosophic conception of God, we behold nature and life and spirit as organic members. Each one is, as it were, a mirror reflecting this *Idea*, so that it appears therein as particularized or as a process, thus manifesting its unity in difference.

In nature religions God is conceived of as some alien natural object. The absolute religion contains this standpoint, but only as a transitory element. In the second form of religion, styled the religion of spiritual individuality (that of the Jews, the Greeks, and Romans), spirit also remains limited finitely. Consciousness has become self-consciousness. But its object is conceived as absolute power. The one, the limiting one, is only abstract power, which is not yet recognized as akin to the worshiper. (In the words of a modern writer, who occupied the same standpoint, it is "the power in us, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness.")

But the power and its necessity are conceived in an abstract way, and hence the degeneracy into finite forms of many gods. It is only in the third and final form that we have that religion of freedom and self-consciousness which is at the same time conscious of the concrete reality of God, as not merely above, beyond, outside, almighty, and arbitrary, but as the Father of all spirits. With such self-consciousness, abstract necessity gives place to concrete freedom. Spirit is everywhere at home. "Not my will, but thy will be done," becomes the glad aspiration of every

spirit who has grasped this conception of God. That will is none other than the law of the perfect life for man, and not the arbitrary imposition by an almighty task-master of laws out of all genial relation to the nature of man.

(B.) The metaphysical *idea*, or concept of the *Idea* of God.

By the metaphysical *idea* of God, Hegel means the absolute *Idea* which realizes itself from within—that is, Spirit. But this implies the unity of concept and reality, of thought and being. This is really the ontological proof, so called, of the existence of God. In this section Hegel discusses the validity of it as given by Anselm, and also the non-validity of Kant's famous criticism of it. But his examination of this argument is so abstruse, that, in place of reproducing it, I shall attempt to give the main points at issue in the discussion of this *proof* to-day, in the spirit of Hegel.

He does not for a moment allow that there can be any formal demonstration of the existence of God. With him this is everywhere itself the principle of the demonstration of every kind of existence. Formal logic may logomacize and cheat itself into the belief that it has performed the demonstration, while really its truth is assumed in the very terms of the demonstration. The existence of God is the necessary precedent and postulate of all human thought of God. It is the primal truth, the Logos of all truth. Induction from the external world and deduction from finite psychological notions are equally futile in trying to reach at the end of syllogisms that which is really the life of all syllogisms. Hegel, however, recognizes the difficulty of grasping the profound truth involved in this argument when it

is attempted by the mere understanding, the faculty of the finite. At this standpoint we have the *idea* or conception of God, and then we have the conception of *being* as different from and in no vital relation with it. The problem, then, is to effect a union between them, to mediate some way between the two, so that the thought of God shall develop itself into existence.

The understanding takes hold of the problem thus: The thought of God is made the starting-point. Then this is defined as including the whole of reality. Then being or existence is affirmed to be a reality; whence follows the conclusion that being belongs to the thought of God, the total of reality. The thought or conception that we have in our minds of the most perfect or the most real Being, ens realissimum, must have the attribute of existence, else we can conceive of a more perfect being, which is contrary to our definition. The conclusion is from thought—that is, from our subjective conception of God to his actual existence. It is no wonder that the understanding has barely framed this syllogism before it proceeds to demolish it. Kant's refutation of this form of it is classically final. He affirms that from our notion or thought of God his existence can never be inferred. For existence is one thing, and our conception another. Anybody can build castles in the air, but no logic can give them actual existence. Anybody can imagine a hundred dollars in his pocket, but by no sophistry can he from this notion get a hundred actual dollars in his pocket. Any merchant may add numberless naughts to his cash accounts without being able to thereby increase his wealth. These last two illustrations are the famous ones of

Kant.* Hegel remarks that the unexampled favor and acceptance which attended Kant's criticism of this proof was undoubtedly due to the *illustration* he made use of. But the illustration seems perfectly valid against this argument when forced into the

syllogism of the understanding.

From the conception of the most perfect Being, logic can deduce the conception of his actual existence. but it can not deduce the objective reality. From the conception of the most wealthy man, logic can deduce the conception of thousands of dollars in his purse, but can never deduce an actually existing rich man with these actual dollars in his pocket. Nothing can be more obvious than that actual existence can not be deduced from the conception of existence. "And nothing," says Hegel, "can be pettier in knowledge than this." But can it even be imagined that such profound thinkers as Augustine and Anselm should have framed an argument so easy of refutation? The fool who in his heart disbelieves in God could not more satirically make mock proof of his existence than by such a form. These men were fools neither in heart nor in head.

Hegel also criticises Kant for applying the term *idea* to things like a hundred dollars, saying that this "may not unfairly be styled a barbarism of language." Indeed, it is claimed by Anselm, as well as Hegel, that the thought or *idea* of God is unique, unlike any merely subjective conception. This *idea* of God involves his existence. It is the unity of thought and existence that constitutes the *idea* of God. Anselm's

^{*} Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's translation, pp. 368-370.

statement of the argument asserts this. It begins by asserting that God is the most perfect Being, who can not be conceived not to exist, though everything else besides can be conceived not to exist.* God is. he says. No proof is offered by him of God's existence. It is asserted, as that of which it is impossible for Reason not to conceive. God is, and is the most perfect Being, and therefore he is more than a mere idea or thought. "God transcends all conception," continues Anselm, and therefore he can not be a mere conception in the intellect of man. "God is before all things, and beyond all things," he continues. How much greater, therefore, than any mere notion of him in the head of man! "God is the only necessary Being, he is the whole, the absolute, the only God," continues Anselm. How different all this is from the argument of straw that Kant so triumphantly demolishes! He accepts the catholic faith of all the wise and good of all time instead of evolving a mere subjective conception from his own head.

God is. Even the fool presupposes him, in the very act of setting forth the denial of him. But he is, therefore, more than any mere conception of him. Anselm is only arguing for the highest possible conception of God, which is that he is not merely a product of the human mind, or the conclusion of a formal syllogism. There is no question of deducing his Being from man's idea of him. The presupposition is always that of the unity of the idea and the existence of God. It is the unity of the idea and being that constitutes the catholic conception of

^{*} Anselm's Proslogium, translation in the Bib. Sacra, vol. viii, and Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. xv.

God. This, however, must not be taken as maintaining that God's existence is exactly identical with your or my conception of him. For Anselm argues that God is greater than all (human) conception or idea of him. It is the *idea* or thought, which is before, beyond, in and constitutive of the thought of all thinkers and all objects of thought. It is the *idea* of the absolute self-conscious intelligence, upon which our whole conscious life is based, without which no thought, no thinker, and no object of thought, would exist.

Such is the thought of Anselm and others on this argument. We may add that nothing could be further from this great thought than the attempt to prove God to have such external, objective, spatial existence as a tree, a house, or a man. Such a poor anthropomorphic and deistic conception of God has scarcely any kinship with the idea of God we have been considering. We may only too gladly yield to its critics that it does not imply God's existence as one among other finite existences. In asserting his existence, as implied in his idea, we are not taking for our measure the conception of existence in the sense of empirical reality, but in the sense of thought, the most real of all reality, extra-temporal and extraspatial, and yet creative of time and space, immanent in these conditions under which we think in a limited way. It is not the idea of God dwelling remotely in the same space conditions, and only making occasional visitations to other parts of space to create and reveal. But, if he did not create in time and space, he did create with them, and since then reveals himself under these self-imposed conditions of ethical love. It is this divine immanence that enables us to

reach the *idea* of him, and guarantees a relative identity even between *our* thought and real being. The very nature of everything finite is an inequality between its *idea* and its actual existence in time and space. The same is true of all finite, subjective conceptions. It is a senseless distortion to say that phi-

losophy affirms their identity with being.

Das Wissen ist Geist. It is not absolute, and yet it is not wholly false. Painful toil and gradual process mark the advance of our thought to more adequate reality. The implicit faith of all activity of our thought is that there is a common ground between the ὄν of the external world and our λόγος. This is the source of all confidence and work, and even of our sanity. Science could not and would not move a step without this presupposition. Philosophy interprets the basis of this faith into that Ontology which makes this common ground to be Infinite Spirit that is the real and absolute unity of Thought and Being. Sense conditioned, we go beyond sense, because both ourselves and sensuous nature are grounded in the supersensuous, the metaphysical, the immanent Divine.

God is the metaphysics (µeτά, in the midst of) of man and nature. The agreement between ideal (rational) laws of thought and the real laws or content of existence is a fact of experience. And the only way to account for this agreement is the presupposition of a common ground of both, in which thought and being not only agree but are identical. This thought is the real ground of the external world and of our thought. That our finite thought can know reality partially, see it through however opaque a glass you please, is explicable only by this thought. This is the real meaning and the vitally practical

significance of the ontological argument. It is only the scientific statement of the faith or reason of humanity. Underneath us and the world are the everlasting arms. We live and move and have our being, mental and moral, as well as physical, in him, and He lives and moves and has real being in us. This external self-conscious Idea involved with all existence, is the ground of its own progressive reproduction into higher likeness, in human thought. God is all that the human spirit is capable of becoming, through zons of learning under the Divine Pedagogue. He is the ethical cause of our God-consciousness, by which we perceive his "eternal power and Godhead" in the universe, and rise to higher and purer conceptions, as he speaks to us "fragmentarily and multifariously."

"In thy light we shall see light" is philosophy's confession, as well as that of religion. "This argument is one latent in every unsohisticated mind, and it recurs in every philosophy, even against its wish and without its knowledge—as may be seen

in the theory of immediate faith."*

(C.) Hegel makes the following division of the whole topic of the Absolute religion: "The absolute eternal *Idea* (Idee) is—

"I. God in and for himself in his eternity before the creation of the world and outside of the world.

"2. Creation of the world. This created world divides itself into the two sides of physical nature and of finite spirit. This is primarily posited as alien and external to God. But it belongs to the very essence of God that he reconcile this to himself.

^{*} Hegel's Logic, p. 287.

The *Idea*, having dirempted itself, must lead back this separated element to itself as its truth.

"3. This process of reconciliation is the work of

the Holy Spirit in his Church."

"These are not external divisions that we make, but the course of the activity, of the developed life of the Absolute Spirit itself. This is its eternal life, its divine history, which we must consider in each of the three forms."

In regard to place or space we may say that the first is divine history outside of the world, spaceless; the second is in the world, or God in perfect, definite existence; the third is within, in the Church, which is at first in the world, but elevating itself to heaven, having heaven already in itself—that is, full of active good-will.

The same distinction may also be applied to this divine history in regard to time. It is timeless, and then passes through the time relations of past, present, and future, into the eternal now. "Throughout the whole it is the *Idea* of God as divine self-revelation, that we have to consider."

Man can not demonstrate the Being of God, but God can and does from his essential nature reveal himself to man. First, he reveals himself as being perfect in and by himself, as pure spirit, thought, reality. This is the realm of the Father. Secondly, he reveals himself as the Son in the world, under the conditions of empirical history. But through this historical form the spirit in man sees the divine history, the manifestation of God himself. This forms the transition to the realm of the *Spirit*, in which the process of reconciliation is embodied in the form of worship.

"We must, moreover, distinguish throughout how the *Idea* is in these three forms for the *idea*, or perfect comprehension, and how it appears in our mental representations of it, in our picture-thought, or image conception. For religion is universal. The idea of God is not only manifest to the man of cultured scientific thought, for philosophers, but also to those who know only in the more popular, unscientific form of imaginative conceptions. It has, indeed, necessary characteristics which are inseparable from this form of knowledge."

The preceding pages of this chapter are chiefly a translation, without attempt at exposition, of Hegel's Introduction to Part III,* with the exception of the paragraphs on the ontological proof. It is scarcely just to give this without accompanying exposition. It is scarcely just to stop with this abstract introduction to the most interesting part of the whole work, consisting of—I. The Construction of the Christian Doctrine of the Holy Trinity. 2. The Doctrine of the Person and Work of Christ. 3. The Realm of the Holy Spirit, or the Formation, Function, and Authority of the Church. I shall, therefore, conclude with a very brief résumé of this Part, which, however, is worthy of large amplification and illustration.

Absolute Spirit, as identical with all real being, is both the goal and the origin of all thought. As Spirit, God is self-conscious. Self-consciousness is not simple but complex. Subject, object, and subject-object are essential and distinguished elements in all consciousness. God is *Actus Purus*. But pure activity has its phases or moments. Before all time

^{*} Pp. 191-223.

God in and for himself eternally begets his only-begotten Son, and recognizes himself in his Son, as the Son does himself in the Father. This reciprocal relation of identity in difference is the Spirit. "The Holy Spirit is eternal love. Love is a distinction of two, who yet are not distinguished for each other. This perceiving, this feeling, this cognizing of unity is love." *

The Trinity is a mystery and a contradiction when the mere understanding looks at it. It comes up with its categories of finitude, counts one, two, three, and says they can not possibly be but one. Two persons can not be one person. But the doctrine of the Trinity is that this threefold Person is but One, each person being posited as an organic moment or element of the One Absolute Personality. The abstract personality of each of these moments must not be retained in their separation, else we have Tritheism. The whole is an eternal, immanent process, "a play of self-sustenance, the assurance of selfexistence." Very rude forms of this conception are found in Oriental religions. Also in Greek philosophy, especially that of Alexandria, we find forms in which this idea has fermented.

The conception of the creation of the world is essentially related to the Triune conception of God. Creation is a free movement, an immanent distinction in the *Idea*, and not an act done once for all. It is the self-posited "other" of God, the principle of antithesis of self-objectivity in God. Hegel subsumes under this category or moment of the Divine self-activity (a) nature, (b) man, and (c) Christ. From

^{*} Vol. ii, p. 227.

the Divine standpoint the whole process is an interplay of love, an activity of self-conscious life. From the human standpoint, this activity in the temporal sphere shows "all the seriousness and pain and labor and patience of the difference," struggling back after reunion with its source. From this standpoint the full emphasis is placed upon the element of difference. This includes the creation, the whole groaning and travailing of the creation in sin and misery, redemption, and reconciliation of the world to God. It includes the whole process which pertains to the incarnation, as the summit of creation, and its resulting church militant merging into the church triumphant, when the Son "shall have delivered up the kingdom to God . . . and also himself be subject unto him who did put all things under him, that God may be all in all," and the emphasis be placed upon the restored unity—the love of the whole process.

Hegel's profound conception of sin and redemption is barely hinted at in such brief *résumé* of his pregnant sentences.

As related to God, man is bad by nature, and must be born again. As related to nature and his environment he is unhappy, and needs the reconciliation which can only come with restored son-ship. He must become fully conscious of both his sin and his misery before the atonement can be mediated by the incarnation. Consciousness of this is also followed by consciousness of total inability to regain his lost estate. Mere morality and civilization are inadequate to the task of healing the breach. "This is the profoundest depth" (die tiefste Tiefe).*

^{*} Vol. ii, p. 270.

Evil, as embracing sin and misery, is the inadequacy of man to his ideal, and his inability to reach his ideal by his own efforts. This drove men to seek help from inadequate gods, and then again to selfhelp in philosophy. All this result of the co-working of God with the human spirit was attained in his schooling of the race until "the fullness of times." The Roman Empire at the advent is analogous to a place of birth, and its pain is like the travail throes of another and higher spirit. The need was felt. and "the desire of nations" came in form adequate to the need, as he had ever been coming unto and seeking men according to their receptive capacity, thus schooling them for the ultimate perfect revelation of reconciling love in the incarnation. The hitherto co-working of God with man came to birththroes in the incarnation, "the axis on which the history of the world turns. It is the goal, and at the same time the true starting-point of history.*

Hegel affirms in the strongest terms not only the necessity of the incarnation, but the necessity of its taking place once for all in one *special* man. It can occur but once, and is absolutely unique, thus differing from the Oriental conception of Avatars.

Christ was not merely a great man, or a great moralist, but absolutely the incarnate Son of God, beyond all human categories. Even the conception of him as the one sinless man is inadequate.† The God-man is the only proper definition, as given by the Church. To the mere understanding this is as monstrous and contradictory a combination as

^{*} Philosophy of History, p. 331.

[†] Vol. ii, pp. 283-287, and Philosophy of History, p 337.

that of the sphinx. If we make absolute and endless distinction between divine and human spirit, this term is monstrous. But "Christ calls himself the Son of God and the Son of man. This must be taken literally," * as it can be only when we do not posit absolute incongruity and non-kinship of the nature of man with that of God. Miracles may lead the way to the recognition of Jesus as the Son of God, but they are relative and subordinate evidence to that of the witness of one's own spirit. Son of Divine love, he manifested this love to his fellow-men. This love begets answering love. Disciples and crowds of needy ones gather about him. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself."

But the reconciliation is yet to be worked out in men and humanity. On the Godward side "it is finished" once for all. "Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet." On the manward side "we see not yet all things put under him (i. e., man). But we see Jesus crowned with glory and honor" (Hebrews ii, 8, 9). This accomplished reconciliation is the basis of the Christian community. But it is known or fully realized only after the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Not till then could his disciples read his earthly life and passion aright. He was made man. Humanity is his kin. His death shows "that he was god-man, the God who had human nature, even unto death.† "With his death begins the return movement; for God maintains and preserves himself in this process, and Christ's death is only the death of death. He arises again to life and ascends to the right hand of God, thus showing,

^{*} Vol. ii, p. 294.

in most marked way, the dignity and worth and the identity of human nature with the Divine nature."* With his ascension comes the outpouring of the Spirit —not till then could his disciples "see Jesus crowned with glory and honor," as the pledge that they also should be crowned with glory and honor. Not till then could they read the divine in the human life of Christ and apprehend the mighty power of his love. It was expedient that he go away out of sensuous form, that the Spirit might make his abode in the midst of them to the end of the world. "The Holy Ghost was poured out over the disciples and became their immanent life. From that moment they went forth joyfully as a church into the world, in order to elevate it to a universal church." † "The Church is a real, present life in the spirit of Christ."

Hegel's view of the authority of the Church is the modern one of the dignity, worth, and adequacy of the utterances of the religious consciousness of the ethical aristocracy of the community, as opposed to subjective, capricious, and very unbalanced views of individuals. His whole view of the moral (sittliche), as embodied in the customs and laws of the ethical institutions of family, state, and church, is militant against extreme individualism. A man has no right to make a brand-new conscience for himself. bound to enlighten and educate it by the cultured conscience of the community, and thus be able to take his part in the frequent reformations and enlargement of this communal conscience. Catholicism, without the constantly purifying and progressive Protestant principle, is sectarian; and

^{*} Vol. ii, p. 300 and foot-note.

Protestantism, without its organic relation with the Catholic past, is also sectarian.

The Christian consciousness is being gradually guided and educated into all truth by the immanent Holy Spirit. "It is important that the Christian religion be not limited to the literal words of Christ himself. It is in the apostles that the completed and developed truth is first exhibited. This complex of thought unfolded itself in the Christian community in the midst of the elements of the environing Roman Empire."* The leaven working in the whole lump and its environments exegetes its own content as the Faith. "It is clear that the community produces this Faith. It is not merely the mechanical sum of Christ's own words—not merely the collocation of the words of the Bible, but the product of the Church. It is the interpretation of these words, and of the merely external history of Christ by the Spirit, in the degree to which he is able to enlighten the Christian community." † "The existence of the Church consists in its perpetual becoming. This is grounded in the nature of Spirit to eternally cognize itself, to divide itself in the finite sparks of individual members, and then to gather itself out of this finitude and comprehend itself again. Thus the Christian consciousness becomes divine self-consciousness in progressively adequate forms." ‡ The spirit which is poured out is but the incipient impulse to its fuller realization. The mediation takes place in the subjective experience of individuals in the social community.

Dogma is inevitable and necessary. "The real-

^{*} Philosophy of History, p. 341.

[†] Vol. ii, p. 328.

[‡] Ibid., p. 330.

ized communion of worshipers is what we call in general the Church." It is self-sustaining, self-propagating, self-defining, and authoritative through the power and wisdom of the indwelling Spirit. Its positing of dogma is an essential activity of the Church. It is a thinking as well as a loving and practical communion. It thinks the contents of the gospel narratives and of the Christian sentiment into the form of the Faith. "Dogma is necessary, and must be taught as valid truth." It is the work of the Holy Spirit in the thinking power of the educated Christian consciousness. This doctrine must be preserved and taught. This makes the ministry an essential institution of the Church. Mere feeling or subjective certitude can form no bond of unity. "For the community (of believers) is only possible through definite church teaching. Each individual has his own feelings, and sentiments, and views of the world. This form does not answer for spirit which wishes to know how it is contained therein." *

He maintains the Church's doctrine of the sacraments. The subject is born into this community of life and doctrine in baptism. "The Eucharist is the central point of the doctrine of Christianity, and the highest act of worship. While, on the one hand, the constant preservation of the Church (which is at the same time the uninterrupted creation of itself) is the continued repetition of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the Church, this, on the other hand, is expressly accomplished in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper."† He maintains the

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. ii, p. 353.

Lutheran view of the Eucharist against the unspiritual Roman and the non-spiritual Zwinglian recollection view, or that of prosy rationalism. "There is no transubstantiation, except such a one as annuls the external, and makes the presence of God strictly a spiritual one, demanding the faith of the communicant as an essential condition." *

Throughout this Part, his polemic against the conception of God as a great Being, dwelling at a distance from the world which he has made and redeemed, almost ceases. This gives place to his constructive work of resetting all the doctrines of the Church in the light of the immanence of God the Holy Spirit. The Trinity, the Divinity of our Lord, the atonement, and immortality, are all as explicitly taught as by any theologian, and indeed in the very spirit and method of the greatest teachers of the early Greek theology, as well as of Anselm and Aquinas. Especially profound and exhaustive is his explication of the doctrines of sin and of the atonement, being implicated with the whole scheme of doctrine beginning with the Trinity, and ending only with the ultimate form of the kingdom of God.

Through both dogma and worship the Spirit is spreading abroad and realizing the love of Christ in the hearts of men, thus extending his kingdom. The leaven is leavening the whole lump. "This actualization of the spiritual into universal reality contains, at the same time, the transformation and the reformation of the Church." It meets and annuls by realizing itself, in the hostile world of (a) the hearts of men, (b) the rationalism of the reflective understand-

ing, (c) thought, reconciling all to itself. In the Philosophy of History (p. 341) he explicates in a slightly different form this mediating work of the Holy Spirit in "reconciling the world unto himself," thus gradually hallowing the secular.

There is a double attitude toward the world: 1. The two are antagonistic. The world is hostile. 2. The world supplies the intellectual media for the work of the Holy Spirit in interpreting the content of the faith and in formulating it into doctrinal symbols. It also supplies the media for his work of organization. Let us take this latter first: (2.) The chief element in the formulating of the doctrinal symbols was supplied by the previous development of philosophy. Alexandria had become the meeting and mingling point of thought of the East and the West. Philosophy had become religious, working at the problem of the bridge between man and God. How can the Infinite descend to the finite. and how can the finite rise to the Infinite? Here the doctrine of the Logos had its first rise. Spirit is Λόγος. "Here speculative thinking attained those abstract ideas which are likewise the fundamental purport of the Christian religion" (p. 342). Both the heresies and the developing catholic doctrine sprang largely from current philosophical conceptions. The heresies manifested the inadequacy of philosophy to the content of Christianity; and this content, on the other hand, forced philosophy to a fuller development. Heresy chose now the monotheistic and now the pantheistic element in Christianity, and the Church said nay to every such onesided apprehension of its content, and maintained its completeness against them all. Prof. Edward

Caird* attributes this work of the Holy Spirit "to the healthy instinct of Christendom, that repelled any attempt to mutilate its life."

It was only gradually that it could create out of existing philosophical conceptions a philosophy adequate to its content. "In the Nicene Council was ultimately established a fixed confession of faith to which we still adhere; this confession had not, indeed, a speculative form, but the profoundly speculative is most intimately interwoven with the manifestation of Christ himself. The profoundest thought is connected with the personality of Christ—with the historical and external. And it is the very grandeur of the Christian religion that, with all this profundity, it is easy of comprehension in its outward aspect by our consciousness, while, at the same time, it summons us to penetrate deeper. It is thus adapted to every grade of culture, and yet satisfies the highest requirements." +

Now, (1) as to its attitude to the world of organized secular life. The Divine reconciliation takes place in the hearts of individuals in a community. This community becomes "a particular form of secular existence, occupying a place side by side with other forms of secular existence. The religious life of the Church is governed by Christ; the secular side is left to the free choice of the members themselves. Into this kingdom of God organization must be introduced. There is a necessity of a guiding and teaching body distinct from the spirit-pervaded community. Those who are distinguished for talents, character, piety, learning, and culture in general, are chosen

^{*} The Philosophy of Kant, p. 22.

as overseers (Vorstehern)."* To this intelligent body of overseers, the spirit comes in a revealed and explicit form, while in the mass of the community it is only implicit. This body becomes thus an authority in spiritual as well as in the secular affairs of the community. This distinction gives rise to an ecclesiastical kingdom in the kingdom of God. But, however necessary, this is not ultimate. Concrete freedom is not yet fully realized for the community. As yet all are not free, do not recognize the authority as congenial and self-imposed. It is yet an external and partly arbitrary and so non-rational authority. The realization of this real freedom and the rationally valid authority of authority is a long process through the ecclesiastical tyranny of the middle ages. For, besides this authority over the consciences of men, we find the Church assuming authority over secular interests.

Soon, too, priestly consecration, though beginning as the official recognition in specially appointed overseers of that authority and divinely imparted knowledge which was implicitly recognized in the universal priesthood of all Christian believers, changes its democracy into an aristocracy. This formed one of the iron rods for the terrible discipline of the middle ages, resulting in the grand denial of this tyranny in the Reformation, which, instead of breaking or marring the unity and life of the Church, only manifested it in higher form, in more essential unity with its Divine head. The merely ecclesiastical supremacy over the minds and institutions of men had served its mission. It had educated the world

^{*} Philosophy of History, p. 344.

into freedom, of which the Reformation was the voice. In the ethical life of the family and state, as well as in the Church, the reconciliation of religion with the world is accomplished.* Humanity now attains the consciousness of a real internal harmonization of spirit, and a good conscience in regard to secular existence. In this there is no revolt against the Divine or sacred, but the realization of that better subjectivity which recognizes the Divine in its own being; which is imbued with the true and the good, and labors for their attainment in the kingdom of God on earth (secular). But this realization is not actualized immediately. The Reformation sets free subjectivity, which does not universally attain rational liberty at once. Abstract liberalism and rationalism assert themselves. The French Revolution was the manifestation of the former; the Aufklaerung, the Écclaircissement and English Rationalism of the latter. The Spirit has further work to do to make the secular life the positive and definite embodiment of the spiritual kingdom, and to reconcile human thinking to itself. Mere rationalism results in agnosticism, and pessimism thinks its reflective thought out. But, in its expiring moment, the Spirit re-enters to restore to fuller life. Spirit itself is thinking that can sympathize with all the infirmities of human thinking, that is in it all, coaxing and forcing it to full concrete cognition. Through this work of the Spirit in philosophy, the content of Christianity is restored, rehabilitated, and justified to thought. Religion must, for thinking men to-day, ground itself upon a substantial and necessary content of truth. Its ration-

^{*} Philosophie der Religion, vol. ii, p. 344.

ality, in the speculative sense of the word, must be vindicated.

This is the work of Philosophy. Abstract thinking of rationalism and no-thinking of pietism destroy or acknowledge no content, no objective truth. Subjective individualism, withdrawing to the height of its infinity, reduces all intellectual and ethical content to its own creation. Everybody has his own God, his own Christ, his own truth, his own good; they are but his own creations. Philosophy contains their objective reality. Its "objective standpoint alone is capable of giving the testimony of Spirit in a cultured and thinking manner, and is contained in the better class of dogmatism of our times. This standpoint is, therefore, that of the justification of religion, especially of the Christian and true religion. It cognizes the content according to its necessity, according to its reason, and, in the same way, it cognizes the forms in the development of this content. We have inspected these forms, namely: the phenomenal manifestation of God, the image-conception for the sensuous, and the spiritual consciousness, which has attained universality or thought, the complete development of the Spirit."*

Thinking that has broken into religion, at first occupies a questioning and then a hostile attitude toward the figurate-conception, and then toward the doctrinal form of religion. Religion takes refuge in emotion, renouncing the understanding of its content. But then the holy Church has no longer a bond of community and collapses into sects; or, its teachers may say, Do not entertain these questionings, and

^{*} Vol. ii, p. 351.

then they are solved. But when I begin to think, I am compelled to have them; I can not put them aside; and the necessity of answering them rests upon the necessity of having them. "Thinking that has thus commenced never ceases; it persists and makes the heart, heaven, and the cognizing spirit empty and void. The religious content then takes refuge in the *idea*. Here it must receive its justification, and thinking must conceive itself as concrete and free; it must hold the differences not as merely positive and external, but must let them go freely from itself, and thereby recognize the content as objective."*

Philosophy has for its aim the cognition of truth, of God, for he is the absolute truth. Light communicates itself. "Whoever says that God can not be cognized says that God is envious, and he is not in earnest in believing in God, no matter how much he talks about him. Rationalism, that vanity of the understanding, is the most violent opponent of philosophy; it is offended when philosophy points out the presence of reason in the Christian religion, when it shows that the testimony of the Spirit of truth is the revealed religion. In philosophy, which is theology, the whole object is to show reason in religion." †

"In philosophy, religion finds its justification from the standpoint of thinking consciousness. Unsophisticated piety has no need of this; it receives truth upon external authority, and finds satisfaction and reconciliation by means of this truth. In faith there is already the true content, but it still lacks the form of valid; necessary thought. This speculative thought is the absolute judge before whom the con-

^{*} Vol. ii, p. 351.

tent of religion must verify and justify itself."* The charge of placing philosophy above religion is false, for it has no other content than religion. It only puts it in the form of necessary thought to save those who are losing it through mere reflective thought or rationalism. It thinks through and above this abortive rationalism. It is *Christian* philosophy or theology. It acknowledges that its content is the Christian religion. Prof. Morris thus distinguishes between reflective and philosophical thought:

There is, indeed, a so-called "reason," the "supersedure" of which is an indispensable condition, not only of spiritual salvation, or of the entrance into the heart of true religion, but also of the very existence of a truly positive and substantial philosophy itself. To this truth the whole history and the intrinsic nature, both of religion and philosophy, bear direct and abundant witness. The "reason" in question is one whose whole industry is absorbed in the detection of abstract contradictions and identities. Its spirit and its weapons are only mechanical and dead, not organic and living. It is abstract, and not concrete. All its logic is formal, and not substantial. It is "metaphysical," dealing with "uncriticised categories," and not philosophical. Its "dialectic" is subjective, artificial, and superficial, not objective, contentful, and dictated by the essential nature of whatever may be the subject of its inquiry. In short, and in fact, it is sense-conditioned reason-ing, and not sense-conditioning The Germans distinguish these two under different names, calling the former Verstand, or "understanding"as though its characteristic work were best described as consisting in arresting, or bringing to a standstill, the living, moving process of reality, with a view to the separate, analytical examination of its parts, and of the mode of their

^{*} Vol. ii, p. 353.

mechanical combination. To the pure understanding, reason proper, and all its objects—all living, organic wholes, and all vitally synthetic processes—are a mystery and incredible. What reason, as a faculty, whose seat is at the very center of human experience, perceives, is imperceptible for the understanding. Reason is the faculty of *insight*—i. c., of essential, thoroughly, and completely objective, or experimental intelligence; understanding is the faculty—if I may so express myself—of outsight, or of superficial, empirical, contingent information respecting external particulars, viewed in abstraction and separation from their essential and vital ground.

To men of the eighteenth century "reason" meant "understanding"; and the self-styled "Age of Reason" was, accordingly, not the age of true, concrete, vital reason -which, in operation, is simply equivalent to Experience taking true and complete and unprejudiced account of herselfbut rather the age of "reasons," of argument, or alleging of "reasons," pro and con, and of consequent "doubt," respecting all that can be made a subject of argument—as everything can. Let us not, then, confound the "reason" of Thomas Paine with the reason of Aristotle, or of philosophy. And, finally, let us not forget that, while any true revelation may be expected to transcend and confound the "reasonings" of an unvitalized "understanding," the very condition of its reception is the existence of reason, as also the condition of its effectiveness is that by it reason finds itself truly illuminated.

As matter of fact, philosophy has received illumination from the Christian consciousness in regard to three fundamental conceptions, of the Absolute, of Nature, and of Man. And let it be remembered that, when I say "philosophy," I do not mean any mere jargon of words, nor any arbitrary collection of dogmatic opinions, but philosophic science—the science, in the strictest sense, of experience, and of experience taken in the deepest, most comprehensive, truest,

and richest sense of the term. Under the influence of the Christian consciousness, then, philosophy has come to a more definite and complete conception of the concrete, living unity of the Absolute, as Spirit. It has, secondly, been enabled to conceive and comprehend more distinctly the personal, living relation of the divine Logos to the world. It need hardly be said that, in proportion as this relation is distinctly conceived, and its truth perceived, the possibility of a lapse into pure naturalism or pantheism is taken away. And, thirdly, Christianity has contributed to philosophy a fuller sense, and demonstration, of the truth that man is made perfect man, not through mere "imitation" of God, or "resemblance" to him, but "in one" with him, by an organic union which, so far from interfering with his freedom, is the very condition of his true—i. e., his spiritual freedom, and of his true spiritual personality.*

Moreover, as Hegel affirms, this whole process of thought must take place within the Church itself. It is to be Christian thinking, subject to the Church, even when criticising and doubting its formal doctrines on its way to speculative insight and harmony of them. Hegel distinguishes three stages or classes in this work: "The first is that of immediate, unquestioning religion and belief; the second, that of the understanding, or the rationalism of the socalled people of culture; and, finally, that of philosophy."† The rationalism of the second class creates discord which itself is powerless to heal. Hence the inadequacy of the Apologetics of the Understanding, which I have criticised in Chapter IV. Only reason can heal the wounds made by reason, but it must be the higher reason of philosophy. Though discord and skepticism still appear in the

^{*} Philosophy and Christianity, pp. 313-315.

actual Church, we dare not speak of its possible decadence. The gates of hell can not prevail against the Church inspired by the Holy Ghost. The discord of semi-pagan life exists in many members of the communion. But the discord of thought, of skepticism, Hegel says, "has been dissolved for us by philosophy, and the aim of these lectures has been to reconcile reason with religion, to discern the latter in its various forms as necessary, and to find again in revealed religion the Truth and the Idea." * This song of triumph to philosophy at the end of his work, however, is not as naïvely joyous as the anthem of praise to religion with which he begins (first page of Chapter III). For he throws in this minor chord: "But this reconciliation is only a partial one, not having acquired external universality. Philosophy is, in this respect, a secluded sanctuary, and its servants form an isolated priesthood, which can not go hand in hand with the world, but must guard the treasure of the Truth." †

^{*} Vol. ii, p. 355.

[†] Ibid., p. 356.

APPENDIX.

CHRISTIAN UNITY IN AMERICA AND THE HISTORIC EPISCOPATE.

Ubi Spiritus ibi Ecclesia.

The American Church is a church of the future, a realizable vision, an ideal certainly more potent to-day than at any other time in our history. Its elements appear to be mere disjecta membra to some, who can not see the working of the synthesizing spirit in the various Christian communities of our land. The Roman Catholics say that this Church is already in our midst. There are evidences of an effort on its part to translate its foreign title Roman into American. It seems to be an impossible feat. The grip of Rome will never be relaxed so as to allow its members here to form an autonomous national church.

Some in our own Protestant Episcopal Church, also, believe that the American Church is a present existing organism. All that seems necessary is to strike out the obnoxious epithet of *Protestant Fpiscopal*, and by this simple device we appear in our true light as "The Church in the United States of America."

None of the other large Christian bodies have such a short and easy method of realizing this ideal. In fact, they have no definitely framed ideal as to the form of this Church of the future. They labor and pray for Christian unity. The Evangelical Alliance is the exponent of their circuical effort, seeking their common faith and spirit. It has no plan of union, and no authority to organize. But it certainly promotes that unity of spirit which must be primal and causal in any union of the parts. It thus begins at the *heart* of the question, and so commands the sympathy of those who believe that any worthy valid union of organization can only come as the natural expression of an ethical unity of

spirit.

Certainly this is better than ready-made artificial plans of unity, and better than any dogmatic claim that the formal organism is already in our midst, and all that is needed is that all other bodies should conform to it. But it does lack that practical element which is so noticeable a feature of the report of the Committee on Christian Unity adopted by the House of Bishops and by the House of Clerical and Lay Deputies in the General Convention of 1886. That was the outcome of the loftiest devotion to the kingdom of God, as distinguished from merely sectarian devotion to their own Church. It is as eirenical as it is practical. It was put forth from a yearning for unity to meet the like yearning for Christian fellowship visibly moving the hearts of so many Christians in our land. It declares "that this Church does not seek to absorb other communions," and "that in all things of human ordering or human choice, relating to the modes of worship and discipline, or to traditional customs, this Church is ready in the spirit of love and humility to forego all preferences of her own, . . . to heal the wounds of the body of Christ," But it also declares that Church unity can only be attained by the acceptance by all Christian communions of these four essentials of catholicity: 1. The Holy Scriptures; 2. The Nicene Creed, as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith: 3. The two sacraments; and, 4. The "historic Episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs of the nations and peoples called of God into the unity of his Church."

It furthermore declares "a desire and readiness . . . to enter into brotherly conference with all or any Christian bodies seeking the organic unity of the Church, with a view to the earnest study of the conditions under which so priceless a blessing might happily be brought to pass."*

^{*} The declaration of the bishops is so lofty, humble, and earnest that it deserves to be widely known. I gladly give the text, omitting the preamble:

[&]quot;We do hereby solemnly declare to all whom it may concern, and especially to our fellow-Christians of the different communions in this land, who in their several spheres have contended for the religion of Christ,

[&]quot;I. Our earnest desire that the Saviour's prayer 'that we all may be one' may, in its deepest and truest sense, be speedily fulfilled.

[&]quot;2. That we believe that all who have been duly baptized with water, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, are members of the Holy Catholic Church.

[&]quot;3. That in all things of human ordering, or human choice, relating to modes of worship and discipline, or to traditional customs, this Church is ready, in the spirit of love and humility, to forego all preferences of her own.

[&]quot;4. That this Church does not seek to absorb other communions, but rather, co-operating with them on the basis of a common faith and order, to discontinue schism, to heal the wounds of the body of Christ, and to promote the charity which is the chief of Christian graces, and the visible manifestation of Christ to the world.

[&]quot;But, furthermore, we do hereby affirm that the Christian unity now so earnestly desired by the memorialists, can be restored only by the return of all Christian communions to the principles of unity exemplified by the undivided Catholic Church, during the first ages of its existence; which principles we believe to be the substantial deposit of Christian faith and order committed by Christ and the apostles to the Church, unto the end of the world, and therefore incapable of compromise or surrender by those who have been ordained to be its stewards and trustees for the common and equal benefit of all men. As inherent parts of this sacred deposit, and therefore as essential to the restoration of unity among the divided branches of Christendom, we account the following; to wit:

[&]quot;I. The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament as the revealed word of God.

[&]quot;2. The Nicene Creed as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith.

We note several characteristics of this noble, lofty, and catholic declaration: First, that it has in view almost entirely Christians of the Protestant communions of this country. Second, that it can afford no ground for the suspicion of its being an attempt to open the way for the absorption of other communions in that of the Episcopal Church, for final selfaggrandizement. Third, that on the first three of its declared essentials there is already practical agreement, unity of faith, affording a basis for some practical steps toward organic unity. Fourth, that the fourth term of communion stated - the "historic Episcopate"-is the only one that they practically declare the other bodies to lack, while their Church holds it only as a trust to be imparted whenever demanded by fellow-Christians. There is nothing in the declaration to lead one to suspect that this is considered as a whit more essential than the other three already held by the other Christian bodies. But it is evident that this "historic Episcopate" will be the chief topic in all "brotherly conferences" on the subject of Church unity or of inter-Church communion.

Our own chief work, then, should be to set forth "the historic Episcopate" as free as possible from the parasitical accretions, distortions, the accidental and unessential débris that cluster about it. We should set it forth, not in any one

[&]quot;3. The two sacraments—Baptism and the Supper of the Lord—ministered with unfailing use of Christ's words of institution, and of the elements ordained by Him.

[&]quot;4. The historic episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs of the nations and people called of God into the unity of His Church.

[&]quot;Furthermore, deeply grieved by the sad divisions which afflict the Christian Church in our own land, we hereby declare our desire and readiness, so soon as there shall be any authorized response to this declaration, to enter into brotherly conference with all or any Christian bodies seeking the restoration of the organic unity of the Church, with a view to the earnest study of the conditions under which so priceless a blessing might happily be brought to pass."

of its transient historical forms, but as studied and estimated in the spirit of the historical method. This would be a common method that the leading students of church history in all communions could employ. It, however, would undoubtedly demand the giving up of the traditional spirit on the one hand, and the dogmatic spirit on the other, where these still exist. Now, "the present predominance of this historical method" is, as Prof. Sidgwick says (History of Ethics, p. 268), largely due to Hegel. It is true that no such a problem as confronts us ever came before him. He, however, believed strongly in national Churches.

He considered religion in its essence to be the foundation of the state. Indeed, "though the aspects of religion and the state are different, they are radically one; and the laws find their highest confirmation in religion" (Philosophy of History, p. 468). When religion exists as separate, dissenting organizations within the state, they must, he says, be subordinated to the ethical supervision of the state. They can not be allowed to foster anything absolutely "alien or opposed to the constitution," or to treat the State as a soulless, Godless mechanism. The ultimate guarantee of the state laws is the disposition of its people. Churches have the large part of the work of forming this disposition. Hence a want of freedom in religion will produce the same lack in the state, and a wrong conception of God will lead to bad laws and government. Modern states base their constitutions on the principle of freedom. Hence, wherever the Roman Catholic religion becomes the prevailing form, the free state is endangered. Here two kinds of conscience exist, the religious conscience, under the direction of its priests, making the other virtually to be Hence Hegel gave the political prefno conscience. erence to Protestantism, because it inculcates freedom of thought and conscience. The Protestant conscience is the ethical (Sittliche) conscience, which harmonizes with the principle of free political life (Philosophie der Religion, vol.

ii, p. 246, and Philosophie des Geistes, p. 439). He considered the Reformation, as we have seen, to be, in one aspect, the abrogation and the reconciliation of the unethical dualism between the Church and the world of ethical (Sittliche) institutions of family and state. Religion now esteems the secular life as sacred; affirms the family life to be more truly ethical than celibacy, and Christian rulers, as well as priests, to be the servants of the Lord. Thus Christianity came to build up the great ethical world of modern life.*

We have also noted how thoroughly it is in the historical spirit that he studies the origin of the Christian Church and ministry. "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us" (Acts xv, 28) is the one formula concurrent with all the developing forms of church life, justifying them; present and future generations of Christians were to be guided into the truth, and to exert plenary authority, not infallible wisdom, in developing its own form of secular life, or external organization—that is, an ecclesiastical kingdom (cf. Chapter VIII, p. 300).

There is no radical dualism between "the Holy Ghost" and "us" in this work, except when any one phase of development is stereotyped as ultimate. Hooker thus identifies the vox populi and vox Dei: "The general and per-

^{*} How entirely did Maurice agree with this view of the relation of the Church and the world! He says: "The world contains the elements of which the Church is composed. The Church is, therefore, human society in its normal state; the world that same society irregular and abnormal. The world is the Church without God; the Church is the world restored to its relation with God, taken back by him into the state for which he created it. Deprive the Church of its center, and you make it into a world. If you give it a false center, as the Romanists have done, still preserving the sacraments, forms, and creeds, which speak of the true center, there necessarily comes out that grotesque hybrid which we witness—i. e., a world assuming all the dignity and authority of a Church—a Church practicing all the worst fictions of a world" (Theological Essays, p. 305).

petual voice of man is as the sentence of God himself." But this does not make such *jure divino* church organizations unchangeable, they also being of the nature of human adaptations to existing needs (Ecclesiastical Polity, iii, x).

No historian of repute to-day denies the fact of the Episcopate as a power or function of the Church, having, in its substantial form, from primitive times, an essentially unbroken continuity of development. Its historic validity is unquestioned. We accept and put it forth as one of the bonds of historic continuity and present community. But some such questions as the following will be asked: Is it essential to the existence (esse) of a Church? Or is it essential to the well-being (bene esse) of a Church, which was Hooker's contention? If so, what is its essential nature and its intrinsic excellence? Does it unchurch non-Episcopal communions by denying that they possess a valid ministry and sacraments, as our English Church reformers did not? Can our Church so interpret this "historic Episcopate" in the historical method that she can impart this fourth essential to non-Episcopal bodies, either without reordination of their clergy,* or with hypo-thetical ordination? Or, finally, can she not impart this essential to others, as she does to her own clergy, without requiring subscription to any doctrinal theory of holy orders, without, I mean, fettering it with the sacerdotal theory of the ministry, which is contrary to whole current of Protestant Christianity?

This is neither an arbitrary, sentimental, nor a merely politic interpretation, but the only one that is justified by the spirit of the historico-philosophical method. The same method gives it to us as a *trust to hold* and yet not with-

^{*} This interpretation is given by the Rev. Henry Forrester, in his Christian Unity and the Historic Episcopate. This is a calm study of the discretion with which the Church in various ages has met like emergencies, by exercising her plenary authority, in dispensing with reordination for the sake of Church unity (cf. Gore., pp. 189-196).

hold. We believe in preserving the historical institution of the Church. We accept the Episcopate as the bond of formal historic unity. We do not care, we not dare, to give it up. But we do dare, and care very much, to give up invalid interpretations of it that distort its chartered functions, and prevent all "friendly conference" with other Christian bodies, on the subject of Church unity. The Rev. Dr. McConnell well says of this anti-Protestant and really un-Catholic interpretation: "It costs us now the opportunity to gain a friendly hearing for the wise and temperate proposals of the House of Bishops, in the interests of Christian unity. Until this suspicion of sacerdotalism shall be removed, the historic Episcopate will go begging" (American Episcopacy, p. 36). This interpretation has only false historical justification. That is, it can be found to be the prevailing view at certain times and with certain parties in the Church. But the true historical justification of past forms is only for their own concurrent times and circumstances, not for others. It vindicates the Papacy in the past, and yet invalidates it for the present Church. So, too, it invalidates the sacerdotal theory of holy orders that has been attached to the purely governmental function of the Episcopate of the Apostolic and post-Apostolic Church.

The Church's organization was evolved, and so was divine. It is yet evolving, and may evolve into different forms. Nay, it must thus evolve, to retain its vital power and divine significance. This principle must be controlling in all attempts to give the historic Episcopate to our brethren of other communions, on the way to the forming of the national Church of America. This alone will save our offer from the opprobrium of arrogance.

The whole result of the historical method in this department is opposed to what I have called the unhistorical, sacerdotal conception of the origin and function of the Episcopate. That fiction of obscurantism, the creation of feeling, fancy, and priestcraft, which reads the New Testament with sacerdotal glasses, should be relegated to the limbo of other man-made, jure divino theories. That of the jure divino theory of kings to govern their people well, served its mission. But the same theory, perverted to that of the right to govern people badly for their own profit ("L'état c'est moi"), has already led the way that its sister must follow. How often it is true that "the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light!" How often the state leads the way, forcing the Church to follow the Divine guidance!

Martin Luther once wrote to King Henry VIII, "I, Martin Luther, by the grace of God an ecclesiastic, to Henry, by the ungrace of God, King of England." And yet the state, as the organization for the perfection of human life in public affairs, is as jure divino as is the Church in its sphere. They are both means to the end of man's wellbeing, and as such jure divino, necessary. Any other jure divino interpretation of Church polity is both mechanical and mythical.

Hooker's claim for the Episcopate was based strictly on the history and well-being of the Church. He was contending against the Puritan for holding the same jure divino theory of a New-Testament-given polity that our Anglo-Catholics hold to-day. No wonder, then, that this party have ceased to refer to Hooker, and that they are doing all they can to shelve him, and bring out Laud and Bancroft as the true exponents of Church principles. Indeed, it was not until the close of the sixteenth century that the jure divino theory of the Episcopate was broached in a sermon by Bancroft. Denied by Hooker in the interest of a larger view, it was taken up again and pressed to its extreme form by those ecclesiastics who sought to uphold the Stuart theory of the divine right of kings, in return for the support given by the Stuarts to the divine right of Episcopacy. Till that time no leading divine had made Episcopacy to be the chief essence of the Church, or "unchurched the bodies of the Continent for an *infelicity*, not a fault." Hooker never claims Episcopacy as *essential* to the *being* of the Church, but freely allows that such churches as were, by untoward circumstances, organized without the Episcopate, are authorized to have a ministry suited to their needs. He rather *laments* than *exagitates* their defect of not having government by bishops. In his whole treatment of the topic he is practically a contemporary of those who use the historical method to-day.

The Church of Christ, as an organized body, is clearly a secular institution, subject to all the conditions of a development in time and in the world. Its early literature is now so well studied that there is little room left for the holding omne ignotum pro mirifico. It is, too, being studied with reference to the forms of social, civil, and religious organizations at the time of its rise, and of those of the various stages through which it has since passed. transforming power of the new leaven is seen entering the prepared lump. The faith and the life of Christ in his disciples and the early converts was the leaven. There was no prescript draft of polity given either by Christ or his apostles. That it developed according to its wants. The form of the family or of a brotherhood was sufficient for its primal needs. Only saintly idealists,* and ecclesiastical dreamers and pedants and politicians, are capable of the vision of the Church dropping ready made from the skies,

^{*}Principal Gore, in arguing for the Episcopate "as a devolution from above and not a delegation from below"—that is, from the apostles by localization rather than from the presbyters as an elevation—can not find the needed facts. He admits that "there was not, indeed, such a localized ruler in every Church in the age immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem," and appeals to unfounded tradition, very honestly qualifying its worth in this way: "But even if this and similar traditions present us with the facts somewhat idealized, as is the habit of tradition, at least they do not misrepresent the facts" (The Church and the Ministry, p. 306).

or of a definite polity imparted by our Lord during the great forty days. They, alone, can have the conscience to apply all the scriptural terms, applicable only to the ideal, the perfected, the wholly holy bride of Christ, to the visible historic forms of its secular life; and they alone care for the right to use certain consecrated phrases in anathematizing all who attempt to lift the mythical veil from their idol and reveal the living power of the Holy Spirit immanent in what they choose to stigmatize as secular.

The historical method says, Given the new and wondrous life and spirit of Christ and the contemporary forms of social, civil, and religious organizations, and the new needs of the Christian communities, and then the presumption of any mechanically supernatural origin of the Church's organization is an impertinence. As Dr. McConnell says, "If one had been present when God was beginning the establishment of his new kingdom, all that he could have seen would have been ordinary men engaged in ordinary activities moving from place to place, teaching, preaching, organizing, experimenting under the conditions of ordinary men." The definite forms of the Church and the ministry were the natural development of this life, its needs and work. Episcopate, as the governing body, not as the channel of priestly grace, was soon one of the most essential, as it has been the most continuous, forms of this organization.

These are the two interpretations of this historic Episcopate: 1. That it is either an essential or a desirable mode of church government; and, 2. That it is the necessary channel for imparting the grace of a valid ministry and sacraments (cf. Gore, pp. 70, 345).

I. The first is plainly the view of the English reformers till the time of Laud. The greatest divines of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (as Usher, Stillingfleet, Tillotson, Burnet, and Waterland) agreed with Hooker in this anti-sacerdotal interpretation. This was the view of those who framed the preface to the Ordinal, and of a long

line of eminent divines of the Church of England (as Archbishop Whately and Bishops Thirlwall and Lightfoot) and of the Episcopal Church in America.

Both these views, the unhistorical jure divino sacerdotal, and the historical jure divino governmental theories are maintained by leading divines in our own Church, which has made the offer of the historic Episcopate. The so-called Low and Broad Churchmen maintain ex animo "the historic Episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs." They are vindicated by both the spirit and the results of the historical method of studying the facts. Two of the recent Bampton Lecturers (Canon Freemantle and Dr. Edwin Hatch) simply modernize Hooker and Whately, as Lightfoot did before them.

"There are some," says Prof. Hatch (The Organization of the Early Christian Churches, p. 19), "no doubt, who will think that to account for the organization of the Church in this way is to detract from the nobility of its birth, or from the divinity of its life. There are some who can see divinity in the thunder-peal, which they can not see in the serenity of a summer noon. But I would ask those who think so to look for a moment at that other monument of divine power. and manifestation of divine life, which we bear about with us at every moment. . . . From antecedent and lower forms came into being these human bodies, with their marvelous complexity of structure, with their almost boundless capacity of various effort, with their almost infinitely far-reaching faculty of observation. And so, out of elements, and by the action of forces analogous to those which have resulted in other institutions of society and other forms of government, came into being that widest and strongest and most enduring of institutions which bears the sacred name of the Holy Catholic Church."

Nothing is gained by showing that this or that element is more primitive than another, for the preservation we seek is not so much ancient form as historical continuity. It is given to each generation to inherit, and also to revise and reform, its splendid inheritance; but it can never bring back or copy the past, without losing its own life. "To suppose a polity fitted to the youth of our religion," says Dr. Washburn (Epochs of Church History, p. 22), "to be the absolute law of all times, is a sectarianism as palpable as to insist on immersion. I know that, in saying this, I offend many champions of our communion. But I urge no radicalism, I give the sound church principle of all our great reformed divines."

This historical view of the origin and function of the Church and ministry is a more truly *jure divino* conception than the one which accounts for them by a mechanical and external, supernatural imposition.

Churchmen of this type accept con amore the historical place and worth of their own communion, as a member of that "blessed company of all faithful people." But they decline to unchurch * the large evangelical bodies about them who are so well known by their fruits in all departments of Christian activity, in missionary, educational and

^{*} Hooker says that the Church "hath not ordinarily allowed any other than bishops alone to ordain, but there may be sometimes very just and sufficient reason to allow ordination to be made without a bishop."

And Bishop Andrews says: "Though our government be of Divine right, it follows not that a church can not stand without it. He must needs be stone-blind that sees not churches standing without it."

Archbishop Whately maintains (The Kingdom of Christ, pp. 209, 215) that "it is a plain duty for men so circumstanced (as the Continental Reformers were) to obey their heavenly Master, and forsake those who have apostatized from him. So far from being rebellious subjects, they would be guilty of rebellion if they did not." "These bodies had full power to retain or restore, or to originate whatever form of church-government they, in their deliberate and cautious judgment might deem best for the time and country, and persons they had to deal with. They were, therefore, at perfect liberty to appoint bishops, even if they had none that had joined them in the Reformation; or to discontinue the appointment, even if they had."

philanthropic work. They will not be guilty of the scarcely pardonable sin and intellectual blunder, of calling them sectarians and schismatics. They decline to deny the validity of their orders and sacraments.

This proper jure divino theory is applicable to all normal authorities in all states and churches, justifiable revolution being always recognized. It justifies the Papacy and Puritanism for certain times and places, and repudiates them as evil for others. It recognizes the right of might in all historical products or forms of ethical (sittliche) life, so far as they have served their day and generation in the advancement of the well-being of man. As the natural congenial product of inner life, all such forms are rational. When they cease to be natural and useful, they cease to be rational and ethical. To claim finality for any one transient rational form is irrational. Finality means sterility. But this is not the way of the Spirit in this world. The Spirit was there. But now he is here. "The powers that be are ordained of God." St. Paul could write this even when Nero was persecuting Christians, and could add, "He is a minister of God (Θεοῦ δίακανος) to thee for good." The ruling powers ordained in the various churches (Articles XXIII; XXXIV) are ministers of God for good. Thus (e.g.) the ministers in the Presbyterian Church are ordained of God for good. This may be frankly and gladly admitted by those holding the historical jure divino theory that all normal ethical institutions, and their reformed form, are jure divino.

Esteeming the value of the continuity and the heritage of the past, not lightly to be given up, this school heartily believes their form of polity and worship to be by far the best fitted to maintain and spread abroad the kingdom of Christ. But they are not sacerdotalists nor sacramentarians in the mediæval sense of these terms, though they recognize the worth of this form of Christianity in the past, and in the present too, where conditions of the past still exist. They deny, as does our Article XXV, holy orders to be a

sacrament. They affirm the laity to be an important part of the universal priesthood of believers, and do not confound the Church with, nor make it a mere appendage to. the clergy. While clinging to the heritage of the past, they are especially concerned to integrate the true, the good, and the beautiful in the present work of the spirit of Christ among Christians. Our first and foremost work lies with our own flesh and blood—the Protestant communions of our country. It is pleasant to be able to quote at least one of the other school who favors the same direction of effort. The Rev. E. S. Ffoulkes, after his return from Rome, writes thus: "We are impatient that the Roman Church refuses to admit our orders; let us now observe that attitude toward Lutherans, Calvinists, and Wesleyans, that we should wish Rome hereafter to observe toward us; let us not be too stiff in our requirements; too captious in our criticisms; too certain that our views are not founded on prejudice, and do not require modifying to be consistent with truth. We have a great fight to wage, but not with Christians" (a sermon preached at All Saints, Lambeth, 1871).

Churchmen of this school cherish their ministry and worship for their intrinsic excellence, and yet emphasize points of agreement rather than points of difference with those of other communions. They do not propose to surrender the historic Episcopate, which is their own contribution to the cause of Christian unity. But they do propose to surrender all that prevents it from being Catholic, Protestant, and republican. They take a higher, broader, and more hopeful view of the Church in America than those can who look upon the Reformation as a wicked schism and upon Protestantism as a failure. They believe that the breaking of this dead unity was the necessary step to spiritual unity and life; that Protestantism is the inherent and essential life of Catholicity, coaxing or forcing it on to fuller life and richer development. They believe in a Providence, in a philosophy of history, in a law of growth and development, 29

through Romanism and Protestantism, to a larger and better Catholicity. This can not be as simple and definite as more primitive forms, for nothing can be that has passed through a course of historical development. A few neat antique phrases, or a few definite antique forms, will not suffice to define and hold the differentiated types of Christianity that must enter as elements into the national Church of America.

Nearly every important schism from external unity has either been forced by an untrue Catholicity, or it has sprung from an attempt to supply and emphasize essential Christian elements that were in danger of being lost or forgotten. They have thus been the true work of the Holy Spirit, and they are known by their fruits. If Protestantism, with its four centuries of most stirring life of Christian thought and of ethical and secular blessings, with its churches and social order, and educational and philanthropic work, has been a failure, no one can point us to any success or to any divine guidance of the Spirit. It was the Divine necessity for Christian Europe.

But everything finite is imperfect. The Reformed Churches on the Continent were, in God's providence, prevented from duly recognizing the continuity of Church history and the victories for Christ and civilization won by the united Church of the West, and so lost the historic Episcopate. But that great Church had so apostatized from Christ that schism from her was the duty of the hour (cf. Whately's Kingdom of Christ, p. 210). In God's providence they lost a great good, the historic Episcopate. in order to keep the chief good, evangelical Christianity. Rome would not recognize the guiding finger of Providence pointing, through the modern state theory, to the autonomy of national Churches, and so lost the Church of England. In God's providence the Church of England was able to retain the historic Episcopate, without losing the better part of the Reformation. It was given to her to hold as the common heritage of Protestantism, in due time. But

she was not catholic enough to contain within her fold the Puritan and the Methodist types of Christianity, and so lost these vital parts of her realm. Is she, or rather is the Episcopal Church in America, catholic enough to-day to make this the due time to impart this heritage to other communions, in such a way as to be of appreciable and appreciated benefit? Can she offer this essential element of the historical Church as the basis upon which a truly national Church can be formed, without arrogating that position for herself by a mere word-juggling with her honest title? Can she supply this missing link so that it may be a vital bond of ethical unity? Can she so demonstrate its present worth as a divinely ordained power, fitted for furthering the wellbeing of the Church of Christ in this land, that the gift will be received on its own intrinsic merits, which form its only sanction, as an essential note of the Church? The school of which we have been speaking labor and pray and hope that she can. But there is some suspicion that the office and its work are hopelessly connected with a theology and an ecclesiastic tendency which is out of all sympathy with the current intellectual, social, and religious life of our Protestant Christianity. This is, as Dr. McConnell says (American Episcopacy, p. 27):

"r. Because the idea of Episcopacy is so fast entangled with other ideas which are not necessary to it; and, 2. Because it is in the popular mind associated with a religious movement which is counter to the broad, strong, and true current of American Christianity."

II. The other school of interpretation which we have mentioned is responsible for this suspicion, which has cost us an appalling price, among other things the good-will of Protestantism and the opportunity to gain a friendly hearing for the wise and temperate proposals of the House of Bishops. In truth, that party does not desire either of these. It is self-labeled *Catholic*. It holds the Episcopate in an *unhistorical* and sacerdotal spirit. It obscures it by

enveloping it with a certain theory of the apostolical succession, making it a necessary channel for the grace of valid ministry and sacraments.* Churchmen of that party hold it in an unhistorical spirit, because they hold it in a form "locally adapted" not to the present living Christianity of this country, but to that of the middle ages, as the costume of a barbarian child might be "locally adapted" to the needs of a full-grown man of this generation and culture. It looks upon Protestant Christianity as a failure or a chaos, as Carlyle's minnow in his little creek might upon the oceantides and periodic currents, and has but one short and easy recipe for its salvation—"Hear the Church." Too often this means only the church in their own person, or parish, or party.

It denies that the protesting, differentiating dialectic of the life of a Christian commonwealth is as much the work of the Holy Spirit as the conservative and synthetic element. It takes a part for the whole. It stands only for the arrested growth of the organization at an earlier period. But history is not a mere dead past. It is a living present in organic connection with a living past, that only becomes dead when *locally unadapted*. The same fact is held by both schools. But it is interpreted by the two with both

^{*}Their theory or doctrine of apostolical succession is thus stated by Froude: "I. The participation of the body and blood of Christ is essential to the maintenance of Christian life and hope in each individual. 2. It is conveyed to individual Christians only by the hands of the successors of the apostles and their delegates. The successors of the apostles are those who are descended in a direct line from them by the imposition of hands; and the delegates of these are the respective presbyters whom each has commissioned" (quoted by Rev. John J. Mc-Elhinney, The doctrine of the Church, p. 359). Again (from Tract No. LII): "In the judgment of the Church, the Eucharist, administered without apostolical commission, may, to pious minds, be a very edifying ceremony; but it is not that blessed thing which our Saviour graciously meant it to be; it is not 'verily and indeed taking and receiving' the body and blood of him, our Incarnate Lord" (ibid.).

a different historical and philosophical spirit. The one says the old must be transmuted into the new; the other says that the new is bad and the old is good. The latter sacrifices the kingdom of God to the Church as an end. To be a good churchman is more than to be a good Christian. They give it a sanctity above and apart from its intrinsic excellence as a means to the welfare of the whole estate of Christ's Church militant. So as to the value placed upon Church authority and holy orders. It calls "orders" a sacrament, though our article (XXV) denies it this grace. Without bishops no priest, without priest no sacraments, and so no salvation except in some way of irregular, unauthorized, uncovenanted Divine mercy. It travesties presbyter into priest, and arrogates to itself the grandest title in God's universe "Catholic." Fortunately for formal truth, it limits this by calling itself the Catholic party. It declines discussion, and deals in emphatic assertion. Its devout thanks to the Lord for the unity of the Church are drowned by its constant litany and commination service for the one mortal sin of schism from a dead past. A few local directions given to local churches in the apostolical age are magnified into a whole book of Leviticus. St. Paul's "cloak" is translated "Eucharistic vestment," and his "parchments" "liturgy." Apist is developing into papist. Miraculous powers, uninterrupted descent, infallible authority, fixed dogmas, and ready anathemas-all are of Rome, Romish.

As Archbishop Whately said: "It is curious to observe how common it is for any sect or party to assume a title indicative of the very excellence in which they are especially deficient, or strongly condemnatory of the very errors with which they are especially chargeable. The phrase 'catholic' is most commonly in the mouths of those who are the most limited and *exclusive* in their views, and who seek to shut out the largest number of Christian communities from the gospel covenant. 'Schism,' again, is by none

more loudly reprobated than by those who are not only the immediate authors of schism, but the advocates of principles tending to generate and perpetuate schisms without end. And 'Church principles'-'High Church principles' -are the favorite terms of those who go the farthest in subverting all these" (The Kingdom of Christ Delineated, p. There can be no more wicked form of schism than that which thus binds the oracles of God where he has not himself bound them. And this theory is called that of organic unity, while it unfrocks the whole body of non-Episcopally ordained ministers, denying the validity of the orders and sacraments of those who have been foremost, under God's uncovenanted mercy, in spreading the principles and doctrines and spirit of Christ among men. Better call it the inorganic unity of petrifaction. Its spirit is really Donatistic, not churchly. Its Church history can all be put in one small volume, a portable but pitiable commentary on the Saviour's promise and power of fulfillment. tory is heresy," said a doctor of the Roman communion. which puts herself above history, or only takes out her own from the great current. To it Christ has been defeated by anti-Christ. Certain it is that the great mass of American Christians will respond to either Roman or Anglo-Roman assertion that "history is heresy" in the words of St. Paul: "After the way they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers" (Acts xxiv, 14). The Romish interpretation given to the Church by this party can never be accepted by American Christianity. For it ignores all the fine spiritual life and thought of the Protestant centuries, the outcome of the deepest mental and spiritual struggles and life of any age of Christendom. It is reactionary, not progressive hierarchical, not democratic-priestly rather than prophetical and ethical. It aims at once more subjecting the consciences of the laity to the direction of priests through the confessional, practically making it obligatory for confirmation and the Holy Communion. It imitates the Roman

costume and cult and dialect, often out-Romaning the Romans. It is a party, rather than a school of thought, bent upon propagating and proselytizing. It is instant in season and out of season in circulating its little reasons for being a churchman of its type. It has its index expurgatorius. With impudent assumption it puts the Church's imprimatur upon its pseudo-Catholic tracts, manuals, and books of devotion and of doctrine. Its peculiar horror is sectarianism, and its chief mortal sin is schism. Protestantism is "the man of sin." Shame forbids me giving the name of the bishop who could write thus: "The question with the Protestant is not so much what you affirm, but what do you deny; and the more he denies and the less he affirms, the better Protestant is he. He is not expected to give much heed to the Lord's Prayer or the Ten Commandments, and for the most part he does not disappoint the expectation." It is but a sorry eirenicon that this party can attempt with the great rich current of American Christianity. If the offer of the historic Episcopate in their interpretation of its significance could be accepted, it would only lead to an American Church that would need to repent in sackcloth and ashes for its spiritual apostacy from Christ, and pray to be speedily baptized with the fiery baptism of a Reformation.

Certainly a polemical protest against the interpretation of the historic Episcopate by this very polemical party, is essential to our holding it forth as an eirenicon to our brethren of the great Christian communions of America. This protest is necessary, because this party, though small, is very noisily aggressive. It is the polemical party in the Church, loudly and constantly protestant against the Protestantism of its own communion. It thus greatly misrepresents us to others. For, measured by the number and dogmatism of its words, it might well be considered as representing the dominant view of our Church. In the interest of internal peace the greatest possible latitude has been allowed to this party. It has been protected in its youth, but, as it gains

strength, it turns again only to rend those who have protected it, and seeks to make its liberty the tyranny of the whole Church. It seems necessary and just at this time to thus descend to the level of its polemical arena, and to answer a fool according to his folly. It is more than that. It is the serpent warmed to life in the bosom of the mother, whom now it would gladly wound unto death—that is, sting her back to the dead past of sacerdotal mediævalism. Church infallibility, a mediæval system of sacramental grace, priestly authority, the confessional, the mass, and the seven sacraments - these Anglo - Roman doctrines will not commend our offer to others; nor do we wish they would. In its beginning, this party sprang from a real revival of religion. had then, and has always had, its devout scholars, saintly men, and genuine philanthropists. It has done much for our own Church in infusing a reverent devotion into worship, and has done a noble work of Christian love among the poor. But this does not commend the system. The same lofty praise due to many of them is also justly accorded to very many of the Jesuits. For its many holy men and their self-sacrificing labors of love I have all honor and thankfulness. For much that they have done to adorn "the Bride of Christ," for the "gold, silver, and precious stones" they have built upon the one foundation. I have due appreciation. But for the theory, and for many of its practical as well as logical results—for its "wood, hay, and stubble"— I have only sorrow and shame.

This retrogressive party is not a large one. While many of its exponents are too devout and holy to put it forth in the obnoxious form described, it is yet as a party extremely pronounced and polemical in its assertion of the sacerdotal character of the ministry. It is a clerical party. It embraces a very few laymen. Neither can it be said that the other school of thought is dominant in the Church, just in the form described. The conservative High Churchmen, perhaps, form the bulk of our communion. These hold to

episcopacy as essential to the very *being* of a visible Church, without giving it the obnoxious sacerdotal interpretation. For the most part, they also hold it in the true historical spirit described.

The attempt by the sacerdotal party to capture this large element wholesale bade fair of success but recently. It has failed and will fail. For that school stands firmly loyal to the historical Reformation of the Church of England. Its wider perspective, its larger practical wisdom and sympathy with the work of the Spirit in the modern world, will prevent its members accepting mediæval sacerdotalism as essentially connected with their view of the Episcopate. It is freedom from this that makes them at one with the Evangelical and Broad Church schools in their desire "to enter into friendly conference with all or any Christian bodies seeking the organic unity of the Church." It is the sacerdotal system connected with the mediæval theory of the Episcopate as the necessary channel of divine grace, instead of the primitive and reformation view of it as the best mode of government, that forms the line of radical demarkation between parties in our Church. Between these two there is as yet no tenable middle ground. The former is not, and the latter is, Primitive, Reformed, Anglican, and American.

This question of our interpretation of the "historic Episcopate" is a most practical spiritual one. It is the question of the relation of the Protestant Episcopal Church to the other Christian Churches of America. The historic fact may be interpreted into an unhistorical and unchristian theory; or it may be so interpreted as to be the form for unifying in external organization the large spiritual unity already existing between the different churches of this country. It may be interpreted so as to lead us to stretch out our hands to the unholy Orthodox Greek Church, that scarcely awakes sufficiently from its torpid slumber to recognize our infantile presence; or to beckon to Rome—to the great, wily, comprehensive, absolute master of this theory—

as Mohammed beckoned to the mountain. Or it may be interpreted so broadly, reasonably, practically, and philosophically in the Spirit of Christ and of the historic method, that we shall not stretch out our hands in vain to our sister churches of America. No age and no form of ecclesiastical institution are perfect or lasting, and yet the Holy Spirit is the diversifying and unifying principle of them all. Holding fast in the spirit of the historico-philosophical and practical method, all that is true in the past in vital connection with all that is good in the present, we need no arrogant pretension of absorbing all into an Anglican Church with its fully developed polity and liturgical worship, in order to be the leader of broken American Christendom into the higher catholicity of the American Church of the future.

The vision of and the sure confidence in the One Holy Catholic Church as realized, or as being realized, through historic process under Divine guidance, has come to all devout disciples of the One Lord. But, under this guidance, the practical step to be taken by us to-day is toward an autonomous national Church. It is the ecclesiastical problem of the country. It is a longing of every Christian heart. To no heart is it dearer than to the universally known and beloved Bishop of Minnesota, who is very much more than "the Apostle to the Indians." No one prays and labors more for this than he does. A few of his many earnest words on the subject are of worth and weight to all. his centennial sermon, before the General Convention of 1889, he says: "The saddest of all is that the things which separate us are not necessary for salvation. The truths in which we agree are part of the Catholic faith. In the words of Dr. Doellinger: 'We can say each to the other as baptized, We are, on either side, brothers and sisters in Christ. In the great garden of the Lord let us shake hands over these confessional hedges, and let us break them down, so as to be able to embrace one another altogether. These hedges

are doctrinal divisions about which either we or you are in error. If you are in the wrong, we do not hold you morally culpable; for your education, surroundings, knowledge, and training made the adherence to these doctrines excusable and even right. Let us examine, compare, and investigate the matter together, and we shall discover the precious pearl of peace and unity; and then let us join hands together in cultivating and cleansing the garden of the Lord, which is overgrown with weeds.' There are blessed signs that the Holy Spirit is deepening the spiritual life of widely separated brothers. Historical churches are feeling the pulsation of a new life from the Incarnate God. All Christian folk see that the Holy Spirit has passed over these human barriers and set his seal to the labors of separated brethren in Christ. The ever-blessed Comforter is quickening in Christian hearts the divine spirit of charity. Christians are learning more and more the theology which centers in the person of Jesus Christ. It is this which world-wide is creating a holy enthusiasm to stay the flood of intemperance, impurity and sin at home, and gather lost heathen folk into the fold of Christ. In our age every branch of the Church can call over the roll of its confessors and martyrs, and so link its history to the purest ages of the Church. We would not rob them of one sheaf they have gathered into the garner of the Lord. We share in every victory and we rejoice in every triumph. There is not one of that great company who have washed their robes white in the blood of the Lamb who is not our kinsman in Christ. Brothers in Christ of every name, shall we not pray for the healing of the wounds of the body of Christ, that the world may believe in him?"

In his sermon at the opening of the Lambeth Conference, 1888, he says: "I reverently believe that the Anglo-Saxon Church has been preserved by God's providence (if her children will accept this mission) to heal the divisions of Christendom, and lead on in his work to be done in the

eventide of the world. . . . Surely we may and ought to be the first to hold up the olive-branch of peace over strife and say, 'Sirs, ye are brethren.'"

The elements of this problem are before us in the shape of the large organized bodies of Christians in America. The principles under which it must find gradual solution are: First and always, the spirit of Christ gladly recognizing each other as "very members incorporate in the mystical body of Christ, which is the blessed company of all the faithful." As Dr. Washburn said, "I know no other churchmanship than this, which loves Christ first, and believes that, if we seek first his kingdom and righteousness, all shall be added." And, secondly, only in this spirit, as essential to large, valid ecclesiastical organization, the historic Episcopate, the other three essentials being practically common to all communions. It is thus that the interpretation of the historic Episcopate is a most important and practical one.

Those who assert that there has always been such a visible corporate unity through the undivided Episcopate, and that upon connection with this depends the spiritual relations of the members of Christ's mystical body—that is, those who confound or identify the real, living, invisible Church with its visible organization—can not fail to recognize that much of the Master's work is being done outside of this close corporation. But they maintain, as they must on the ground of their mechanical theory of unity and its concomitant sacerdotalism, that this can only be recognized as irregular and defective. It frankly unchurches all non-Episcopal communions, and thus estranges instead of winning them to Christian unity as the necessary step to Church unity.*

^{*} The Rev. Charles Gore, Principal of the Pusey House, in a recent work on The Church and the Ministry, gives this view of the Episcopate in a volume which is a model of calm, scholarly, and honest treat-

On the other hand, those who hold the historic Episcopate as a governing function, to be the best visible mark of real continuity of the ideal Church, still in the process of making, do not conceive it to be absolutely necessary to the being of a church, nor, under such providential circumstances as have visibly accompanied the setting up of the important non-Episcopal Churches, as essential to the well-being of a church.*

ment of the evidence. One can speak of such a book with the deepest respect. But it is a white raven among its fellows. He states this point with great mildness. He says: "Beyond all question they" (the Presbyterians, etc.) "took to themselves these powers of ordination, and consequently had them not. It is not proved—nay, it is not even perhaps probable—that any presbyter had in any age the power to ordain. It follows, then, that a ministry not Episcopally received is invalid" (p. 345). This is to be taken in connection with his teaching of the sacraments as the channels of grace which can only be administered by such Episcopal priests. They do not all, however, deny the validity of lay baptism, as they euphemistically call it, as the early members did (cf. Tract, No. XXXV).

* Since writing this chapter, an article has appeared in the North American Review, by Canon Farrar, entitled Why I am an Episcopalian. I give the following extracts, as indicating a similar estimate of Episcopacy:

"Let me begin by saying that, though I am a convinced Episcopalian. I hold the question of Church organization to be altogether secondary and subordinate, and in no sense essential to morality or salvation. I consider Episcopacy to be in most cases the best, the most authorized, and, in its rudiments at least, the most ancient form of Church government: but I do not regard it as one of the necessary notes of a true Church, nor do I consider it to be at all indispensable for the esse, or even for the bene esse, of any Church. . . . Neither here" (in the Prayer Book) "nor in any document of the Church of England is Episcopacy insisted on as a thing indispensable. . . . The revival and exaggeration of Romish principles in Reformed churches may make these views appear lax to some; yet they are, almost totidem verbis et literis, the views of some of our most honored divines. It naturally follows that, though Episcopacy seems to me to have the Divine sanction, I do not, in any sense, regard Episcopacy as a thing of immediate Divine institution or universal obligation, any more than I regard monarchy. . . . There is but one flock

They hold that to deny a valid ministry and sacraments to those who have the same belief in Christ and his sacraments, and who are foremost in evangelizing the world, is to make us sectarian and uncatholic. They hold that to unchurch all Christian communions without this note, is to weaken both spiritual and ecclesiastical communion with fellow-Christians. They recognize that the great mass of American Christianity is outside their Church, and they recognize it as Christianity. To call these bodies sects is as great an intellectual blunder as to call them Dissenters.

Dr. Washburn (Epochs of Church History, p. 237) writes thus of these two schools: "The one holds the Protestant Reformation to be the true historic step in the progress of the Church, and would only preserve the continuity of the body with the real life of the past; the other plants itself on a fancied Catholic age before the Papacy, and rejects the Reformation as a failure. The one holds the supremacy of God's Word, and denies the infallibility of even general councils; the other rests on the decrees of Nice as concurrent authority with Scripture and ultimate authority. The one retains the Episcopate as of historic worth; the other rejects the validity of other orders."

The two schools start from the same historical facts. But they represent two fundamentally different methods of interpretation, based upon two different conceptions of God, man, and the world. We may say that the one is

 $^{(\}pi o l \mu \nu \eta)$. There are, and to the end of time there will always be, many folds $(\alpha \dot{\nu} \lambda \alpha \dot{l})$.

[&]quot;If we are to choose the form which, apart from exceptional circumstances, is ideally and absolutely the best, I believe that form to be Episcopacy. I am an Episcopalian because I believe that the Church acted under the guidance of the Spirit of God in early and finally adopting the rule of bishops, as a rule that would best promote the advancement of the kingdom of Christ, and the integrity of the faith, once for all delivered to the saints."

based upon the conception of the Divine immanence and the natural and eternal kinship of the Divine and the human manifested and certified to in the incarnation of our Lord. The other is based upon the conception of the Divine absence, and of only a supernatural and mechanical connection of God and man. Further characterization is not needed or in place here.

The following are the chief historical facts for interpretation:

- I. As to the apostolate. The apostles were sent by Christ; they preached, gained converts, appointing over them other teachers, while retaining the oversight of them all. They appointed assistants in preaching and in the care of the poor.
- 2. The Church grew in many different places, and among many different people. The need of organization became more evident as the apostles died. To continue their work in the larger sphere, the church in each city selected and appointed a president, styled δ ἐπίσκοπος, in distinction from the rest of the Episcopoi. These were already also designated by the more general and applicable term presbyters. Both Ignatius and Jerome represent the elders (presbyters) as the successors of the apostles, over whom the bishop presides, as Christ (Ignatius), or as a president elected from their own number (Jerome).
- 3. The chief question, then, is whether or not the Episcopate was formed out of the apostolate by localization, or out of the presbyterate by elevation. Facts may be quoted to show that it was in the first way in the church of Jerusalem, and in the other way in the church at Alexandria.
- 4. It was not till the sixteenth century that any attempt was made to prove from the Scriptures that Episcopacy was definitely instituted by Christ. Hooker argued stoutly that neither Puritan nor Romanist could find any fixed definite form of church polity revealed in the Scriptures (Ecclesiastical Polity, Book III, chap. ii, § 1, and chap. x, § 8). The

state had led the way into this *jure divino* theory of polity, but was rapidly obeying the monitions of God in history and leading the way out of it.

5. It is impossible for any party to revert to more *primitive* forms. Thus modern Episcopacy is very different from that of early Christianity, in respect not only to jurisdiction, but also in respect to official function and daily round of duties.

It is also a fact that by the middle of the second century Episcopal polity was the prevailing form of organization, though the diocesan system was of much later growth. On the other hand, all the evidence goes to show that this form of polity was based upon, grew up in consequence of, and was defended by an appeal to, the needs of the Church. And it is impossible to prove that it was a definitely fixed polity instituted by Christ himself or by his apostles, and so essential to the being of the Church. These latter points are the missing links that the ultra High Church party needs to complete the facts upon which to base its theory. That is, there is no proof (1) of the formal constitution of Episcopacy, by either Christ or his apostles, as the direct succession of the apostolate as distinct from the presbyterate. These points, as well as the following, are candidly admitted by Gore (The Church and the Ministry, p. 260). (2) Nor is there any evidence of definitely fixed duties of the Episcopate in its earlier supposed forms, all facts showing that both the office and the duty grew out of local needs.*

1. The ultra High Church interpretation of these facts and their missing links has a strong attraction for many of

^{*} It is, doubtless, in view of these necessary admissions that Gore says, in an earlier part of his volume (p. 72), that "it is a matter of very great importance—as will appear further on—to exalt the *principle* of the apostolical succession above the question of the *exact form* of the ministry, in which the principle has expressed itself, even though it be of apostolical ordering." That is, it seems, making an a priori theory of

the most earnest, wise, and zealous men in our Church. It meets the needs of those who want a clear, simple, definite. and working theory. It is a theory as logical as mathematics is logical, and not as illogical as all life and all history are. For history follows the non-logical logic of life rather than the formal or Aristotelian logic of the understanding. Thus it presents other facts for which that theory has no place, and can only recognize as irregular and defective and inscrutable. It holds external schism as the most heinous of sins, and yet it sees a divided Christendom. It can account for this by the wiles of the devil or of sinful man. But along with this it is forced to recognize the "fruits of the Spirit," the manifest presence and work of the Divine Master, and to grant that sectarians are often saints. Yet it is logically compelled to unchurch all non-Episcopal communities. It has generally the courage of its convictions, though it sometimes tries to conceal its denial of the validity of their ministry and sacraments by allowing that of their baptism. In doing this it does not help meet the concrete situation. It does not make for either spiritual or visible Christian unity. In fact, however, its arrogant position today has ceased to inflame or humiliate other Christians. because of its patent untruthfulness. Its logical and its asserted "extra ecclesia nulla salus" is a perfectly harmless, rusty old weapon. Its ubi Episcopos ibi Ecclesia is not catholic enough as a definition of the local or spiritual boundaries of the kingdom of Christ.

2. The other school accepts the same facts, and is ready to accept the *missing links* when discovered. But, beginning with a different conception of God and man and their relations, and with a different conception of the per-

the ministry to be the interpreter of its historical development. Cf. also Gore (p. 343), where his reasoning necessarily justifies the Papacy as of Divine institution, as that was the logical and historical culmination of the one undivided Episcopate theory.

son, work, method, and spirit of Christ, they give them a very different interpretation, as already shown. They deem it incongruous with the method and spirit of the Divine Master when on earth, that he should have given such a definite binding organization to his Church as the other theory claims, or that he should have fixed upon a mechanical method of imparting his spirit and life to future generations so utterly unlike the method and spirit he used in his own day and generation. They find the apostolate and the mission of the seventy perfectly congenial with his own manifested spirit and method, as also was the appointment of deacons, presbyters, and bishops by the growing community. Church organization is all the movement and growth of highly concentrated life, creating its own body out of, or in analogy with, other institutions.

They study Church history as in organic relation with secular history, and thus trace the inner and the outer life of the Church through the apostolic age, the vast missionary age, the growth of the Papacy, the Renaissance, and the Reformation, recognizing throughout the work of the same Spirit dividing severally to each as he will, and as each is able and willing to receive. They adopt the eirenical maxim, ubi Spiritus ibi Ecclesia. In the interest of truth, as interpreted by the method and spirit of Christ, as well as by the spirit of the modern historical method, they decline to unchurch the other churches of America. In the interest of truth, and of a more comprehensive organization of the various branches of the Church, and consequently more extended usefulness, they also hold out "the historic Episcopate locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs," as making for peace, unity, and the best interests of Christ's kingdom.

Recognizing the working value of the other theory as a needed schoolmaster, where the middle ages still prevail, they also recognize the exceeding practical value of the recovery and restatement of the Gospel after the Law. They believe that the sole object for which the Church exists is as a means to impart the Divine life to men, and that its visible form should be a catholic embodiment of all Christian life. And their interpretation of "the facts" affords a large, generous, comforting, hopeful, and, we believe, Christly view of the Christian Church. They love their own Church, but they frankly say, We are not, and in exclusive form we can not be, the Church of America. Nor, it is only just to add, do any of the riper minds in any party seek to absorb the other communions.

The Puritans and Presbyterians and Lutherans and Baptists and Methodists and Moravians have had far too large a share in the upbuilding of Christ's kingdom here for us to ignore. The Presbyterians in Pennsylvania, for instance, like the Puritans of New England, planted the religious academies and colleges that shaped the mental and moral character of the largest part of that State. It can not be amiss, for one who knows from experience the deep religious and moral life of that communion, to render grateful homage for its part in the upbuilding of Christ's kingdom in this land. The progress of Christianity in our country has been the progress of society as organized by vital Christianity. In this progress the influence of these great bodies has gone along with the whole spirit of the nation, permeating and deepening its Protestant religious life. The future Church of America must be the synthesized outcome of all these religious factors. It must grow, develope through formative influences and epochs just as the great Roman Church of feudal and monarchical Europe did. It must be bound up with the whole social, religious, and national life of the people. No one present form of the Church in America can absorb into itself all the religious life of the country. There is nothing strange, unhistorical, or undivine in all this formative process. But nothing can be more clear than that, not till we are in our

decadence, can a hierarchy of any type dominate this land. Our knowledge of the past, in the historic spirit, is our only prophecy of the future. The unity of a nation, and the divine guidance in human history, may be our polar star as we sail across the broad ocean of history. It may lead us to act well our part in this formative process to an organic unity, which shall manifest and contain the transmuted diversities of administrations and gifts which that one and self-same Spirit worketh, dividing to each one severally as he will. It is the one body of many members, for by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body. For the body is not one member, but many. But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every one to profit withal (r Cor., xii).

Our gift is our constitutional order, modeled after that of the republic; our "historic Episcopate," as the bond of unity and continuity with the past; our admirable and enrichable liturgy of common worship, ethical tone, and genuine devotion; our œcumenical symbols, for transmitting and not for strangling the witness of the Spirit; our practical system of organized life; our professed "happy mean between too much stiffness in refusing and too much easiness in admitting variation in things once advisedly established": our "general aim, to do that which may most tend to the preservation of peace and unity in the Church; the procuring of reverence and exciting of piety and devotion in the worship of God"; and to make nothing binding "which a godly man may not with a good conscience use. or which is not fairly defensible, if allowed such just and favorable construction as in common equity ought to be allowed to all human writings" (Preface to the Book of Common Prayer). This gift is given to us "to profit withal." Not to renounce but to exercise our gift is the call of the Spirit to us to-day. Not to give up any positive landmarks of faith or order for any vague, fanciful, unreal, inorganic unity, but to manifest the intrinsic value of them to the

spiritual life of the whole, and that not as our own private property, but as the common heritage of all Christians; not to love others less because we love ourselves more; but while coveting the best gifts, to heed the voice of the Spirit whispering unto us the "more excellent way" of charity, which never faileth, but shall abide when all other gifts vanish away. "Every good and every perfect gift is from above." By their fruits we may know that the other Christian churches grow out of the organic life of the one body; that the branches which bear such fruit can only do so by abiding in the Vine. "Charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up." We need not wish for external union until we have the organic, ethical, spiritual unity of charity. No mere side-by-side addition, no mere swallowing of part by part, no artificial or hierarchical absolutism, no primitive, mediæval, or reformation type of the ever-growing historic Episcopate, can afford that plan of unity which the Spirit himself is forming in and through them all. There can be no ethical external union until there is spiritual unity. There is, I rejoice to believe, more of this unity now than our idols of the cloister allow us to perceive. Without this ethical unity of the Spirit, any external corporate union would be but the dark walls of a prison-house, or the paper polity of priests. With it there will come that integration of the expressed "variations of Protestantism," and of the suppressed variations of Romanism, that may justly be called the Catholic Church of America.

In the way of practical suggestions* I have not much to add to the one made throughout this chapter. Cer-

^{*} Since writing this chapter I have read with great pleasure Rev. Dr. W. W. Newton's admirable study of the spirit, parties, and drift of our Church, entitled The Vine out of Egypt. Candor and charity are its marked characteristics. It is written in the interest of Christian unity, and gives many valuable suggestions as to practical steps toward this result, the author having been actively identified with the work of The American Congress of Churches.

tainly I have no paper polity, no doctrinaire scheme, no definite vision of this still distant city of God on earth. No one formula is sufficient to define it. But certainly the non-sacerdotal interpretation of the historic Episcopate is a practical step toward it. And this, too, is the very letter and spirit of the offer made by our House of Bishops. If the great true voice of our Church will speak out and sustain them, we may hope for many fruitful "brotherly conferences." If the continuous and vehement protestations of the sacerdotal party be allowed to represent the true inwardness of their offer, then we can not.

I have also mentioned with approval the plan* of giving the other communions the Episcopate without requiring reordination of their present clergy, under the condition of the future use of this historical method of ordination. The historical precedents for such action have been well stated in the small volume by the Rev. Henry Forrester.

It may seem "good to the Holy Ghost and to us" to exercise again this wise discretion to meet a present emergency, looking toward a nearer organic unity. We can not, however, suppose that these large bodies would at once dissolve under the Episcopal alembic so as to create an *immediate* fusion of all into one; that would have to come through the further

^{*} The re-establishment of Episcopacy in Ireland, under the Duke of Ormond and his coadjutor, Archbishop Bramhall, is an example of the efficiency of the method of conditional or hypothetical ordination of the Presbyterian clergy (cf. Carwithen's History of the Church of England, vol. ii, p. 342). A similar scheme was proposed at the Revolution by Tillotson, Stillingfleet, and others, and again by Rev. Dr. White (afterward bishop) after our own Revolution. The scheme was to form a Church here, ordain clergy, and do all the work of a church, hoping to obtain the Episcopacy later. If that should be obtained, "any supposed imperfections of the intermediate ordinations might, if it were judged proper, be supplied, without acknowledging their nullity, by a conditional form of ordination resembling that of conditional baptism in the Liturgy" (Wilberforce, History of the American Church, chap, vi, and McElhinney's Doctrine of the Church, p. 346).

work of the Spirit in historic process. It would be matter for further most serious consideration and wise prudence, as the handmaid of love. Closer affiliation and co-operation would have to ripen gradually into more vital relations. Learned and wise laymen should have a large part to do in shaping the form of the coming national Church. Laymen skilled in the history and science of politics, as well as in the practical politics of our republic, would have to be the interpreters of its essential needs in the way of organization.

The *clergy* were the Church in pre-Reformation times. The laity were not recognized as a part of the universal priesthood of Christians, and had no voice in the shaping of her organization. But our laity are wiser now, and are fortunately claiming their just voice in this work of the Church. This, indeed, is almost our *spes ecclesiae* to-day.

We possess this fourth essential of a larger organic unity. We do so only as a trustee. Our opportunity is our duty. It is also our duty to help make our opportunity, and to make all possible sacrifices for it. We have made a noble beginning in the declaration of our House of Bishops. Will the love of Christ constrain us to make that more than an empty, formal letter? The reception of other clergy, say of the Presbyterians, into our ministry without reordination, as we receive Roman Catholic clergymen, might be made one step of this process. The plan proposed by the Rev. Dr. Shields, in his notable and noble article (The Century Magazine, December, 1887) seems feasible and lawful and expedient in regard to the mutual recognition of their present orders. "Let both parties," he says, "openly and generously recognize each other in concurrent ordinations, as occasion requires. By such means all question of valid ministrations would at length die out, as in a marriage of rival houses. . . . He would be a bold prophet who would strike out either Presbytery or Episcopacy from the future Christian civilization of this continent. . . . I venture to hope that in any union to be devised, the historic Episcopate can be retained. . . . The four terms proposed (by the bishops) are so large and fair that they will almost carry consent in their statement." Certainly we must at least recognize the *spiritual efficiency* of their ministry and sacraments, though we hold to the *organic validity* of our own, with reference to the total organization of ecclesiastical unity. But, if we wish to restrict the application of this term *valid* to *our* method of ordination, we certainly thus take out the stinging injustice it has when restricted for sacerdotal reasons. We can hold it in the same firm and evangelical spirit that the Moravians do.

If "nations redeem each other," mutually supplying mutual deficiencies, we must believe that Churches also may thus redeem each other. That this may be recognized, is a chief ground of our hope of unity. To this end the bishops declare "that in all things of human ordering or choice, relating to the modes of worship and discipline, or to traditional customs, this Church is ready in the spirit of love and humility to forego all preferences of her own." If this means anything, it means that all of us, all schools in the Church, have personal sacrifices to make of feelings and tastes that are so strong as to seem to be almost principles too sacred to be given up. Many things relating to modes of worship, and many traditional customs, might be mentioned, the giving up of which in love and humility would help break down the hedges and heal the breaches of our Christianity.

The best means for discovering just what these special obstacles are, is for each clergyman to adopt the message of the bishops, and like them manifest his "desire and readiness to enter into brotherly conference with all"—say with all the clergy of the other communions in his own community,* with a view to the earnest study of the unessential

^{*} Canon Freemantle, writing to the Christian Commonwealth, a dissenting paper, says that a proposal in that journal, that Christians of all

elements of division. This willingness to understand one another's difficulties and predilections, to make reasonable concessions, and finally to appreciate and emphasize points of agreement rather than points of difference with our separated brethren, seems the best practical step just now to help on God's work of drawing the members of his blessed Son into vital unity. It is needless to say that this will often require the most Christly self-denial, the bravely stepping out of the grooves of congenial methods to make a voyage of discovery. But we shall be largely repaid by finding ourselves somewhat at home everywhere, because we shall find so much of the essential undivided Christ everywhere. The spirit of admiration and love will come to take the place of ungenerous criticism and misunderstanding. This spiritual schism being largely healed, the corresponding change will come over the external divisions. In the midst of our nation's bitterest, bloodiest sectional strife, President Lincoln uttered words that we of the Church may well adapt and adopt in this work: "With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in

kinds should meet together in order to discuss the mode of action to be adopted with a view to practical good and to renewing society through the Spirit of Christ, was one which had his warmest sympathy:

"The difficulties in the way lie almost wholly with the Episcopalian clergy. There are among them many who long for Christian unity. But some are afraid that their ministry might suffer if they met on equal terms with other ministers; some are haunted by what Church authorities and Church newspapers might say; some imagine that, by avoiding the questions on which Christian bodies have separated from each other, all discussion would become insipid. 'The only result,' said one of the most distinguished to me, 'would be that we should separate with the mutual assurance that we are all very good fellows.' Such fears are almost wholly chimerical. A single bishop who would boldly put himself at the head of such a congress as you propose, though he might run some risks in this enterprise of faith, would, I am convinced, carry all before him. Such risks ought to be undertaken if, as I am persuaded, the words of the Episcopal Encyclical at Lambeth in 1888 were sincere and meant to be effective."

the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation's (Church's) wound; . . . to do all which may achieve a just and a lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations."

May this Christly spirit of love constrain us to sympathetic co-operation with our Bishops toward the realization of our common Saviour's prayer to his Father, "that they may all be one, . . . even as we are one."

THE END.

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